Max talks with Rob Mark about the latest NTSB cases and safety lessons for pilots. They begin with new details on the B-52 near miss at Minot, North Dakota, where the bomber nearly collided with both a regional jet and a Piper Archer. The tower controller, working alone without radar support, became overwhelmed and failed to advise the B-52 crew of conflicting traffic. At one point, he even issued incorrect altitude and heading clearances. Though everyone avoided contact, the case illustrates that controllers can—and do—make mistakes, making pilot vigilance essential.

Attention then turns to a fatal midair collision in Fort Morgan, Colorado, where a Cessna 172 on a straight-in approach collided with an Extra 300 turning base just after an aerobatic contest. Because of their high- and low-wing configurations, each aircraft was hidden in the other’s blind spot. The accident underscores the importance of CTAF communication, traffic scanning, and using a second radio to monitor the local frequency even while on IFR clearances.

Rob next reports on a Cessna 172 from San Jose’s Reid-Hillview Airport whose pilot declared jammed flight controls. Another pilot attempted to assist in the air, but the aircraft ultimately crashed. The case recalls earlier accidents where loose objects, like portable GPS antennas, jammed control linkages.

The episode also examines student pilot tragedies. In Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, a young student turned crosswind too soon at low altitude and struck trees. In New Jersey, a 61-year-old student in a Cirrus SR20 succumbed to somatogravic illusion, leveling off at night and descending into terrain after takeoff. Both highlight the risks of solo flight without CFI oversight and the dangers of night solos.

Further cases include a Cessna 152 overrun at night in Kansas with a pilot who fled the scene, a T-6 Texan stall/spin at Oshkosh caused by low-speed maneuvering, and a Cessna 206 crash in Alaska where water-contaminated fuel led to an engine failure.

Throughout the discussion, Max and Rob emphasize recurring themes: respect stall speeds and G-loading, always sump fuel, avoid complacency with ATC instructions, and never assume other pilots are on frequency. Their message is clear—aviation safety depends on every pilot maintaining situational awareness, discipline, and respect for physics.

In Episode 10 of NTSB News Talk, aviation safety experts Max Trescott and Rob Mark examine recent accident reports that reinforce why loss of control in flight continues to be the number one cause of fatalities in general aviation. Drawing from official NTSB accident reports and preliminary findings, they analyze crashes involving a TBM turboprop in Montana, a Beechcraft King Air in Arizona, and other cases where night flying illusions and equipment failures played a decisive role.

Rob begins with an August accident in Kalispell, Montana, where a TBM turboprop attempted to land at the city airport. Witnesses said the aircraft touched down near the approach end of the runway before veering into parked planes, sparking a fire. Incredibly, all four occupants survived with only minor injuries. Though details are still sparse, the incident highlights how quickly loss of control can occur even in a high-performance single-engine turboprop.

Max and Rob stress that while the TBM is an advanced and capable aircraft, any landing can go wrong if the pilot mismanages energy or fails to stabilize the approach. This accident serves as a reminder that precision, discipline, and preparation remain critical during the landing phase, when the margin for error is smallest.

The hosts then turn to a tragic August 5th accident involving a Beechcraft King Air 300 on the Navajo Nation in eastern Arizona. The aircraft was inbound on a medical transport flight, but before picking up its patient it crashed near the single runway at Chinle Municipal Airport. All four aboard—two pilots and two healthcare providers—were killed.

Conditions that day created a perfect storm: a density altitude of over 8,400 feet combined with gusty crosswinds approaching 28 knots, nearly 90 degrees to the runway. The demonstrated crosswind limit for the King Air 300 is 20 knots, but as Rob explains, that number is not a hard limitation—it simply reflects the strongest crosswind tested during certification. What really matters is pilot proficiency.

The Chinle crash underscores the dangers of trying to land in challenging conditions when performance margins are already compromised by high elevation and high temperature. For many pilots, especially those not flying crosswind landings regularly, the combination can quickly exceed skill level and lead to loss of control.

