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  • For the sake of a reset with Russia, Trump has abandoned efforts to mediate peace in Ukraine

    For the sake of a reset with Russia, Trump has abandoned efforts to mediate peace in Ukraine
    2025/05/20
    After a phone call with Russian leader Vladimir Putin on May 19, US president Donald Trump took to social media to declare that Russia and Ukraine will “immediately start negotiations” towards a ceasefire and an end to the war. He did, however, add that the conditions for peace “will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be”.With the Vatican, according to Trump, "very interested in hosting the negotiations" and European leaders duly informed, it seems clear that the United States, and Trump personally, have effectively abandoned their stalled mediation efforts to end the war against Ukraine.It was always a possibility that Trump could walk away from the war, despite previous claims he could end it in 24 hours. This only became more likely on May 16, when the first face-to-face negotiations between Ukraine and Russia for more than three years predictably ended without a ceasefire agreement.When Trump announced shortly afterwards on his social media platform that he would be speaking to his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts by phone a few days later, he effectively mounted the beginning of a rearguard action. This was further underlined when US vice president JD Vance shortly before the Trump-Putin call explicitly told reporters that the US could end its shuttle diplomacy.The meagre outcomes of the talks between Russia and Ukraine — as well as between Trump and Putin — are not surprising. Russia is clearly not ready for any concessions yet and keeps insisting that Ukraine accept its maximalist demands of territorial concessions and future neutrality.Putin simultaneously continues to slow-walk any negotiations. After his call with Trump, he reportedly said that "Russia will offer and is ready to work with Ukraine on a memorandum on a possible future peace agreement", including "a possible ceasefire for a certain period of time, should relevant agreements be reached."The lack of urgency on Russia's part to end the fighting, and, in fact, the Kremlin's ability and willingness to continue the war, was underlined by the largest drone attack against Ukraine so far in the war on the day before the Trump-Putin call. Nor has there been any let-up in the fighting since. And the fact that Putin spoke to Trump while visiting a music school in the southern Russian city of Sochi further suggests that a ceasefire in Ukraine is not that high on the Russian leader's priority list.A large part of the Kremlin's calculation seems to be the desire to strike a grand bargain with the White House on a broader reset of relations — and to signal clearly that this is more important than the war in Ukraine and might even happen without the fighting there ending.This also still appears to drive thinking in Washington, with Trump foreshadowing an improvement in bilateral relations by describing "tone and spirit of the conversation" with Putin as "excellent". Following the two-hour conversation with his Russian counterpart, Trump also seemed excited about the prospects of "largescale trade" with Russia.Trump is on record as saying that there would be no progress towards peace in Ukraine until he and Putin would get together. Such direct interaction between the American and Russian presidents may well be critical to any progress in relations between the two countries. However, it is worth bearing in mind that very little movement towards a ceasefire in Ukraine, let alone a peace agreement, occurred after the previous phone call between the two presidents on February 12.Part of this lack of progress has been Trump's reluctance to date to put any real pressure on Putin. And despite agreement in Brussels and preparations in Washington for an escalation in sanctions against Russia, it is unlikely that Trump will change his approach. If anything, the outcome of this latest Trump-Putin call is an indication that Trump is prioritising the improvement of bilateral relations with Russia over peace in Ukraine.In this context, the sequence in which the calls occurred is also telling. Trump and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, had a short call before the former spoke with Putin. Zelensky said he told Trump not to make decisions about Ukraine “without us”.But rather than presenting Putin with a clear ultimatum to accept the existing ceasefire proposal, Trump apparently discussed future bilateral relations with Putin at great length during their call — before informing Zelensky and key European allies that the war in Ukraine is now solely their problem to solve.This has certainly raised justifiable fears in Kyiv and other European capitals again that, for the sake of a reset with Russia, the US might yet completely abandon its allies across the Atlantic.However, if a reset with Russia at any cost really is Trump's strategy, it is bound to fail. As much as Putin seems willing to continue with his aggression against Ukraine, Zelensky is as unwilling to surrender. Where Putin can rely on China's continuing...
