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Navigating the Vortex

Navigating the Vortex

著者： Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
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 We live in a complex and ever-changing world. To navigate the vortex we must adapt to change quickly, think critically, and make sound decisions. Lucy Marcus & Stefan Wolff talk about business, politics, society, culture, and what it all means.

www.navigatingthevortex.comLucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff 政治・政府 政治学 経済学
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  • Europe wins, Russia loses as Moldovans deliver a clear message in crucial parliamentary elections

    Europe wins, Russia loses as Moldovans deliver a clear message in crucial parliamentary elections
    2025/09/29

    With almost all of the votes counted in yesterday’s parliamentary elections in Moldova, the ruling pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity of President Maia Sandu has achieved a slim overall majority of just over 50% of the vote.

    More importantly, perhaps, it has garnered more than twice the votes of the main pro-Russian opposition party Patriotic Bloc, which has just under 25% of the vote.

    While Sandu’s party, as expected, did very well in the diaspora vote with almost 80% of votes cast in its favour, it also convincingly beat the Patriotic Bloc in the vote in Moldova with 44% versus 28%.

    In another sign of the changing tide, the party also doubled its vote share in the Russian-controlled break-away region of Transnistria.

    Turnout in the elections, however, has been low again. Just over 52% of eligible voters went to the polling stations. This is slightly higher than in the three previous parliamentary elections in 2019, 2020, and 2021, but below the turnout in the second round of last year’s presidential elections.

    At the end of the day, the results also reflect the long-standing, and by most accounts, deepening polarisation in Moldova between the pro-European and pro-Russian camps. The fact that Sandu’s party achieved an overall, and only slightly reduced majority again, indicates that its support base has held up remarkably well amid unprecedented Russian election interference and the serious economic problems that Moldova has faced for many years, but especially since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

    While slightly weakened compared to the 2021 parliamentary elections, achieving more than 50% of the vote — and probably gaining 55 seats in the 101-seat parliament — is a remarkable achievement for Sandu’s party in these circumstances. It demonstrates the strength of support for the country’s European path among the general population. If the results of other parties and party blocs that claim to be pro-European are taken into account, this means that a solid majority of Moldovans favour membership in the EU over closer ties with Russia.

    The outcome of the parliamentary elections yesterday, as well as of the presidential elections last year, also demonstrates the limits of Russia’s influence campaigns.

    Despite spending millions on vote buying and disinformation, Russia has not been able to turn Moldova into a country in which a majority of the population would want to jeopardise their European future.

    This is an important signal well beyond Moldova and will be noted with significant relief in Chisinau, Brussels, and other European capitals.

    We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including:

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    4 分
  • As Trump looks set to abandon Ukraine peace efforts, Europe must step up to face Russian aggression alone

    As Trump looks set to abandon Ukraine peace efforts, Europe must step up to face Russian aggression alone
    2025/09/26
    Donald Trump appears to have had a major change of heart regarding Ukraine. On the face of it, it looks like he has embraced outright optimism that Kyiv “is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form”.However, this came with the message that Europeans will need to be in the driving seat to make this happen. According to Trump, a Ukrainian victory depends on “time, patience, and the financial support of Europe and, in particular, NATO”.The only US commitment is “to supply weapons to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them”. Most tellingly, Trump signed his Truth Social missive off with: “Good luck to all!” This is perhaps the clearest indication yet that the US president is walking away from his efforts to strike a peace deal.It also suggests that he has given up on a separate deal with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. But this is where the good news ends — and where the European-led coalition of the willing will need to deliver security and stability for the continent in an ever more volatile environment.After several weeks of Russian incursions into Nato airspace, drones — thought highly likely to be linked to Russia — twice disrupted Danish airspace in the vicinity of Copenhagen airport. It felt like a presentiment of the dystopian drone wars predicted by Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, in his speech at the UN general assembly in New York on September 24.Putin’s continuing provocations are a brazen challenge to Kyiv’s European allies. At the heart of this coalition of the willing, the European Union certainly has demonstrated it is willing to flex its rhetorical muscles to rise to this challenge. EU institutions in Brussels have never left any doubt about their determination that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine “needs to end with a just and lasting peace for Ukraine”, as Ursula von der Leyen, the EU commission president, put it most recently in her state-of-the-union address.Beyond rhetoric, however, the coalition of the willing is facing a number of potential problems. Individually, none of them is insurmountable, but taken together they illustrate the unprecedented challenge Kyiv’s European allies are facing.To begin with, the coalition of the willing is not a coherent body. Its membership includes members of Nato and the EU, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. But the United States is not among their number.It grew from eight countries plus the EU and Nato in February 2025, to 33 participants in April, and 39 in September. Its relationship with the 57-member Ukraine Defense Contact Group of countries supporting Kyiv with military equipment, which held its 30th meeting in early September, is not entirely clear.The lack of coherence in membership in the coalition of the willing is mirrored by different levels of commitment, whether that’s the willingness to deploy a reassurance force after a ceasefire in Ukraine — or the capacity to do so.It’s also not entirely clear whether the leaders of the EU and Nato are speaking for all members of their organisations. Among EU and Nato members, Hungary and Slovakia, for example, have taken ambiguous stances when it comes to defending Ukraine and Europe against Russia.These different levels of commitment also reflect partially conflicting priorities. European members of Nato are deeply — and not wrongly — concerned about US abandonment. Add to that fears of a disastrous trade war, and placating Donald Trump becomes a priority.Doing so by buying US arms may please Trump and plug gaps in Europe’s ability to supply Ukraine. But it is perhaps not the best way of ensuring the urgently needed development of an independent European defence-industrial base.Trump’s return to the White House swiftly ushered in the end of US largesse in support of Ukraine. Europeans have only partly filled that gap, with Germany taking the lead and the EU mobilising over €10 billion (£8.7 billion) in its current budget to 2027, with the aim to supplement efforts by member countries.But it’s not clear how long these efforts will be sustainable in light of inflation and domestic spending pressures. France’s public finances are in distress, while Spain has openly defied Nato’s 5% spending target.Part of the solution to these problems would be much swifter defence-industrial cooperation across the coalition, including with Ukraine. Over time, this could help to build the indigenous defence-industrial capacity needed to produce military equipment at the scale required. But making up for critical gaps in manpower, dealing with the Russian drone threat, strengthening air defences and long-range strike capabilities, and replacing the potential loss of US intelligence support will not happen overnight.Individual countries and the various multilateral forums in which they cooperate will need to decide how to balance three only partially aligned priorities. ...
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    7 分
  • Ukraine’s coalition of allies needs to be more than willing — it needs to get ready