Rob next covers a preliminary report on a Cessna Conquest II that departed Youngstown, Ohio, en route to Bozeman, Montana. Security video showed the aircraft lifting off after a normal ground roll, but instead of climbing, it leveled off at just 100 feet and maintained that altitude until impacting trees. Both engines were reportedly running, making the lack of climb especially puzzling.

Witnesses described unusual engine sounds, but Max and Rob note that eyewitness accounts are often unreliable. The bigger mystery is why the pilot failed to climb, despite having ample power available. Possible scenarios include distraction, incapacitation, or improper handling of the aircraft. As Max points out, 80 percent of accidents are linked to human error, and this crash may ultimately fall into that category.

Max then shares insights into a

On this episode of NTSB News Talk, Max Trescott covers the third and final day of the NTSB’s investigative hearing into the January 2024 midair collision near Washington’s Reagan National Airport between a PSA Airlines CRJ-700 and a U.S. Army UH-60L Black Hawk. Day 3 featured Panel 4: Collision Avoidance Technology and Panel 5: Safety Data and Safety Management Systems.

The hearing opened with spatial disorientation testimony and interviews with Army pilots about Route 4 altitude protections they incorrectly believed would keep them clear of Runway 33 arrivals. NASA’s Dr. Stephen Casner explained that cockpit traffic displays can help pilots spot targets up to eight times faster than by visual scan alone.

Experts detailed ADS-B system complexities — including the two incompatible broadcast frequencies (UAT and 1090ES) — and reviewed the limits of pre-ADS-B collision avoidance technology. The UH-60L Black Hawk lacks integrated traffic displays, relying instead on iPads with Stratus receivers, which Army policy prohibits the flying pilot from using. Portable ADS-B In devices provide only partial traffic pictures unless paired with ADS-B Out, limiting situational awareness.

Discussions turned to TCAS: its nuisance alert problem, differences for helicopter operations, and why the CRJ-700 lacks a certified ADS-B In solution. The NTSB Chairwoman confronted the FAA over its 17-year refusal to mandate ADS-B In, despite repeated post-collision recommendations. The Army is now procuring 1,685 Stratus/iPad sets for priority units, but operational use will still be limited at low level.

FAA data revealed 366 TCAS resolution advisories within 10 nm of DCA from 2023–2025. Testimony noted that crews involved in RAs are typically not notified unless a deviation occurs. Panelists debated safety culture, just culture, and leadership removals at DCA Tower after the accident. A controller supervisor described the pre-accident culture as “robust,” but post-accident changes removed key institutional knowledge.

The hearing also exposed gaps in PSA pilot special-qualification training for DCA — including no information on helicopter routes or operations — and examined simulator results showing that circling to Runway 33 can double or triple pilot workload compared to a straight-in to Runway 1.

Closing testimony on future ACAS XR technology indicated it could have alerted the Black Hawk crew 73 seconds before impact, with potential nationwide deployment by 2027. Max weaves these details into a narrative showing how technological shortfalls, flawed assumptions, procedural gaps, and cultural challenges all converged in this tragic midair — and what reforms could prevent a repeat.

NTSB Docket on Reagan National midair collision

Check out our other Aviation News Talk Network podcasts:

UAV News Talk Podcast

Rotary Wing Show Podcast

Aviation News Talk

Max Trescott plays audio clips from Day 2 of the NTSB investigative hearing on the midair collision near Washington’s Reagan National Airport between a PSA Airlines CRJ-700 and a U.S. Army UH-60L Black Hawk. This day focused exclusively on Panel 3: Training, Guidance, and Procedures Applicable to DCA Air Traffic Control, revealing systemic issues that shaped the events leading to the accident.

A major theme was visual separation. Testimony explored the difference between pilot-applied and tower-applied visual separation in Class B airspace and the operational norm at DCA where helicopter pilots almost reflexively request pilot-applied visual separation. Experts explained how the unique combination of restricted airspace, helicopter routes, and runway configurations makes visual separation “paramount” for traffic flow, though it shifts collision avoidance responsibility to pilots. A U.S. Army pilot described the difficulty of spotting Runway 33 arrivals at low altitude, highlighting how these challenges contributed to the accident sequence.

