エピソード

  • The RJ Reynolds Memo That Turned Doubt Into a Selling Strategy

    The RJ Reynolds Memo That Turned Doubt Into a Selling Strategy
    2026/10/30
    A 1969 RJ Reynolds memo declares "Doubt is our product" and a PR plan turns scientific evidence into a marketing weapon-how did that expose them?

    The RJ Reynolds Memo That Turned Doubt Into a Selling Strategy

    In this episode, we trace how industry communication shifted from public reassurance to manufacturing uncertainty and follow the networks that amplified that approach. How did a single sentence in a company memo become a blueprint exported across industries?

    Person: Richard Doll
    Person: Austin Bradford Hill
    Date: November 1953
    Date: 1969
    Organization: Advancement of Sound Science Coalition

    - Reader's Digest runs "Cancer by the Carton" summarizing Doll and Hill's epidemiology linking cigarette smoke to lung cancer.
    - Major tobacco executives meet at the Plaza Hotel and hire Hill and Knowlton to coordinate a response focused on protecting revenues.
    - The 1954 "Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" funds research and emphasizes unsettled science rather than rebutting the epidemiology.
    - A 1969 internal RJ Reynolds memo states "Doubt is our product," framing uncertainty as a deliberate competitive tactic.
    - The memo's tactics are institutionalized through groups like TASSC to seed credentialed skepticism into public debate.

    To listen to this podcast ad-free and access premium episodes, try our subscription with a 14-day free trial at obomedia.com.

    © 2026 OBOMEDIA. All rights reserved.
    This episode and its content (audio, text, and related materials) are the exclusive property of OBOMEDIA and are protected by applicable copyright laws. Reproduction, distribution, editing, or commercial use, in whole or in part, without prior written permission from OBOMEDIA is prohibited. For permissions, licensing, and business inquiries: business@obomedia.com.
    続きを読む 一部表示
    16 分
  • The vitamin C and preservative that produced benzene in cans

    The vitamin C and preservative that produced benzene in cans
    2026/10/29
    A teenager buys a vitamin C drink from a gas-station cooler; common ingredients can form benzene - how did that expose them?

    The vitamin C and preservative that produced benzene in cans

    In this episode, we trace how routine labels-ascorbic acid and sodium benzoate-came together in warm, light-filled conditions to create benzene in commercial beverages, and how regulators and manufacturers responded over more than a decade. What choices and gaps left those drinks on shelves despite documented chemistry?

    Person: unnamed former FDA chemist
    Date: 1993 (first peer-reviewed documentation), 1998 (quiet withdrawals), 2005-2006 (citizen tests and public disclosures)
    Location: United States (tests and FDA correspondence); United States and Germany (investigations)
    Topic: benzene formation from ascorbic acid and sodium benzoate in beverages

    - A gas-station cooler, summer heat and light accelerated benzene formation in a vitamin-enriched can that tested 87.9 ppb.
    - Ascorbic acid (vitamin C) and sodium benzoate are common label ingredients whose reaction with metal ions can release benzene.
    - Researchers documented the chemistry in 1993 and advised fixes like EDTA chelators and sugars to inhibit formation.
    - The FDA learned of the issue, requested voluntary reformulation, tested beverages, and set no mandatory benzene limit for soft drinks.
    - Public awareness rose after a citizen’s 2005 test and a former FDA chemist’s 2006 disclosure, prompting UK and German investigations.

    To listen to this podcast ad-free and access premium episodes, try our subscription with a 14-day free trial at obomedia.com.

    © 2026 OBOMEDIA. All rights reserved.
    This episode and its content (audio, text, and related materials) are the exclusive property of OBOMEDIA and are protected by applicable copyright laws. Reproduction, distribution, editing, or commercial use, in whole or in part, without prior written permission from OBOMEDIA is prohibited. For permissions, licensing, and business inquiries: business@obomedia.com.
    続きを読む 一部表示
    13 分
  • The supervised room that caught 3,426 overdoses and kept people alive

    The supervised room that caught 3,426 overdoses and kept people alive
    2026/10/28
    A supervised injection room in Sydney recorded 3,426 overdoses-how did that record expose the model's power and the politics around it?