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    7 分
  • Territorial concessions, and who makes them, are central to any Ukraine peace deal — and to Russia’s long-term agenda

    Territorial concessions, and who makes them, are central to any Ukraine peace deal — and to Russia’s long-term agenda
    2025/05/15
    When the Ukrainian and Russian delegations meet in Istanbul later today (May 15), territory — and who controls it — will be high on their agenda.The meeting, when it happens, will have come about after the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, offered to start direct talks between Moscow and Kyiv at a press conference on May 11. Donald Trump, the American president and want-to-be peacemaker, pushed Volodymyr Zelensky, his Ukrainian counterpart, to accept this offer in a social media post, saying that "Ukraine should agree to this, IMMEDIATELY."And the Ukrainian president, still buoyed by a meeting with the British, French, German, and Polish leaders that called for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire, agreed shortly afterwards.In the build-up to the possible resumption of direct negotiations, there was some hope that all three presidents — Putin, Zelensky, and Trump — would meet, but this has now apparently been ruled out, indicating that no breakthrough towards an actual peace deal is expected. This is hardly surprising, given that Moscow’s and Kyiv’s negotiating positions still lie far apart. Russia has made it clear that it wants to focus on the so-called Istanbul communique of March 2022 and a subsequent draft agreement negotiated but never adopted by the two sides in April 2022.The 2022 negotiations were mostly about Ukrainian neutrality and security guarantees, and they deliberately excluded the status of Crimea by relegating its resolution to separate negotiations with a 10-15 year timeframe.When Russia additionally mentions what it calls “the current situation on the ground”, this is thinly-disguised code for territorial questions that have become more contentious over the past three years as a result of Russian gains on the battlefield and the illegal annexation of four Ukrainian regions in September 2022 (in addition to Crimea, which Russia annexed also illegally in 2014).Russia's position, as articulated most recently by the country's foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, is that "the international recognition of Crimea, Sevastopol, the DPR, the LPR, the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions as part of Russia is ... imperative."This is clearly a non-starter for Ukraine, as repeatedly stated by Zelensky, even though there might be some flexibility on accepting that some parts of sovereign Ukrainian territory are under temporary Russian control, as suggested by Trump's Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg, and Kyiv's mayor, Vitali Klitschko.The territories that Russia currently occupies — and claims — in Ukraine have varying strategic, economic, and symbolic value for Moscow and Kyiv. The areas with the greatest strategic value include Crimea and the territories on the shores of the Sea of Azov, which provide Russia with a land corridor to Crimea.The international recognition of Crimea as part of Russia, as apparently suggested under the terms of an agreement hashed out by Putin and Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff, could expand Russia's de jure control of the Black Sea, which could then be used by the Kremlin as a launchpad for renewed attacks on Ukraine. Such extended maritime control would also threaten NATO's eastern flank in Romania and Bulgaria. Any permanent recognition of Russia's de-facto control of these territories is, therefore, unacceptable for Ukraine and its European partners.Compared with Crimea and the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions along the Sea of Azov, the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk are of lower strategic value. However, there is a certain economic value in all four regions on Ukraine's mainland.This includes, in the long term, the mineral resources on which the US and Ukraine concluded a separate deal on April 30. While there is considerable doubt over how good a deal this is, the resource potential of the Russian-occupied territories is substantial, including Europe's largest nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia. In addition, the four occupied regions boast a substantial labour force among their estimated population of between 4.5 million and 5.5 million people who will be critical to Ukraine's post-war reconstruction.Beyond the strategic and economic value of the illegally occupied territories, the symbolism that both sides attach to their control is the most significant obstacle to any deal, given how irreconcilable Moscow's and Kyiv's positions are. For both sides, control of these territories, or loss thereof, is what defines victory or defeat in the war.Putin may be able to claim that even partial territorial gains in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 short of full control of all four regions are a victory for Russia. But even for him any compromise that would see Russia give up territory that it has conquered — often at exceptionally high cost — would be a risky gamble for the stability of his regime.For Ukraine, anything less than the complete restoration of the country's territorial integrity in its 1991 borders would imply ...
