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Navigating the Vortex

Navigating the Vortex

著者: Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
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概要

We live in a complex and ever-changing world. To navigate the vortex we must adapt to change quickly, think critically, and make sound decisions. Lucy Marcus & Stefan Wolff talk about business, politics, society, culture, and what it all means.

www.navigatingthevortex.comLucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
政治・政府 政治学 経済学
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  • Farcical peace talks continue in Abu Dhabi as Russia tries to bomb and freeze Ukraine into submission
    2026/02/05
    Russia, Ukraine and the US have met for a second time in as many weeks to discuss a possible cessation of hostilities. The meeting got off to the same familiar and depressing start as the first one: on February 3, the night before the three sides gathered in Abu Dhabi, Russia launched a massive barrage of 521 drones and cruise missiles, once again targeting critical civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities, including the capital, Kyiv. And while the talks were in full swing, Russia followed up on its nighttime strikes by deploying cluster munitions against a market in Druzhkivka, one of the embattled cities in what remains of Ukraine’s fortress belt in the Donetsk region.This was clearly not the most auspicious start to talks aimed at stopping the fighting that has now lasted almost four years. Add to that the fact that the basic negotiating positions of Moscow and Kyiv remain as far apart as ever, and any hopes for an imminent breakthrough to peace in Ukraine quickly evaporate.The more technical discussions on military issues, including specifics of a ceasefire and how it would be monitored, appear to be generally more constructive. Apart from a prisoner exchange, however, no further agreement was reached. But even such small confidence-building steps are useful. And even where no deal is feasible for now, identifying likely issues and mapping solutions that are potentially acceptable to both Moscow and Kyiv is important preparatory work for a future settlement.Without a breakthrough on political issues, however, it does not get the conflict parties closer to a peace deal. These political issues remain centred on the question of territory. The Kremlin insists on the so-called “Anchorage formula” according to which Ukraine withdraws from those areas of Donetsk it still controls and Russia agrees to freezing the frontlines elsewhere.Kyiv has repeatedly made clear that this is unacceptable. US mediation efforts, to date, have been unable to break the resulting deadlock.The political impasse, however, clearly extends beyond territory. Without naming any specific blockages to a deal, Yury Ushakov, a key advisor to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, recently noted that there were other contested issues holding up agreement. Very likely among them are the security guarantees that Ukraine has been demanding to make sure that Russia will not renege on a settlement.These future security guarantees appear to have been agreed between Kyiv and its European and American partners. They involve a gradually escalating response to Russian ceasefire violations, ultimately leading to direct European and US military involvement.The Kremlin’s opposition to such an arrangement is hardly surprising. But it casts further doubt on how sincere Putin is about a durable peace agreement with Ukraine. In turn, it explains Kyiv’s reluctance to make any concessions, let alone those on the current scale of Russian demands.What complicates these discussions further is the fact that the US is linking the provision of security guarantees for Kyiv to Ukrainian concessions on territory along the lines of the Moscow-endorsed Anchorage formula.This might seem a sensible and fair compromise, but there are some obvious problems with it. First, it relies on the dependability of the US as an ultimate security backstop. But confidence, especially in Kyiv and other European capitals, in how dependable US pledges actually are, has been severely eroded during the first 12 months of Donald Trump’s second term in the White House.Second, Europe is moving painfully slowly to fill this confidence gap and the additional void left by the US decision to halt funding to Ukraine. The details of a €90 billion loan agreed in principle by EU leaders in December, have only just been finalised. It will take yet more time for money to be available and to be used, including for essential arms purchases for Kyiv.Doubts — as voiced by Nato secretary-general, Mark Rutte — also persist about whether, even in the long term, Europe will be able to develop sufficient and sufficiently independent military capabilities outside the transatlantic alliance.As a result, there are few incentives for Kyiv to bow to US pressure and give up more territory to Russia in exchange for security guarantees that may not be as ironclad in reality as they appear on paper. Likewise, it makes little sense for Moscow to agree even to a hypothetical western security guarantee for Ukraine, which could thwart future Russian expansionism, in exchange for territory that the Kremlin remains confident it can take by force if necessary.Russia will feel further reassured in its assumption that it can outlast Ukraine on the battlefield and at the negotiation table by developments in both Washington and Beijing. In the US capital, there is still no progress on a new sanctions bill which has been languishing in the US senate since last spring, and which was allegedly “greenlit”...