    The supervised room that caught 3,426 overdoses and kept people alive

    In this episode, we trace the history and practice of legal supervised injection sites from their origins to modern clashes over law and politics. We follow how the rooms operated, the data they produced, and the persistent questions about why cities still resist allowing them.

    Person: staff at supervised injection sites
    Event: 3,426 overdoses recorded at Sydney's MSIC
    Location: Kings Cross, Sydney
    Date: May 2001-2010 (first nine years of MSIC operation)
    Topic: legal supervised injection sites and harm reduction

    - Staff recorded every overdose event and intervened inside the Medical Supervised Injecting Centre in Kings Cross.
    - The model grew from a church in Rotterdam and a Bern site opened in June 1986 amid the HIV crisis.
    - Over decades more than one hundred facilities on four continents operated with a documented zero death toll inside the rooms.
    - Before a site opened in Copenhagen’s Vesterbro, residents counted roughly ten thousand discarded syringes weekly; that fell below one thousand after the site opened.
    - The spread of facilities (92 by 2009 across 61 European cities) faced obstacles from law, politics, and audits in different cities.

    To listen to this podcast ad-free and access premium episodes, try our subscription with a 14-day free trial at obomedia.com.

    © 2026 OBOMEDIA. All rights reserved.
    This episode and its content (audio, text, and related materials) are the exclusive property of OBOMEDIA and are protected by applicable copyright laws. Reproduction, distribution, editing, or commercial use, in whole or in part, without prior written permission from OBOMEDIA is prohibited. For permissions, licensing, and business inquiries: business@obomedia.com.
    続きを読む 一部表示
    15 分
  • The temperature pill that slammed his throat shut and sparked a fever

    The temperature pill that slammed his throat shut and sparked a fever
    2026/10/27
    A prison dermatologist gives a man a "temperature pill" in a Philadelphia jail; four days later his throat slams shut. How did that expose them?

    The temperature pill that slammed his throat shut and sparked a fever

    In this episode, we follow the events inside Holmesburg Prison where routine medical care blurred into large-scale human testing and institutional secrecy. The episode traces how a single unguarded dose became entangled with an informal research program and raises the question of what accountability looked like inside those walls.

    Location: Holmesburg Prison, 8215 Torresdale Avenue, Philadelphia
    Person: Albert Kligman
    Date: 1951 (Kligman first entered Holmesburg), 1947-1974 (period of experiments)
    Program scale: 33 corporate and government sponsors; 80-90% of ~1,200 inmates used as subjects
    Incident: Jerome Roach swallowed a "temperature pill" and developed throat closure, joint locking, fever, and sores

    - Albert Kligman, a Penn dermatologist, first came to Holmesburg in 1951 to treat athlete's foot and then returned informally without written authorization.
    - Kligman described the inmates as "acres of skin," framing the prison population as an available resource for dermatological testing.
    - The testing program ran in a working city jail from the late 1940s to 1974 with dozens of outside sponsors paying to use inmates' bodies.
    - Administrative separation meant experiments were recorded in a different system than routine prison medical care, so connections between treatments and adverse events were not documented.
    - Jerome Roach swallowed a small "temperature pill" provided as part of a study, developed sudden throat closure on day four, then joint locking, fever, and sores, and was treated without records linking him to the experiment.

    To listen to this podcast ad-free and access premium episodes, try our subscription with a 14-day free trial at obomedia.com.

    © 2026 OBOMEDIA. All rights reserved.
    This episode and its content (audio, text, and related materials) are the exclusive property of OBOMEDIA and are protected by applicable copyright laws. Reproduction, distribution, editing, or commercial use, in whole or in part, without prior written permission from OBOMEDIA is prohibited. For permissions, licensing, and business inquiries: business@obomedia.com.
    続きを読む 一部表示
    16 分
  • The intrathecal penicillin that silenced a boy

    The intrathecal penicillin that silenced a boy
    2026/10/26
    A doctor injects thirty times the dose of penicillin into a boy in Glasgow; his meningitis clears but his hearing does not - how did that expose them?