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    8 分
  • Russia's partnership with China, Iran, and North Korea is deepening

    Russia's partnership with China, Iran, and North Korea is deepening
    2025/05/14
    Although small in number and only tenth in a line-up of 13 foreign military contingents during the parade marking the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany in the second world war, the participation of Chinese troops in Russia’s Victory Day parade in Red Square, Moscow, on May 9 was a clear indication that President Xi Jinping is fully committed to his “no-limits” partnership with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.Xi Jinping’s own attendance at the parade, which came as part of a state visit to Moscow, underlines that China is not only supporting Russia, but that Beijing wants this fact to be understood clearly in Kyiv, Washington and European capitals.Travelling to Moscow and having his troops goose-step down Red Square was not a last-minute decision by Xi Jinping. Nor was the multitude of agreements signed by him and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, anything but part of a well-established pattern of deepening relations between Russia and China.The strengthening of the partnership between Moscow and Beijing has accelerated since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But the breadth and depth of China’s commitment to Russia at this particular moment is undoubtedly related to the broader upheaval in the international order that has been worsened since Donald Trump’s return to the White House.The Trump administration, possibly spooked by market wobbles, has taken steps to restore stability. China and the US have agreed a deal to slash the import tariffs they have imposed on each other. But uncertainty remains — above all about how the complex relationships in the triangle of Washington, Beijing, and Moscow will work out and where this will leave the rest of the world.On May 8, in the wake of the presidential meetings in Moscow, Russia and China also released a joint statement. It stressed the intention of the two leaders to “enhance the coordination of their approaches and to deepen the practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability, as well as to jointly address common challenges and threats in this sphere.”They reiterated this determination in their press statements afterwards. Putin emphasised that he and Xi Jinping “personally control all aspects of [the] Russia-China partnership and do all we can to expand the cooperation on bilateral issues and the international agenda alike”.Beijing’s read-out from the talks was similarly clear on the alignment between the countries. The Chinese president reportedly said that “in the face of unilateralist counter-currents, bullying and acts of power politics, China is working with Russia to shoulder the special responsibilities of major countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council.”This unequivocal display of how close Moscow and Beijing – and Putin and Xi Jinping personally – are is important for both nations. For Russia, it remains important to demonstrate that western attempts at international isolation have not succeeded.For China, the very public consolidation of ties with Russia is above all a signal to the US. China is keen to stress that Trump’s efforts to engineer a split between Moscow and Beijing, which the American president described as necessary to “un-unite” the two nations during an interview with US talk show host Tucker Carlson in November 2024, have largely failed.However, beyond the glossy surface of the celebrations in Moscow, all is not as well for Russia as Putin is trying to make out. For all the public displays of friendship between their leaders, the relationship between the two countries remains highly asymmetrical.Russia would not be able to continue to wage its war against Ukraine without Chinese support. Trade between Russia and China is critical to propping up the Russian war economy, reaching a record high of nearly US$250 billion (£190 billion) in 2024. Their trade has increased by more than 60% since 2021, yet it is only marginally up since 2023.Perhaps more importantly, however, it is also China's diplomatic clout that is helpful to Russia. If Beijing had taken an unequivocal stance opposing Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine, fewer leaders in the developing world would have sided with Putin.In this case, Russia would probably have lost organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Brics group of emerging economies as platforms to further Putin’s broader agenda of restoring Moscow’s erstwhile status as a great power.In that agenda, Putin has been moderately successful. But with South Africa and India’s leaders absent from Russia’s Victory Day commemorations, the list of attendees was shorter than at the Brics summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.Notably absent from the celebrations in Moscow was high-level representation from North Korea and Iran — two other key allies of Russia with whom Moscow signed strategic partnership agreements in June 2024 and ...