Staffing emerged as a critical factor. The DCA tower had 19 fully operational controllers to cover 16 shifts a day, forcing position combinations such as merging tower and helicopter frequencies. Witnesses described high workload and a culture summed up by the phrase “just make it work,” raising questions about whether safety margins were being eroded. A management-level request to reduce arrival rates from 32 to 28 per hour due to safety concerns was denied, reportedly over political timing related to FAA reauthorization.

The hearing also examined miles-in-trail spacing, revealing inconsistent agreements between Potomac TRACON and DCA Tower and noting that arrivals were being fed at less than four miles apart before the accident. Conflict alert systems were scrutinized, with testimony that up to 50% of alerts are “nuisance alerts,” that could lead to controller desensitization. The Black Hawk’s lack of ADS-B Out was discussed, though radar coverage mitigated its effect on conflict alerting in this case.

Additional revelations included confusion over helicopter route altitudes, the tower’s downgrade from Level 10 to Level 9 (which resulted in new controllers being paid at a lower level than existing controllers), and an external compliance audit that found 33 areas of non-compliance—so severe the audit was halted and converted into an internal corrective action. The episode also covers the failure to conduct alcohol testing at all of controllers after the accident, contrary to the DOT’s two-hour requirement.

Max weaves over an hour of testimony into a narrative that exposes the intersection of human factors, training gaps, and systemic pressures inside one of the nation’s most complex airspace environments. The episode underscores how a combination of cultural norms, operational constraints, and safety oversight gaps set the stage for this tragic collision—and what must change to prevent future accidents.

NTSB Docket on Reagan National midair collision

Check out our other Aviation News Talk Network podcasts:

UAV News Talk Podcast

Rotary Wing Show Podcast

Aviation News Talk

Max Trescott takes listeners deep inside Day 1 of the NTSB’s investigative hearing into the tragic midair collision near Washington’s Reagan National Airport between a PSA Airlines CRJ-700 and a U.S. Army UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter. The accident claimed the lives of 67 people, including the crew of both aircraft, and has become one of the most scrutinized airspace safety failures in recent history. In this episode of NTSB News Talk, Max distills over ten hours of testimony into 18 critical clips, delivering more than an hour of compelling audio that reveals surprising findings, heated exchanges, and systemic safety issues.

The day opened with an animated reconstruction of the collision showing the helicopter at 280 feet MSL—80 feet above the 200-foot altitude depicted for that segment of the published helicopter route—and the CRJ-700 at 290 feet on short final to DCA’s Runway 33. Panel 1, “Overview of Accident Helicopter’s Air Data Systems and Altimeters,” uncovered a significant problem with UH-60L altimeter accuracy. Test flights conducted after the accident revealed rotor downwash caused barometric altimeters to read 80–130 feet lower than true altitude at hover and cruise. Compounding the issue, transponder encoders legally transmit in 100-foot increments and can be off by up to 90 feet while still being “in spec.” The testimony underscored how cumulative tolerances could create a 100-foot discrepancy between left and right seat altimeters, even with properly maintained systems.

The hearing also exposed a fundamental difference in altitude standards between Army and civilian pilots. Army witnesses stated their standard is to maintain altitude within ±100 feet, meaning 300 feet would still be considered acceptable when targeting 200 feet MSL. Civilian operators, including medevac pilots accustomed to the DCA corridor, testified that in this airspace 200 feet is treated as a hard ceiling, not a target with a tolerance band. This cultural gap framed much of the day’s discussion.

Panel 2, “Overview of the DCA Class B Airspace and Helicopter Routes,” shifted focus to the unique and congested structure of Washington’s helicopter corridors. FAA representatives confirmed a startling fact: the altitudes on the published helicopter charts are “recommended” for VFR operations and are not regulatory unless specifically assigned by ATC. Likewise, drifting off the depicted route or exceeding the published altitude is not a violation unless ATC imposes a hard restriction. Yet multiple witnesses testified that in practice, both Army and civilian pilots, as well as controllers, treat the published routes and altitudes as mandatory. The disconnect between policy and operational understanding drew pointed questioning from the Board.

