Nuclear Restraint: Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button?
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Nuclear Restraint: Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button?
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このコンテンツについて
Rationalist and normative theories offer different explanations for nuclear restraint. Rationalists emphasize deterrence and practicality, while normative perspectives highlight the nuclear taboo and noncombatant immunity. Wargames show that foreign policy elites during the Cold War were reluctant to use nuclear weapons, emphasizing deterrence, practicality, and reputation.
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