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    7 分
  • Europe begins to stand on its own feet

    Europe begins to stand on its own feet
    2025/05/09
    The term that perhaps best describes the international impact of the first 100 days of Donald Trump’s second term in the White House is “disruption”. His tariff policy, his abolition of USAID, his questioning of the transatlantic alliance, and his attempted rapprochement with Russia have neither destroyed the liberal international order nor established anything new in its place. But the prospects of liberal internationalism under Trump are vanishingly small. And Trumpism, in the guise of an America-first foreign policy, is likely to outlast Trump’s second term.That the US is no longer the standard bearer of the liberal international order has been clear for some time. Trump and his Russian and Chinese counterparts, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, appear to see themselves as dominant players in a new multi-polar world order. But it is not clear that a grand bargain between them is possible — or that it would endure.Europe is particularly vulnerable to these changes in the international order. Having been able to rely for the past eight decades on an iron-clad American security guarantee, European countries chronically under-invested in their defence capabilities, especially since the end of the cold war. Defence spending as a proportion of GDP may have increased again over the past decade, but expenditure remains lacklustre – and investment into an independent European defence industrial base faces many hurdles.These deficiencies predated Trump’s return to the White House. Addressing them will only be possible in a time frame beyond his second term. With no dependable partners left among the world’s great powers, Europe’s predicament – unenviable as it may be for the moment – nonetheless offers an opportunity for the continent to begin to stand on its own feet.Early signs of a more independent Europe are promising. In March, the European commission released a white paper on defence which anticipates defence investment of €800 billion over the next four years. The bulk of this will rely on the activation of the so-called “national escape clause”. This allows EU member states to avoid penalties if they exceed the normal deficit ceiling of 3% of their GDP. Once activated for the purpose of defence spending, they can now take on additional debt of up to 1.5% of their GDP. By the end of April, 12 EU member states had already requested that the national escape clause be activated, with several more expected to follow.Defence is clearly the most urgent problem for Europe — in light of Trump’s scepticism about the value of the transatlantic alliance and the ongoing war in Ukraine. But it isn’t the only aspect to consider when it comes to achieving greater strategic autonomy, something that the European Union has grappled with for more than a decade. In other areas, such as trade and energy, the starting point is a very different one.Regarding energy independence, the EU has achieved a remarkable and quick pivot away from Russia. It has just released a final plan to stop all remaining gas imports from Russia by the end of 2027.On trade, Donald Trump’s America-first tariff policy has done significant damage to the global system. This has, in turn, created opportunities for the EU, as one of the world’s largest trading blocs, including greater cooperation with China, already one of its largest trading partners.China and the EU clearly share an interest in preserving a global trade regime from which both have benefited. But their economic interests cannot be separated easily from their geopolitical interests. So far, China has sent very mixed signals to Europe. Beijing has, for example, proposed to lift sanctions against some members of the European parliament who have been critical of China in a show of goodwill. But China’s support for Russia continues as well, most recently with President Xi’s commitment to visit Moscow for the victory day parade on May 9.Standing with Moscow may benefit Beijing in its rivalry with the US by solidifying the no-limits partnership that Xi and Putin announced on the eve of Russia’s full-sale invasion in February 2022. But it does little to win the EU over as a partner in defence of the open international order that Trump is trying his best to shutter. On the contrary, in reaffirming China’s commitment to its partnership with Russia, Xi may well have lost whatever chances there were for a European realignment with China.The complexities of the EU-China and EU-US relationships — a curious mix of rapidly shifting interests — reflects the EU’s position as the natural centre of gravity of what is left of the west. This is evident in the rapid evolution of the “coalition of the willing” in support of Ukraine, which brings together 30 countries from across the EU and Nato under French and British leadership.Beyond Europe, Trump’s tariff policy has also given plans for a strategic partnership between the EU and the Comprehensive and ...