A recurring theme was the vulnerability of the route structure due to lack of consistent oversight. FAA orders require an annual review of the Baltimore-Washington helicopter route chart, but testimony revealed that DCA Tower has cycled through ten air traffic managers since 2013, with five in the last five years, making continuity of safety evaluations nearly impossible. A working group identified Route 4—the exact route used by the Black Hawk—as hazardous and attempted to mitigate risk by designating charted hotspots. FAA’s Aeronautical Information Services rejected the request on the grounds that “hotspot” symbology is limited to surface charts. NTSB members expressed frustration that bureaucratic charting standards overrode a direct safety recommendation from front-line controllers in the nation’s most complex helicopter environment.

One surprising revelation involved ADS-B compliance. The Army testified that less than 20% of its flights in the region flew with ADS-B Out enabled. Even worse, the investigation discovered that seven of eight Lima-model Black Hawks at

Max and Rob bring listeners a packed episode of aviation safety lessons anchored by the NTSB. They begin with the Board’s announcement of a three-day investigative hearing into the Reagan National midair between a regional jet and a U.S. Army helicopter. Rob dives into a dramatic close call in North Dakota, where a Delta Regional Jet on final narrowly avoided a B-52 bomber crossing its flight path near Minot. The incident exposes communication gaps, contract tower limitations, and the critical need for radar and coordination between military and civilian traffic.

In Mexico City, a Delta A320 rejected a high-speed takeoff to avoid an AeroMexico E-190 landing over the top of it on the same runway. The event raises red flags about ATC language use, as Spanish transmissions prevented the Delta crew from maintaining situational awareness. Max explores the Hollister RV-8/Cirrus collision, highlighting how a relocated runway threshold and lack of radio calls can set the stage for disaster. A video of the midair was posted on Facebook.

AOPA's Sweepstakes Aviat A-1C-200 Husky was damaged in a landing incident, in which the pilot's left foot was misplaced an not on the rudder pedal.

A Murphy Aircraft Manufacturing Limited Moose airplane, N250MK, was destroyed when it was involved in a takeoff accident near Montrose, CO. According to the Preliminary NTSB report, two pilots on board were killed.

The Falcon 10 runway overrun in Panama City offers a textbook example of checklist discipline when thrust reversers failed due to switches left in the wrong position, turning deceleration into forward thrust. The AOPA Sweepstakes Husky mishap adds another cautionary tale about cockpit discipline and distractions.

The episode’s most personal moment comes when Rob shares his experience flying rusty in a G1000-equipped Cessna 182. Fatigue, cockpit visibility issues, haze, and a failed trim system combined to erode his performance and highlight how ego can mask risk. Max underscores the I’M SAFE checklist—illness, medications, stress, alcohol, fatigue, emotion—and how self-awareness can prevent tragedies. Together, they emphasize that open discussion and honest reflection are vital to improving safety and preventing accidents.

Check out our other Aviation News Talk Network podcasts:

UAV News Talk Podcast

Rotary Wing Show Podcast

Aviation News Talk

Max Trescott and Rob Mark return for episode five of NTSB News Talk with a full slate of recent accidents and preliminary reports that highlight critical lessons in decision-making, mechanical failure, and situational awareness.

They start with the tragic crash of a Cirrus SR22 in North Carolina that killed a family of four. The aircraft had experienced electrical issues early in the flight, and despite indications of ongoing problems, the pilot chose to continue to the destination rather than land. Max emphasizes how what may seem like a minor issue—such as an alternator failure—can escalate, especially if the pilot doesn’t fully understand the systems or how cascading failures can emerge.

Next, they examine a mid-air collision in Steinbach, Manitoba between two Cessna training aircraft. Despite clear weather and an active pattern, both pilots were killed. Max reminds listeners that most mid-airs happen close to airports, often on final. Rob adds that see-and-avoid doesn’t always work, especially with sun glare or poor traffic sequencing.