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    7 分
  • Talks to end the Ukraine war keep hitting the same wall
    2026/01/27
    The first official and direct three-way talks between the United States, Russia and Ukraine since the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 had been a rare sign of progress in an otherwise bleak start to the new year. But they ended without a breakthrough on January 24, with follow-up discussions before too long likely, but not certain. It is hardly surprising that a peace agreement continues to elude the negotiators and mediators.The fundamental disagreement between Moscow and Kyiv over the status of territory remains. Russia formally annexed four regions of Ukraine in September 2022 — in addition to the Crimean peninsula which it has occupied illegally since 2014 — but still does not fully control them after nearly four years of fighting. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears convinced that his troops will eventually be able to capture the remaining Kyiv-controlled parts of the Donetsk region — some 5,000 square kilometres — just as they have done with almost all of the neighbouring region of Luhansk. At the current rate of Russia’s military progress, this could easily take another year; so Mr Putin would likely prefer to get his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to withdraw his forces. Mr Zelenskyy rejects the idea of giving up any territory that Russia has not been able to take by force — not least because there is no guarantee that the Kremlin would stop there. Ukrainian public opinion is largely behind him on this. In addition, the Ukrainian president cannot simply give away territory on his own. The Ukrainian constitution requires that any such deal be approved in a referendum.More important still are strategic considerations. Those areas in the Donbas that Ukrainian forces still hold are part of the country’s best developed defensive lines, including several so-called fortress cities. Handing these over would leave Kyiv much more exposed in the future and give Moscow an improved staging ground for renewed offensives.This makes an agreement on post-war security guarantees all the more crucial for Ukraine. After meeting with his American counterpart, Donald Trump, at the World Economic Forum in Davos just a day before the talks in Abu Dhabi, Mr Zelenskyy said that an agreement on security guarantees from the United States had been finalised. That may be so, but it has not been officially signed as yet, making any Ukrainian concessions even more risky.As a result of their respective calculations, neither side appears to be willing to budge.All of this should be fairly obvious to any mediator, and it is hard to see how the American team, led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, can be blind to these facts.If they were hoping to apply pressure on either or both sides to make concessions, their strategy has not, for now, worked.Even in the chaotic foreign policy process of the current administration in the White House, it seems clear that American pressure on Russia is unlikely to be forthcoming in any meaningful way — and the Kremlin appears acutely aware of this.Mr Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, made it very plain before the start of the trilateral discussions in Abu Dhabi on Friday that Russia’s demand for full control of the Donbas remained in place. Overnight, Russia then carried out another devastating strike against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which is already teetering on the brink of collapse.In addition, Russia continues to frame its current ‘offer’ to freeze the frontlines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in exchange for full control of Donetsk as the “Anchorage formula”, a term the Kremlin uses to refer to the agreement that Mr Putin and Mr Trump apparently struck at their summit in Alaska last August. By couching its territorial demands in terms of the “Anchorage formula”, Moscow tries to establish a fait accompli that gives the impression of a properly negotiated deal, and crucially one agreed by the American president. It flatters the dealmaker in Mr Trump, presents a potentially significant win for Mr Putin, and casts Mr Zelenskyy in the light of the unreasonable spoiler if he rejects an ‘agreement’ he had no part in negotiating.These are not the signals of good-faith negotiations.After more than a year of so far fruitless efforts, Mr Trump’s team also still does not seem to understand that pressure on Kyiv alone is not going to get them, or anyone else, closer to a deal. US support remains important for Ukraine and gives Washington leverage over Mr Zelenskyy, but it is no longer the only game in town.Mr Zelenskyy’s European partners remain steadfast in their backing and are picking up their game, albeit only slowly. The fact that Europe stayed united and faced Mr Trump down over his threats to annex Greenland — if need be, by force — will also weigh positively in Mr Zelenskyy’s calculations. With an even deeper rupture in the transatlantic alliance avoided for now, Europe will be both less ...