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    8 分
  • Zelenskyy has pulled off a tactical win for Ukraine

    Zelenskyy has pulled off a tactical win for Ukraine
    2025/05/07
    After months of negotiations, the United States and Ukraine have finally signed their long-awaited so-called minerals deal on April 30. The agreement establishes a United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund “for the long-term reconstruction and modernization of Ukraine, in response to the large-scale destruction caused by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and in pursuit of a peaceful, sovereign, and resilient Ukraine.” This is an unusually unequivocal stance regarding Russian responsibility given US President Donald Trump’s allegation at a press conference on February 18 that Ukraine had started the war.A statement released by the US Treasury after the conclusion of the deal went a step further, noting that the “agreement signals clearly to Russia that the Trump Administration is committed to a peace process centred on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.”As part of the negotiations, Kyiv managed to exclude from the agreement any recognition of past US assistance as part of Washington’s contribution to the fund. Mr Trump initially saw the minerals deal as a way to make Ukraine ‘reimburse’ the US for past military assistance. Questionable a premise as this was to begin with, it was made worse by Washington’s completely fictional $500 billion price tag attached to the demand—around four times what the US had actually provided since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Instead, only future military assistance will count as a US contribution toward the fund.The terms of the deal also acknowledge Ukraine’s sovereignty over its natural resources. Hence, the agreement does not give Ukraine’s minerals to the US but includes provisions for the US to purchase mineral resources and to benefit from investment in their extraction. The fact that Washington and Kyiv managed to agree on final terms —despite last-minute uncertainties—is in itself remarkable. The joint exploration of Ukraine’s resources after the end of the war was one of five points in the victory plan presented by the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on October 16, 2024. While Mr Trump had already signalled an interest in such a deal when he and Mr Zelenskyy met in New York at the end of September, the first concrete proposal presented by Washington to Kyiv in early February was rejected by Ukraine. And after the very public falling-out between Mr Zelenskyy and Mr Trump at the White House on February 28, it looked like the Ukrainian president had gambled away his country’s future.What changed most in the two months since seems to be Mr Trump’s calculus about how he can live up to his campaign promise—and most likely sincerely held belief—that he will and must end the war against Ukraine. No matter how significant American concessions appeared to be, Mr Trump’s counterpart in Moscow, Vladimir Putin, refused to agree even to a ceasefire. And Mr Putin’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, reiterated Russia’s insistence on its maximalist demands for a peace agreement, including the full international recognition of all illegally annexed Ukrainian territories, as recently as April 28. After an apparently very productive 15-minute meeting with Mr Zelenskyy in the Vatican before the funeral of Pope Francis, Mr Trump now seems to acknowledge that this is unacceptable to Ukraine and its European partners and that he needs to increase pressure on Mr Putin to get a deal done.All of this indicates that Ukraine is now in a much stronger position than it has ever been since Mr Trump returned to the White House for a second term in January, 2025. But this will not necessarily translate imminently into a ceasefire or pave the way towards meaningful negotiations of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine.Mr Putin appears to remain committed to victory in Ukraine. Despite heavy casualties, Russian forces continue to make gains on the battlefield inside Ukraine and have all but eliminated Kyiv’s hold on territory in the Kursk and Belgorod regions inside Russia. This is unlikely to change unless Mr Trump follows through on his threats of heavier sanctions against Russia and increases military support for Ukraine. There were some signs of the latter, at least, with the White House approving sales of military equipment to Ukraine worth $50 million shortly after the minerals deal was concluded.Ukraine’s enthusiasm for the minerals deal is therefore understandable, but may still turn out to be misplaced. One key demand by Kyiv—that formal US security guarantees be baked into the deal—has clearly not materialised. There is a certain logic to US treasury secretary Scott Bessent’s claim—first put forward in February 2025—that “an economic partnership would lay the foundations for a durable peace by sending a clear signal to … the government of Russia about the importance of Ukraine’s future sovereignty and success to the US.” However, it...
