The “Quad” – Australia, India, Japan and the United States – insists it isn’t here to make anyone choose sides, while Southeast Asia keeps saying “Please don’t make us choose sides.” So if everyone agrees, why is cooperation still so hard?

Arzan Tarapore, Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, returns to preview a white paper built by experts he convened from Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore, asking how those countries would react if the Quad stepped up maritime security cooperation. He explains why the controversial grouping cut its agenda to just four lines of effort at its July 2025 foreign ministers’ meeting, and why a more modest Quad may be a more credible one.

The headline findings: the Quad’s capacity-building activities are far more acceptable than the reflexive “Southeast Asia won’t like it” suggests. The partner with the most capacity, the United States, is also the most provocative, while India is the reverse. Experts disagreed on whether bringing Southeast Asian countries into Quad activities is more or less provocative than the Quad acting alone.

On geography, meanwhile, there was no disagreement at all: the Indian Ocean is far less provocative than the South China Sea, which is why the Quad’s new Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Collaboration Initiative was placed in the IO.

Jim and Ray press: How does ASEAN centrality square with ASEAN having no security mandate? Were early critics right that the Quad was too broad to deliver anything? (“I fear that it was.”) Does “modest” just mean less consequential?

Arzan says the bluntest challenge is that four countries are walking a tightrope defined by twelve others to avoid upsetting one. His answer: China’s behavior is a variable, not just a brake, and security itself is a public good worth a little provocation.

Ray adds a memory from his years in Hanoi: Vietnamese officials praising a U.S. operation that “poked China in the eye”, then in the same breath asking Washington to please be careful.

The conversation also covers why undersea domain awareness shared among Quad members would improve the whole region’s picture of the PLA Navy, how the Middle East’s Combined Air Operations Center can be a model for tiered data sharing among partners with different clearances, and Arzan’s lightning-round verdict on the Modi-Trump quarrel: the strategic rationale is intact, but the damage to trust on the Indian side should not be underestimated.

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China may not need to invade Taiwan to isolate it. Chinese coast guard and maritime militia ships now patrol east of the island, and have begun challenging commercial vessels by radio as though Beijing has authority there. Could these patrols be the opening steps of an incremental, gray-zone quarantine that takes shape before anyone recognizes a crisis?

Kwangyin Liu, deputy managing editor of CommonWealth Magazine in Taipei and host of Taiwanology, joins Ray Powell and Jim Carouso to discuss “Broken Chain,” her newsroom’s investigation drawing on 1.8 billion vessel-tracking records.

Kwangyin points to maritime boundary talks between Japan and the Philippines as the trigger for the June operation, and considers whether those talks simply gave Beijing a pretext for a move it already intended to make. They discuss how tactics tested around Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Island are spreading to Taiwan’s Pacific waters, and why non-naval government vessels let Beijing press its claims with less risk of escalation than warships.

The investigation drew attention from security specialists but got little public response. Kwangyin describes a public focused on a robust economy and stock market, and resistant to warnings that Taiwan is the world’s most dangerous place. Fishermen near the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands tell her that Chinese patrols they once watched closely have become unremarkable. She recalls National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu’s warning that the worst outcome is a public grown numb to pressure.

Kwangyin also explains differences between the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and opposition Kuomintang (KMT), including unease among younger KMT supporters over their party chair’s closeness to Beijing. What does “hedging” between China and America mean in practice, and how do Trump’s accusations that Taiwan stole America’s chip business erode confidence that Washington would help in a crisis?

The conversation also covers the growth of AI-enabled influence campaigns and her thoughts on the Trump–Xi summit. Kwangyin closes with why she started Taiwanology: to bring a Taiwanese perspective to international conversations about the island.

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For decades we've been told this is the Asian century: that the region's economic weight will turn into geopolitical power, and maybe into China's century. Retired Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan calls that "a snappy phrase used by lazy thinkers," and one Beijing is happy to promote.

Bilahari, Singapore's famously undiplomatic former top diplomat, spent 37 years in its foreign service as ambassador to Russia, permanent representative to the United Nations and permanent secretary of foreign affairs. Here he joins Ray and Jim to discuss his controversial recent essay, The Myth of the Asian Century.

His starting point: there is no geopolitically coherent "Asia" to have its own epoch. China and India are rivals, as are China and Japan, while Japan and South Korea remain uneasy partners. China is far stronger than it used to be but "not 10 feet tall," and its rise is already producing pushback, most visibly from Japan. The real danger is fatalism: if the region accepts Beijing's predominance as inevitable, it helps make it so.

On the recent New Delhi BRICS summit, Bilahari sees less a bloc than a Global South "mood," with no real convergence of interests among India, China, Iran, Russia, the Gulf states and the rest. He points out that the summit’s 140-paragraph declaration never mentions geopolitical hotspots Ukraine or the South China Sea, and argues that longer communiqués usually signal less agreement, not more.

On America, Bilahari argues Trump didn't create the shift, but simply strips the idealistic wrapping off a country that, like all countries, has always put itself first. Asian governments learned that lesson from the Vietnam War, Nixon's surprise opening to China and the 1985 Plaza Accord. His standing answer on whether America is reliable: "Of course it's not reliable. However, you are indispensable."

Bilahari also explains why he expects little from the interminable South China Sea Code of Conduct negotiations, even if ASEAN and China do somehow produce a text this year. He sees a slow Chinese “strangulation” of Taiwan as more likely than an invasion, and worries even more about Taiwan’s own will to defend itself. The conversation also ranges from Pakistan and Indonesia to Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s shocking recent Taiwan remarks, which Kausikan dismisses as simply “Anwar being Anwar.”

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