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    7 分
  • Trump's performance at Davos underscored America's diminishing trustworthiness and dependability
    2026/01/26
    The week that marked the first anniversary of Donald Trump’s return to the White House for a second term as US president was particularly turbulent, even by his standards and especially for the transatlantic alliance. If there was even a hint of Trump being capable of self-reflection, one could add that it was a rather embarrassing week for him — on at least three counts.First, after much bluster about Greenland, including hints that if push came to shove he would authorise a military operation to get his hands on territory of long-standing Nato ally Denmark, Trump made a first climb-down and ruled out the use of force in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Wednesday. He also dropped the threat of imposing tariffs on the eight European Nato members who dispatched a small number of military personnel to Greenland in a highly symbolic show of support.Second, and contrary to earlier pronouncements that the American security guarantee for Europe was conditional on allies’ financial contributions to Nato, he insisted that the US would always be there for its Nato allies. But, as is usually the case with Trump, it was one step forward, two steps back as he cast doubt on them reciprocating in an American hour of need.Worse still, in a subsequent interview with Fox News, he denigrated the sacrifices of allied servicemen and women in Afghanistan, prompting a chorus of justified outrage from across the alliance. After a phone call with the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, on Saturday, and an expression of concern in a message conveyed “through backchannels” from King Charles III, Trump changed his tune. He did not exactly apologise, but he used his TruthSocial platform to praise the bravery and sacrifices of British soldiers in Afghanistan. No other Nato ally has received even that acknowledgement yet.Third, by the end of the week we were also reminded that progress on one of Trump’s flagship projects — making peace between Russia and Ukraine — is as elusive as ever. The US president appeared to have had a constructive meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, in Davos. But a much-touted agreement on US security guarantees has not been officially signed yet. And no progress has been made either on a deal for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.Two rounds of talks between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators in Abu Dhabi over the weekend failed to produce any concrete results apart from an agreement to meet again the following weekend. While Trump’s mediators tried, unsuccessfully, to push Moscow and Kyiv to compromise over the future of Ukrainian territory claimed but not controlled by Russia, the Kremlin’s relentless air and ground campaigns continued unabated — to bomb Ukraine into submission now and increase the costs for its post-war reconstruction later.Contrary to how swiftly he threatened the imposition of tariffs on supposed allies for sending a few dozen soldiers to Greenland, Trump failed, yet again, to get tough on Putin. There is still no sign of a vote on a bipartisan sanctions bill which Trump allegedly greenlit in early January. The bill, in the making since the spring, aims to cripple Russia’s ability to finance its war against Ukraine and “to provide sustainable levels of security assistance to Ukraine to provide a credible defensive and deterrent capability.”One could, therefore, argue that it was a bad week for Trump and a much better week for the rest of the western alliance. After all, Nato is still intact. Europe seems to have discovered more of a backbone and, perhaps more importantly, that pushing back against Trump is not futile. The US president has neither abandoned Zelensky nor walked away from mediating between Russia and Ukraine. And Trump might soon get distracted by plans for regime change in Cuba or Iran, preventing him from wreaking any more havoc in Europe.But such a view underestimates both the damage already done to relations with the US and that yet to come. Consider the issue of Greenland. Trump’s concession to renounce the use of force was, at best, only a partial climb-down. Throughout his speech, Trump reiterated several times that he still wants “right, title and ownership” of Greenland. And as it’s not at all clear what his framework deal actually entails, his closing comments on Greenland included an unambiguous warning to other Nato members that they can “say ‘yes‘ and we will be very appreciative, or ... ‘no’ and we will remember.” There is already, it seems, some advance remembering happening in Trump’s renamed Department of War, which released its new national defence strategy on Friday night. According to the document, the Pentagon will provide Trump “with credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal.”On Nato, Trump’s ambivalence towards the ...
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    7 分
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