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    7 分
  • As Europe releases proposals for a ceasefire in Ukraine, Trump is falling into the trap of Munich 1938

    As Europe releases proposals for a ceasefire in Ukraine, Trump is falling into the trap of Munich 1938
    2025/04/26
    After a second consecutive night of deadly Russian air attacks – against the capital Kyiv on April 23 and the eastern Ukrainian city of Pavlohrad on April 24 – a ceasefire in Ukraine seems as unrealistic as ever.With Russian commitment to a deal clearly lacking, the situation is not helped by US president Donald Trump. He can’t quite seem to decide who he will ultimately blame if his efforts to agree a ceasefire fall apart.Before the strikes on Kyiv, Trump blamed Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky for holding up a deal by refusing to recognise Crimea as Russian. The following day, he chided Vladimir Putin for the attacks, calling them “not necessary, and very bad timing” and imploring Putin to stop.The main hurdle on the path to a ceasefire is what a final peace agreement might look like and what concessions Kyiv – and its European allies – will accept. Ukraine’s and Europe’s position on this is unequivocal: no recognition of the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea or of permanent Russian control of currently occupied territories in Donbas. This position is also backed by opinion polls in Ukraine, which indicate only limited support for some temporary concessions to Russia. Along similar lines, the mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, also suggested that temporarily giving up territory “can be a solution”.The deal that Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff apparently negotiated over three rounds of talks in Russia was roundly rejected by Ukraine and Britain, France, and Germany, who lead the “coalition of the willing” of countries pledging support for Ukraine.This prompted Witkoff and US secretary of state Marco Rubio to pull out of follow-up talks in London on April 24. The talks went ahead regardless, involving mostly lower-ranking officials. They ended with a fairly vacuous statement about a commitment to continuing “close coordination and … further talks soon”.And even this now appears as quite a stretch. Coinciding with Witkoff’s fourth trip to see Putin on April 25, European and Ukrainian counterproposals were released that reject most of the terms offered by Trump or at least defer their negotiation until after a ceasefire is in place.The impasse is unsurprising. Washington’s proposal included a US commitment to recognise Crimea as Russian, a promise that Ukraine would not join Nato and an acceptance of Moscow’s control of the territories in eastern Ukraine that it currently illegally occupies. It also suggested lifting all sanctions against Russia.Ukraine would give up large parts of territory and receive no security guarantees, while Russia is rewarded with reintegration into the global economy.It is the territorial concessions asked of Kyiv which are especially problematic. Quite apart from the fact that they are in fundamental breach of basic principles of international law – the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states – they are unlikely to provide solid foundations for a durable peace.Much like the idea of Trump’s Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg, to divide Ukraine like Berlin after the second world war, it betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of what, and who, drives this war.Kellogg later clarified that he was not suggesting a partition of Ukraine, but his proposal would have exactly the same effect as Trump’s most recent offer.Both proposals accept the permanent loss to Ukraine of territory that Russia currently controls. Where they differ is that Kellogg wants to introduce a European-led reassurance force west of the river Dnipro, while leaving the defence of remaining Ukrainian-controlled territory to Kyiv’s armed forces.If accepted by Russia – unlikely as this is, given Russia’s repeated and unequivocal rejection of European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine – it would provide at best a minimal security guarantee and only for a part of Ukrainian territory.What it would almost inevitably mean, however, is a repeat of the permanent ceasefire violations along the disengagement zone in eastern Ukraine where Russian and Ukrainian forces would continue to face each other.This is what happened after the ill-fated Minsk accords of 2014 and 2015, which were meant to settle the conflict after Russia’s invasion of Donbas in 2014. A further Russian invasion could be just around the corner once the Kremlin felt that it had sufficiently recovered from the current war.The lack of a credible deterrent is one key difference between the situation in Ukraine as envisaged by Washington and other historical and contemporary parallels, including Korea and Cyprus.Korea was partitioned in 1945 and has been protected by a large US military presence since the Korean war in 1953. After the Turkish invasion of 1974, Cyprus was divided between Greek and Turkish Cypriots along a partition line secured by an armed UN peacekeeping mission.Trump has ruled out any US troop commitment as part of securing a ceasefire in Ukraine. And the idea of a UN force in Ukraine, ...