    Ukraine’s coalition of allies needs to be more than willing — it needs to get ready
    2025/09/24
    While the air and ground war in Ukraine is grinding on, Moscow is increasing pressure on Kyiv’s western allies. Russian drone incursions into Poland in the early hours of September 10, and Romania a few days later, were followed by three Russian fighter jets breaching Estonian airspace on September 19. And there has been speculation that drones, which forced the temporary closure of Copenhagen and Oslo airports overnight on September 22, were connected to the Kremlin as well.While this might suggest a deliberate strategy of escalation on the part of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, it is more likely an attempt to disguise the fact that the Kremlin’s narrative of inevitable victory is beginning to look shakier than ever. A failed summer offensive that has been extremely costly in human lives is hardly something to write home about. Estimates of Russian combat deaths now stand at just under 220,000. What’s more, this loss of life has produced little in territorial advances: since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia gained some 70,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian land. While this means that Moscow has nearly tripled the amount of territory it illegally occupies, during its most recent summer offensive, it gained fewer than 2,000 square kilometres. On 1 September 2022, Russia controlled just over 20% of Ukrainian territory, three years later it was just 19% (up from 18.5% at the beginning of the year).Perhaps most telling that the Russian narrative of inevitable victory is hollow is the fact that Russian forces were unable to convert a supposed breakthrough around Pokrovsk in the Donbas area of Ukraine in August into any solid gains amid a successful Ukrainian counterattack.That Russia is not winning, however, is hardly of comfort to Ukraine. Moscow still has the ability to attack night after night, exposing weaknesses in Ukraine’s air defence system and targeting critical infrastructure.The western response, too, has been slow so far and has yet to send a clear signal to the Kremlin what Nato’s and the EU’s red lines are. While Nato swiftly launched Eastern Sentry in response to the Russian drone incursion into Poland, the operation’s deterrent effect appears rather limited given subsequent Russian incursions into Romania and Estonia, as well as undeclared flights in neutral airspace near Poland and Germany. Subsequent comments by Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, threatened to “shoot down flying objects when they violate our territory and fly over Poland” while cautioning that it was important “to think twice before deciding on actions that could trigger a very acute phase of conflict.”On the other side of the Atlantic, Donald Trump, the US president, in his latest missive opined that Kyiv can “WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.” But he has generally said little about Russia ratcheting up pressure on Nato’s eastern flank. Regarding the Russian drone incursion into Poland, he mused that it could have been a mistake, before pledging to defend Nato allies in the event of a Russian attack and encouraging allies on the eastern flank to shoot down Russian intruders.This is certainly an improvement on his earlier threats to Nato solidarity, but it is at best a backstop against a full-blown Russian escalation. What it is not is a decisive step to ending the war against Ukraine. In fact, any such US steps seem ever farther off the agenda. The deadline that Trump gave Putin after their Alaska summit to start direct peace talks with Ukraine came and went without anything happening. The US president’s so-called phase-two sanctions on Russia and its enablers have now been conditioned by Trump on all Nato and G7 countries to impose such sanctions first. And the last line of his “Ukraine can win” post on his TruthSocial platform — “Good luck to all!” — looks more like him completely abandoning his hitherto unsuccessful peace-making efforts. Meanwhile US arms sales to Europe, meant to be channelled to strengthen Ukraine’s defences, have been scaled down by the Pentagon to replenish its own arsenals. At the same time, a long-standing US support programme for the Baltic states — the Baltic security initiative — is under threat from cuts and could be discontinued as of next year.As has been clear for some time, support for Ukraine — and ultimately the defence of Europe — is no longer a primary concern for the US under Trump. Yet, European efforts to step into the gaping hole in the continent’s security left by US retrenchment are painfully slow. The defence budgets of the EU’s five biggest military spenders — France, Germany, Poland, Italy, and the Netherlands — combined are less than a quarter of what the US spends annually. And even if money were not an issue, Europe has serious problems with its defence-industrial base. The EU’s flagship Security Action for Europe programme has faced months of delays over the...
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    7 分
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