Last week, the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy. Such documents are usually fairly staid exercises in lofty rhetoric. Not this one. It harshly rebukes the strategies of prior administrations, highlighting what Trump’s team sees as the failures of traditional foreign policy elites. It pointedly criticizes Washington’s traditional allies in Europe and fixates on security issues in the Western Hemisphere, but it has little to say about American rivals such as China and Russia. In recent weeks, the administration has provided a demonstration of what its strategy looks like in practice, launching controversial strikes against boats allegedly trafficking drugs in the Caribbean and mulling military intervention in Venezuela, while also putting the trade war with China on hold and pushing for a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine.

To Kori Schake, this approach represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the means and ends of American power. Now a senior fellow and director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Schake served on the National Security Council and in the State Department in the George W. Bush administration, and she has become one of Trump’s sharpest critics. What she sees from the administration is “solipsism masquerading as strategy,” as she put it in her most recent piece for Foreign Affairs.

Schake argues that the administration’s actions—and the worldview undergirding them—are based on “faulty assumptions” with potentially dire consequences: a United States hostile to its longtime allies, a brewing civil-military crisis at home, and a world order that could leave Washington behind.

You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

In the last decade, American foreign policymakers have been forced to reckon with a shifting global balance of power. Theorists have long argued over the shape of international order. But such questions now occupy practitioners, as well, as they grapple with the end of the unipolar moment that followed the Cold War and struggle to shape new strategies that account for new geopolitical realities.

Emma Ashford is a leading proponent of a more restrained U.S. foreign policy. In an essay for Foreign Affairs, as well as in her new book First Among Equals, she argues that American policymakers must, above all, get comfortable with the fact of a multipolar world. “Instead of artificially cleaving the world in two,” she writes, “the United States should choose to embrace multipolarity and craft strategy accordingly.”

Ashford joined Dan Kurtz-Phelan on Monday, November 17, to discuss this new order, how the Biden and Trump administrations have dealt with these changes, and how the United States must adapt to thrive in a multipolar age.

You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

In the last few years, artificial intelligence has become a central focus of geopolitical competition, and especially of U.S.-Chinese rivalry. For much of that time, the United States, or at least U.S. companies, seemed to have the advantage. But Ben Buchanan, a leading scholar of technology who crafted the Biden administration’s AI strategy, worries that the United States’ AI superiority isn’t nearly as assured as many have assumed.

In an essay in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs, Buchanan, writing with Tantum Collins, warns that “the American way of developing AI is reaching its limits,” and as those limits become clear, “they will start to erode—and perhaps even end—U.S. dominance.”

The essay calls for a new grand bargain between tech and the U.S. government—a bargain necessary to advancing American AI and to ensuring that it enhances, rather than undermines, U.S. national security. Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke to Buchanan about the future of AI competition and how it could reshape not just American power but global order itself.

You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

Members of the foreign policy world have talked a lot about great-power competition over the last decade. But no one can entirely agree on the contours of today’s competition. Whether it’s a battle of autocracies and democracies. Or revisionists and status quo powers. Or whether, as the realists would argue, it’s just states doing what states do.

S. C. M. Paine, a longtime professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College, sees something else going on. To her, the great-power competition we talk about today is just the latest example of the centuries-old tension between maritime and continental powers. For maritime powers—such as, for most of its history, the United States—money and trade serve as the basis of influence. And that leads them to promote rules and order. Continental powers—such as Russia most clearly and China in most but not all ways—focus their security objectives on territory, which they seek to defend, and control, and expand.

From this divide rises two very different visions of global order. It also, Paine argues in a new essay in Foreign Affairs, explains the basic drivers of today’s great-power competition. But as she looks at more recent developments, Paine lays out an additional concern. The United States has long been an exemplar of maritime power. But it is starting to behave in ways that suggest a shift away from the maritime strategies that have served it so well. Paine’s focus on the contest between land and sea makes clear the stakes of that shift.

