ACCTG 502 | Session 5 | The Role of Sell-Side Analysts after Accusations of Managerial Misconduct
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ACCTG 502 | Session 5 | The Role of Sell-Side Analysts after Accusations of Managerial Misconduct
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ACCTG 502 | Session 5 | The Role of Sell-Side Analysts after Accusations of Managerial Misconduct - 2019
Jared Jennings
Introduction:
The study investigates how sell-side analysts respond to security class action lawsuits that allege managerial misconduct. Jennings (2019) argues that while prior scholarship often critiques analyst research as biased or inefficient, the filing of a lawsuit creates an environment in which managers are constrained in disclosure, thereby elevating the potential informational role of analysts. The central finding is that analysts not only increase the volume of their research but that this research becomes more informative for investors following litigation filings (p. 183). This reframes analysts as valuable intermediaries during crises of managerial credibility.