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  • Parfit on Game Theory (Part One)

    Parfit on Game Theory (Part One)
    2025/06/19
    On Derek Parfit's "Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner's Dilemma" (1978). What is a "prisoner's dilemma" and what is its relevance to ethics? In general, it's better for me if I break norms so long as others in general follow them, but if we all try to be free riders in this way, then no one gets to ride at all. Parfit considers variations of this situation and lays out legislative and ideological/psychological strategies for addressing them. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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    1 時間
  • Spinoza on Emotions (Part One)

    Spinoza on Emotions (Part One)
    2025/06/05
    On Spinoza's Ethics, Third Part, "Concerning the Origin and Nature of the Emotions." We want to see how emotions ground ethics, but first, we have to explain what emotions are, which means explaining how mind and body (and causality) work together on Spinoza's account. A passion is being affected by something that we don't understand, whereas reason (which will yield ethical behavior) involves grasping a cause clearly and distinctly. The latter means it's in your individual mind, whereas even if you don't understand the cause, it's still in God's mind, which each of us is essentially a part of. Read along with us, starting on p. 83 (PDF p. 129). You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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    58 分
  • Scheler on Personhood (Part Three)

    Scheler on Personhood (Part Three)
    2025/05/29
    On "Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values" (1916), Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," sec. 3, "Person and Act." While you may want to listen to part one, we're more or less starting fresh, as parts one and two (the latter only available to paying supporters at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy), were mostly about how Scheler rejects Kant's idea of the transcendental ego. We're skipping several pages here to start with section 3 on the recommendation from a member of the International Scheler society, hoping that at least we will find out what makes a person: What makes each of us unique and worthy of moral respect? Read along with us, starting on p. 382 (PDF p. 415). You can choose to watch this on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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    1 時間 7 分
  • Edith Stein on Self (Part One)

    Edith Stein on Self (Part One)
    2025/05/05
    We discuss "On the Problem of Empathy," ch. 4 "Empathy as the Comprehension of Mental Persons," starting with section 2, "The Mental Subject" and into section 3, "The Constitution of the Person in Emotional Experiences." We're trying to figure out what these early 20th century German phenomenologists think a "person" is as someone we're able to empathize or sympathize with and which is morally worthy of respect. Stein does this by saying what the "I" (the self) is. It is the thing that "has" experiences, but also something that we understand in terms of a network of motivations, which are different than mere causes, in that they're supposed to be rational. Our self gains definition, Stein says, when we have emotional experiences, which can of course be shallow and undirected (mere moods) or can be very deep and self-revelatory. Read along with us, starting on p. 87 (PDF p. 107). You can choose to ⁠watch this on video⁠. To get future parts, subscribe at ⁠patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy⁠. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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    1 時間 5 分
  • Scheler on Personhood (Part One)

    Scheler on Personhood (Part One)
    2025/04/16
    On Ch. 6 "Formalism and Person," in Max Scheler's most famous work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (1916). Ethical Formalism is Kant: What makes something ethically correct is just something about the type of act and willing involved. Non-formalism pays attention to the content, e.g. our sentiments (a la Hume). As we've been studying on The Partially Examined Life, phenomenologists starting with Brentano sought to merge the two: Things in our experience just present themselves as intuitively praiseworthy, and this is sufficient to establish ethical obligations. We have been reading about how Scheler relies in his ethical theorizing on our experiences of sympathy and love, but we wanted to learn more about what it is about particular people that we love and respect: What is it to be a "person" in the moral sense? This book moves very slowly, so in this part he's still just distinguishing himself from Kant when it comes to saying some basic things about your relation to your own selfhood. Read along with us, starting on p. 370 (PDF p. 403). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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    1 時間 2 分
  • Schopenhauer on Ethics (Part One)

    Schopenhauer on Ethics (Part One)
    2025/04/02
    On The Basis of Morality (1840), Part III: "The Founding of Ethics," Ch. 5: "Statement and Proof of the Only True Moral Incentive." Everything up to this point in the book has been negative: Morality can't be founded on pure reason as Kant thinks, or on the idea of the good life (eudaimonia) per Aristotle. Schopenhauer tells us that all actions are motivated by someone's "weal" or "woe." We are naturally self-interested (motivated by own own weal and woe), but such actions will not be moral. So Schopenhauer's puzzle is: How can I be effectively motivated by someone else's weal and woe? I must somehow identify with that person so that the Other's suffering induces my compassion. This is the only source of moral value. Read along with us, starting on p. 165 (PDF p. 193). You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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    1 時間 8 分
  • Husserl on Perceiving Minds

    Husserl on Perceiving Minds
    2025/03/21
    On Edmund Husserl’s Ideas, Vol. 2 (1928), Section 3, “The Constitution of the Spiritual World,” Ch. 1, “Opposition Between the Naturalistic and Personalistic Worlds." Given Husserl’s method of “reduction” whereby he sets aside the metaphysical status of objects in the natural world (are they mind-independent or merely ideas?), we wanted to see how he accounts for our ability to directly perceive other people’s minds. We don’t just perceive their bodies and our own bodies and deduce that others must be like us, but we perceive both our minds and those of others as strata (aspects) of physical bodies. Read along with us, starting on p. 183 (PDF p. 101). You can choose to watch this unedited on video. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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    1 時間 11 分
  • Guattari on Fascism (Part One)

    Guattari on Fascism (Part One)
    2025/02/18
    Mark and Wes read through and discuss the beginning of Felix Guattari's "Everybody Wants to Be a Fascist" (1973). Guattari was a Lacanian psychotherapist, and he argues for explaining fascist tendencies via a "micropolitics of desire," i.e. looking at the individual psychology of fascism instead of merely focusing on sociological, material causes of the rise of fascism. Read along with us. You can choose to watch this on video. To get future parts, subscribe at patreon.com/closereadsphilosophy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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    1 時間 13 分