You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

Robert O’Brien served as Donald Trump’s national security adviser from 2019 to 2021. O’Brien’s predecessors in that position left the administration to become some of the most vociferous critics of their former boss. O’Brien, in contrast, remained a staunch defender of Trump’s foreign policy through the Biden administration and into Trump’s second term. And perhaps as a result, he can help make some sense of the thinking behind Trump’s approach on key national security issues, drawing out the objectives and assumptions driving policy on China, Ukraine, the Middle East, Venezuela, and much else.

Shortly before the 2024 election, O’Brien wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs called “The Return of Peace Through Strength: Making the Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy.” Last week, he published a follow-up to that essay, giving Trump high marks for his approach to the world over the past ten months. O’Brien and Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke on Monday, November 10, about the second-term policy so far, about where he sees continuity and where he sees change from the first term, and about where Trump’s foreign policy may be going from here.

You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

Last week’s meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping may have brought a respite in the trade war. But it hardly touched the more fundamental drivers of U.S.-Chinese rivalry, a rivalry that has come to shape more and more dimensions of geopolitics, the global economy, and beyond.

Few have spent as much time observing and chronicling the interactions between Washington and Beijing as Orville Schell. Schell, one of America’s foremost China hands and the author of too many books on China to name, has been in the room for encounters between a slew of American presidents and Chinese leaders. He has also, for decades, interpreted the bitter factional struggles and geopolitical jockeying of the Chinese Communist Party. And as Xi’s attempt to remake the Chinese state continues, Schell has mined China’s history and its present for insight—into how the country thinks of its place in the world, and into the unresolved contradictions that continue to roil the party. “Peek behind the veil,” Schell writes in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, “and a different reality reveals itself: a dog-eat-dog world of power struggles, artifice, hubris, treachery, and duplicity—yet also an enormous amount of sacrifice.”

Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke with Schell on Tuesday, November 4, about Trump and Xi, about the state of the United States’ China policy, and about both the past and future of China itself.

You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

If one thing can be said to characterize the first months of Donald Trump’s second term, it is his expansive and often norm-breaking use of presidential power, both abroad and at home. There are the lethal strikes on boats alleged to be smuggling drugs; the range of tariffs he’s imposed; the way he’s gone after enemies, withheld funds, and restructured the federal workforce; the list could go on. Trump has disregarded constraint after constraint on the power of the executive, and many of the forces expected to check that power—in the courts, in Congress, in the private sector or media—have shown little ability or willingness to do so.

In the early weeks of Trump’s second term, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs called “How to Survive a Constitutional Crisis.” Cuéllar, a former justice on the California Supreme Court who now serves as president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, looked at Trump’s early moves and tried to lay out a framework for understanding which of them represented just radical shifts in policy, and which of them posed a threat to the very foundations of the American system. Cuéllar believes that the country’s courts, its system of federalism, and its independent media can still provide meaningful checks on presidential power. But time is of the essence, he warns, before these pillars of American democracy could start to crack.

You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

With a cease-fire in place in Gaza after two years of war, Donald Trump has proclaimed the arrival of peace in the Middle East. At the moment, however, it’s not even clear if the cease-fire itself will hold, let alone whether there’s a viable path to a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Few are more familiar with the elusiveness of peace in that conflict than Robert Malley. He has served as a senior Middle East official in American administrations going back to the 1990s. He has sat across from Israeli and Palestinian leaders at moments of great optimism and, more often, greater disappointment. And in a recent piece for Foreign Affairs, drawing on a new book co-authored with Hussein Agha, Malley argues that the cause of that disappointment is Washington’s dogged insistence on a two-state solution that neither Israelis nor Palestinians really want. Years of folly, Malley and Agha argue, have seen the United States claim “success even as its efforts yielded serial disaster.”

Malley offers a harsh indictment of decades of U.S. Middle East policy—a policy that, in his assessment, has done more to destabilize and inflame the region than contribute to a lasting peace. Editor Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke with him about America’s record in the Middle East, the devastation of the war in Gaza, and what could perhaps rise from the wreckage.

You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.