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    8 分
  • Trump is still the only one with a chance of getting Ukraine and Russia to the table

    Trump is still the only one with a chance of getting Ukraine and Russia to the table
    2025/04/25
    United States President Donald Trump is finding the reality of negotiations to bring about a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine yet again less easy than he imagined on the campaign trail before returning to the White House for a second term. Having boasted about ending the war in Ukraine in 24 hours, he now finds himself close to the 100-day mark of his second term oscillating between threatening to walk away from ceasefire negotiations and promising that a deal was “very close”.Neither is a realistic outcome at this moment.Ministerial-level talks between the US, Ukraine, and the European coalition of the willing led by the UK, France, and Germany, to discuss ending the war fell through on Wednesday (April 23) after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio cancelled his participation, prompting British, French and German counterparts to pull out as well and releasing their own proposals for a deal on April 25.For Mr Trump, Ukraine is an important puzzle piece in his reconfiguration of US-Russia relations which are critical to his focus on China.The US president is keen to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. This strategy is often referred to as a “reverse Kissinger”, in reference to the late American grand strategist’s success of capitalising on the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and normalising US relations with communist China. That Mr Trump and his advisers lack the strategic acumen of Henry Kissinger and that there is no Russia-China split on the horizon to capitalise on does not mean that rapprochement between the US and Russia is impossible.On the contrary, if the terms were right, both Mr Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, might yet seal a deal to serve their interests – but such a deal will unlikely bring an end to the war against Ukraine.The US is still the only player in the complex dynamics of negotiations with even a remote chance of getting a deal done — because of the leverage the Trump administration has over Russia and Ukraine. Past initiatives to end the war against Ukraine, including those by China, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and the Vatican, never got any traction. Their sponsors generally lacked the ability or, in China’s case, the will, to bring Kyiv and Moscow to the negotiation table.Mr Trump has so far focused on incentives in his dealings with Russia. He can offer Mr Putin much of what the Kremlin wants. Washington’s current peace plan includes the recognition of Moscow’s territorial gains in Ukraine, the lifting of all US sanctions and ruling out future NATO membership for Kyiv.If Trump forges ahead with such a deal, the consequential weakening of the transatlantic alliance would also ensure, in the Kremlin’s eyes, a reordering of European security for the benefit of Russia. It would include US withdrawal from Europe and put limits on the size and capabilities of Ukraine’s armed forces.It is not clear, however, what, if anything, Russia has offered in return — apart from relinquishing claims to territory that Moscow does not yet control.By contrast, the US president has concentrated on pressure when it comes to the relationship with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Mr Trump has been unequivocal that he will suspend military aid and intelligence sharing as leverage. This has made sure that Kyiv keeps engaged in negotiations and accepts giving the US privileged access to Ukraine’s mineral and energy resources and infrastructure.The limits of such leverage, however, are clear: Mr Zelenskyy ruled out a recognition of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, proposed in the US peace deal. Mr Trump’s response was to lash out on Truth Social, blaming Zelenskyy for prolonging the “killing field”.The gap between what the US has put on the table and what Ukraine and its European partners will accept remains wide.If, in light of these difficulties, he did abandon talks, Mr Trump could still cut a deal with Mr Putin in an effort to pry him away from China. But such a deal — on Russia’s terms — would almost inevitably deal another major, and potentially fatal, blow to the American alliance system in Europe and further increase doubt about the dependability of the US as a partner among its Asian allies.Both outcomes would be detrimental to US interests in its rivalry with China and are unlikely to be offset by vague hopes of the Kremlin realigning with the White House.Alternatively, Mr Trump could turn against Mr Putin for failing to agree to a ceasefire and finally implement his earlier threat to impose large-scale sanctions on Russia. Unlikely as it is at the moment, this would preserve what is left of the transatlantic alliance, at least for the time being. It would also allow Mr Trump to conclude his coveted minerals deal with Ukraine. If it means the continuation of US military support and intelligence sharing, such an outcome would clearly be problematic for Mr Putin.This appears to be a reality that the Kremlin...
