『Ukraine’s coalition of allies needs to be more than willing — it needs to get ready』のカバーアート

Ukraine’s coalition of allies needs to be more than willing — it needs to get ready

Ukraine’s coalition of allies needs to be more than willing — it needs to get ready

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 While the air and ground war in Ukraine is grinding on, Moscow is increasing pressure on Kyiv’s western allies. Russian drone incursions into Poland in the early hours of September 10, and Romania a few days later, were followed by three Russian fighter jets breaching Estonian airspace on September 19. And there has been speculation that drones, which forced the temporary closure of Copenhagen and Oslo airports overnight on September 22, were connected to the Kremlin as well.While this might suggest a deliberate strategy of escalation on the part of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, it is more likely an attempt to disguise the fact that the Kremlin’s narrative of inevitable victory is beginning to look shakier than ever. A failed summer offensive that has been extremely costly in human lives is hardly something to write home about. Estimates of Russian combat deaths now stand at just under 220,000. What’s more, this loss of life has produced little in territorial advances: since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia gained some 70,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian land. While this means that Moscow has nearly tripled the amount of territory it illegally occupies, during its most recent summer offensive, it gained fewer than 2,000 square kilometres. On 1 September 2022, Russia controlled just over 20% of Ukrainian territory, three years later it was just 19% (up from 18.5% at the beginning of the year).Perhaps most telling that the Russian narrative of inevitable victory is hollow is the fact that Russian forces were unable to convert a supposed breakthrough around Pokrovsk in the Donbas area of Ukraine in August into any solid gains amid a successful Ukrainian counterattack.That Russia is not winning, however, is hardly of comfort to Ukraine. Moscow still has the ability to attack night after night, exposing weaknesses in Ukraine’s air defence system and targeting critical infrastructure.The western response, too, has been slow so far and has yet to send a clear signal to the Kremlin what Nato’s and the EU’s red lines are. While Nato swiftly launched Eastern Sentry in response to the Russian drone incursion into Poland, the operation’s deterrent effect appears rather limited given subsequent Russian incursions into Romania and Estonia, as well as undeclared flights in neutral airspace near Poland and Germany. Subsequent comments by Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, threatened to “shoot down flying objects when they violate our territory and fly over Poland” while cautioning that it was important “to think twice before deciding on actions that could trigger a very acute phase of conflict.”On the other side of the Atlantic, Donald Trump, the US president, in his latest missive opined that Kyiv can “WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.” But he has generally said little about Russia ratcheting up pressure on Nato’s eastern flank. Regarding the Russian drone incursion into Poland, he mused that it could have been a mistake, before pledging to defend Nato allies in the event of a Russian attack and encouraging allies on the eastern flank to shoot down Russian intruders.This is certainly an improvement on his earlier threats to Nato solidarity, but it is at best a backstop against a full-blown Russian escalation. What it is not is a decisive step to ending the war against Ukraine. In fact, any such US steps seem ever farther off the agenda. The deadline that Trump gave Putin after their Alaska summit to start direct peace talks with Ukraine came and went without anything happening. The US president’s so-called phase-two sanctions on Russia and its enablers have now been conditioned by Trump on all Nato and G7 countries to impose such sanctions first. And the last line of his “Ukraine can win” post on his TruthSocial platform — “Good luck to all!” — looks more like him completely abandoning his hitherto unsuccessful peace-making efforts. Meanwhile US arms sales to Europe, meant to be channelled to strengthen Ukraine’s defences, have been scaled down by the Pentagon to replenish its own arsenals. At the same time, a long-standing US support programme for the Baltic states — the Baltic security initiative — is under threat from cuts and could be discontinued as of next year.As has been clear for some time, support for Ukraine — and ultimately the defence of Europe — is no longer a primary concern for the US under Trump. Yet, European efforts to step into the gaping hole in the continent’s security left by US retrenchment are painfully slow. The defence budgets of the EU’s five biggest military spenders — France, Germany, Poland, Italy, and the Netherlands — combined are less than a quarter of what the US spends annually. And even if money were not an issue, Europe has serious problems with its defence-industrial base. The EU’s flagship Security Action for Europe programme has faced months of delays over the...
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