    The intrathecal penicillin that silenced a boy

    In this episode, we follow the clinical timeline and legal question after a child with pneumococcal meningitis received an intrathecal penicillin dose thirty times the prescription. The account traces the treatment decisions, the immediate toxic effects, and the unresolved mystery of whether the meningitis or the overdose caused the permanent bilateral deafness.

    Person: Andrew Kay
    Date: 29 November (in Glasgow), discharged 24 December
    Location: Glasgow, Royal Hospital for Sick Children / Queen Mother's Hospital
    Event: Intrathecal penicillin overdose (approx. 300,000 units vs prescribed 10,000)
    Topic: Whether the overdose or the meningitis caused bilateral profound deafness

    - A GP treated Andrew initially for a presumed chest infection with oral ampicillin while he was vomiting and failing to retain medication.
    - Consultant Dr. McClure prescribed a targeted intrathecal penicillin dose of 10,000 units after CSF cultures grew pneumococcus.
    - Senior house officer Dr. Adam-Strump administered an intrathecal injection that delivered approximately 300,000 units into the subarachnoid space and recognized the error immediately.
    - Within minutes Andrew convulsed and developed hemiplegia; acute toxic effects resolved by 1 December and the meningitis cleared faster than expected.
    - Bacterial expert Dr. McAllister found zero published cases where intrathecal penicillin overdose was documented to cause deafness, leaving causation disputed and the legal question unresolved.

    To listen to this podcast ad-free and access premium episodes, try our subscription with a 14-day free trial at obomedia.com.

    © 2026 OBOMEDIA. All rights reserved.
    This episode and its content (audio, text, and related materials) are the exclusive property of OBOMEDIA and are protected by applicable copyright laws. Reproduction, distribution, editing, or commercial use, in whole or in part, without prior written permission from OBOMEDIA is prohibited. For permissions, licensing, and business inquiries: business@obomedia.com.
    続きを読む 一部表示
    13 分
  • The Credential Gap That Let a Surgeon Cut Patients to Pieces

    The Credential Gap That Let a Surgeon Cut Patients to Pieces
    2026/10/25
    A renowned spine surgeon operates for years while hospitals saw only a twelve-page CV-what did that credential gap hide and how did it expose them?

    The Credential Gap That Let a Surgeon Cut Patients to Pieces

    In this episode, we lay out the sequence of events that followed a surgeon with a twelve-page curriculum vitae as he moved between Texas hospitals, the complications patients suffered, and the institutional choices that let him continue operating. What did the missing signals in his record allow to happen?

    Person: Christopher Duntsch
    Date: MD 2001; PhD 2002; born April 3, 1971
    Location: Dallas / Regional / Farmers Branch, Texas
    Case: multiple spinal operations with severe complications
    Institution: Baylor Regional Medical Center, Dallas Medical Center, South Hampton Community Hospital

    - A twelve-page CV and a claimed magna cum laude doctorate that included a non-existent St. Jude program carried Duntsch into hospital operating rooms.
    - Duntsch completed fewer than one hundred supervised procedures in residency, far short of the typical neurosurgeon’s volume.
    - Allegations of cocaine use during residency led to an impaired physician program and mandatory direct supervision that later ended without broader disclosure.
    - After a wrong-level surgery at Baylor Regional, administrators accepted Duntsch’s resignation rather than a termination, leaving no report to the National Practitioner Data Bank.
    - At Dallas Medical Center and South Hampton, temporary privileges and non-reporting let Duntsch operate despite intraoperative warnings and cases with misplaced screws, bone fragments, and suspected inebriation.

    To listen to this podcast ad-free and access premium episodes, try our subscription with a 14-day free trial at obomedia.com.

    © 2026 OBOMEDIA. All rights reserved.
    This episode and its content (audio, text, and related materials) are the exclusive property of OBOMEDIA and are protected by applicable copyright laws. Reproduction, distribution, editing, or commercial use, in whole or in part, without prior written permission from OBOMEDIA is prohibited. For permissions, licensing, and business inquiries: business@obomedia.com.
    続きを読む 一部表示
    17 分
  • The Fort Dix recruit's fever triggered a nationwide vaccination

    The Fort Dix recruit's fever triggered a nationwide vaccination
    2026/10/24
    A sick recruit at Fort Dix in 1976 sparks a swine flu vaccination campaign - how did his fever expose the fear of a century-old pandemic?