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    8 分
  • The path to peace in Ukraine narrows down further — even if Trump secures a ceasefire

    The path to peace in Ukraine narrows down further — even if Trump secures a ceasefire
    2025/04/22
    After more than three years of war, the prospects of peace for Ukraine remain slim. There is no obvious, credible pathway even to a ceasefire, given Russia's refusal to extend a brief and shaky truce over Easter — despite the US, UK and Ukraine all signalling their support for this idea. And even if the considerable hurdles impeding a ceasefire deal could be overcome, a more fundamental problem would remain: none of the key players in the conflict appear to have a plan for an agreement that is likely to be acceptable to both Kyiv and Moscow.Less than a year ago, there were at least seven different third-party peace proposals.At one level this is surprising. Less than a year ago, there were at least seven different third-party peace proposals. Among them, China, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and the Vatican had their distinct visions for how to achieve peace. In addition, there was a multilateral proposal by a group of African states, led by South Africa, and a joint proposal by China and Brazil.The best that could be said about these plans last autumn was that several of their sponsors had converged around the principles of the China-Brazil proposal by forming a Chinese-led "Friends of Peace" group in the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2024. Remarkably — because it was in clear contravention of the western opposition to a ceasefire at the time — EU and NATO members Hungary and Slovakia also joined the group, alongside South Africa, Egypt, Indonesia, Türkiye, and other countries from the global south. By the end of 2024, this initiative, however, clearly had run its course and arrived at a dead end, as indicated in a short press release after the only other meeting the group held at the level of their countries' permanent representatives to the UN. A statement on what Beijing calls the Ukraine crisis by China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, on March 7, 2025, made no mention of the group. More importantly, that statement also seemed to indicate that China was no longer pursuing an active role in mediation, limiting its involvement to simply welcoming and supporting "all efforts for peace".What these plans had in common was their primary focus on a ceasefire as a stepping stone to negotiations about an actual peace agreement. They were all light on detail of what a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine would entail but were nonetheless roundly rejected by Ukraine and its western allies as favouring Russia. Given that a ceasefire would simply freeze the front lines and very likely make them permanent with or without a subsequent peace agreement, this was not an unreasonable position. Except that what Ukraine proposed instead — and what its western allies backed, at least rhetorically — was hardly more viable. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's 2022 peace plan was already on life support at the time of the first "Summit on Peace in Ukraine” in Switzerland in June 2024. And when merely 84 of the 100 delegations attending the summit (out of 160 invited) supported a watered-down version of Zelensky's plan in their final communique without agreement on a follow-up meeting, Ukraine's peace plan was dead in the water. Its 'replacement' — Ukraine's internal resilience plan — with its focus on ensuring that the country can survive a long war of attrition with Russia is anything but a peace plan.Among its European allies, the absence of a peace plan is similarly glaring, albeit for different reasons. Europe remains committed to supporting Kyiv, but the Russian war against Ukraine is only one — though clearly the most important — security priority for an emerging coalition of the willing among western backers of Ukraine. For them, it is important to keep Ukraine in the fight while they build up their own defences in a new international order in which the world might well be carved up into American, Russian and Chinese spheres of influence.Such a carve-up is at the heart of efforts by US president Donald Trump who seeks to secure a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, as well as a deal that would give the US privileged access to Ukrainian resources, partly as a repayment for US support in the war to date. The latter appears to be relatively close to conclusion after it initially fell apart during an extraordinarily acrimonious press conference in the White House on February 28.The ceasefire deal Trump appears to envisage would divide Ukraine itself into spheres of influence…The ceasefire deal Trump appears to envisage would divide Ukraine itself into spheres of influence — as recently suggested by Trump's special envoy for Ukraine, retired general Keith Kellogg. Yet even such a pro-Moscow arrangement that would offer Putin control of 20% of Ukraine continues to elude negotiators, primarily because Russian president Vladimir Putin has few incentives to settle for less than Russia’s maximum demands and stop a war that he thinks he is still able to win on the battlefield,...
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