They then move to a bizarre and poorly documented case of a Cessna T240 that departed Ramona, California and flew 400 miles offshore before descending into the Pacific. With no radio contact and the aircraft failing to respond to repeated ATC calls, the case raises the possibility of a medical event or incapacitation. The plane was never recovered.

A medical charter King Air crash in London, UK, is briefly discussed. The aircraft appeared to roll left and crash immediately after takeoff. Rob stresses the importance of immediate rudder input and pitch control following engine failure in twins.

A major focus of the episode is the preliminary report on Air India Flight 171, a Boeing 787 that lost both engines seconds after rotation. Both fuel cutoff switches moved from RUN to CUTOFF, then briefly back. One pilot is heard asking, “Why did you cut the fuel?” The other responds, “I didn’t do anything.” Rob and Max explore the implications of this odd event, especially in light of a 2018 FAA bulletin about fuel control switch locking mechanisms. Despite the non-mandatory nature of the bulletin, it directly referenced the potential for disengagement of the locking feature. Rob explains how the switches require a deliberate lift-and-pull action to move into CUTOFF, making accidental movement unlikely. Suicide and sabotage are also deemed improbable.

The discussion turns back to U.S. reports, including a crash in Montana where a Cessna 172 flew low and hit unmarked power lines. Max reiterates how hard it is to see wires until it's too late. Rob reflects on his own youthful low-level flying and how little awareness he had of such hazards at the time.

They then discuss a helicopter crash in Alaska. A Robinson R66 pilot operating in flat, snow-covered terrain under a 500-foot overcast likely experienced whiteout conditions and lost situational awareness. Max explains how disorientation is common in visually featureless environments—recounting his own night flight in hazy conditions where city lights and stars blurred...

Max Trescott and Rob Mark return for Episode 4 of NTSB News Talk with critical analysis and commentary on recent aviation accidents and safety investigations. The show kicks off with an update on the fatal Air India Flight 171 crash involving a Boeing 787, which resulted in 241 onboard deaths and 19 fatalities on the ground. A single survivor remains, and while early speculation surrounds the Ram Air Turbine deployment and potential engine failure, official conclusions await India's preliminary report, expected in three months.

The discussion then shifts to the LEAP-1B engine bird strike incidents involving Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 MAX jets. Both flights suffered bird ingestion leading to severe cockpit smoke—traced to a design issue where the Load Reduction Device (LRD) triggered an oil leak into the bleed air system. Though the FAA downplayed the threat, the NTSB issued a safety bulletin highlighting the potential risk, drawing parallels to the MCAS issue that plagued earlier MAX crashes.

Next, Max recaps the San Diego Citation S550 crash, which occurred during an LNAV approach at night. The pilot descended well below minimums—possibly misreading a military-only value of 500 feet on the approach chart. With no weather reporting available at Montgomery Field and several human factors at play, fatigue and poor decision-making appear to have contributed to the crash.

In Broomfield, Colorado, a Beechcraft Travel Air crashed after the pilot reported a door pop shortly after takeoff. The pilot flew an abnormally low pattern and lost control during the downwind leg, possibly due to a stall induced by slowed airspeed. Max and Rob stress that open doors are not emergencies and urge pilots to fly a normal pattern and maintain aircraft control.

Rob covers a fatal floatplane crash near Beaver Island, Michigan, where a homebuilt Avid Magnum impacted water during a low sightseeing pass. Though conditions were reported clear, satellite imagery later revealed smoke and haze that likely obscured the horizon. The glassy water conditions and lack of instrumentation may have contributed to the pilot's inability to perceive altitude, a classic seaplane hazard.

The show also reviews the in-flight breakup of a Cessna 182 in Reliance, Tennessee, caused by continued flight into a thunderstorm and turbulence beyond the aircraft’s maneuvering speed. Shockingly, the aircraft’s BRS parachute was deployed but not connected properly to the structure, rendering it useless.

Finally, the episode covers a Cessna 182RG crash in North Carolina. Witnesses reported an excessively nose-high attitude during a soft field takeoff attempt. The airplane stalled and crashed after barely lifting off. Investigators determined that the pilot likely failed to properly set the elevator trim before...