    The Fort Dix recruit's fever triggered a nationwide vaccination

    In this episode, we follow the timeline from a recruit’s rapid death at Fort Dix to the federal decision to vaccinate millions, laying out the people, science, and choices that drove the response. What drove public health leaders to act as if 1918 had returned?

    Person: Army recruit (Fort Dix)
    Date: February 5, 1976 (illness); October 1-December 16, 1976 (vaccination program)
    Location: Fort Dix, New Jersey; nationwide United States
    Event: A/New Jersey/1976 H1N1 outbreak and National Influenza Immunization Program
    Topic: Swine influenza, reassortment, public health response

    - A recruit reported fatigue, was ordered to rest, and died within 24 hours; the strain infected roughly five people and stayed inside the base fence.
    - Scientists identified the virus as H1N1, the same subtype linked to the 1918 pandemic, raising fear of a repeat catastrophe.
    - Researchers described pigs as “mixing vessels” because their respiratory receptors enable reassortment between avian and mammalian influenza strains.
    - Between October 1 and December 16, 1976, the U.S. launched a mass vaccination campaign that immunized 48,161,019 people.
    - The outbreak in humans lasted about three weeks at Fort Dix, yet federal leaders recommended vaccinating the entire population before the fall.

    To listen to this podcast ad-free and access premium episodes, try our subscription with a 14-day free trial at obomedia.com.

    © 2026 OBOMEDIA. All rights reserved.
    This episode and its content (audio, text, and related materials) are the exclusive property of OBOMEDIA and are protected by applicable copyright laws. Reproduction, distribution, editing, or commercial use, in whole or in part, without prior written permission from OBOMEDIA is prohibited. For permissions, licensing, and business inquiries: business@obomedia.com.
    続きを読む 一部表示
    15 分
  • The unlocked digoxin cabinet that sent thirteen infants to death

    The unlocked digoxin cabinet that sent thirteen infants to death
    2026/10/23
    A grieving father, an unlocked digoxin cabinet at SickKids, and two impossible blood levels - how did that expose them?

    The unlocked digoxin cabinet that sent thirteen infants to death

    In this episode we lay out the unfolding crisis at the Hospital for Sick Children in 1980-81: a cardiac ward reorganization, a widely accessible supply of digoxin, and a sudden rise in infant mortality that clinicians noticed before police were involved. What patterns and decisions kept questions unanswered as families demanded explanations?

    Person: Kevin Pacsai
    Location: Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto
    Date: June 30, 1980 (ward reorganization) - March 1981 (police arrival)
    Topic: unexpected spike in infant cardiac deaths and digoxin access
    Event: two infants with exceptionally high digoxin blood concentrations (one 13× normal)

    - Administrators split the cardiac unit into two adjacent wards on June 30, 1980, a routine logistical change before the deaths rose.
    - During summer 1980-spring 1981, digoxin was stored unsecured and accessible to any staff on the cardiac ward.
    - Senior cardiologists recognized a sharp increase in mortality (from about one death per week to five) but deliberately delayed escalation citing ward morale.
    - Dr. Paul Tepperman received autopsy blood results showing the highest digoxin level of his career, then, days later, another result nearly as extreme (thirteen times normal).
    - The case produced a five-year investigation and a public inquiry with a 200-page report, yet no criminal convictions were reached.

    To listen to this podcast ad-free and access premium episodes, try our subscription with a 14-day free trial at obomedia.com.

    © 2026 OBOMEDIA. All rights reserved.
    This episode and its content (audio, text, and related materials) are the exclusive property of OBOMEDIA and are protected by applicable copyright laws. Reproduction, distribution, editing, or commercial use, in whole or in part, without prior written permission from OBOMEDIA is prohibited. For permissions, licensing, and business inquiries: business@obomedia.com.
    続きを読む 一部表示
    16 分