The Partisan's Gambit | Why Leaders Like Weak Candidates
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The Partisan's Gambit | Why Leaders Like Weak Candidates
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Why would a political party support a candidate who's less likely to win an election?
Because winning the election isn't the only consideration. Party leaders and political activists also care about what their candidates will do once elected.
In this episode of The Rational Nationalist, Lee Ellis examines the trade-off between electability and political loyalty—and why a weaker candidate may sometimes offer party leadership more influence than a stronger, more independent one.
We explore:
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Why independently popular politicians have greater freedom to defy party leadership.
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How primaries create incentives for ideological conformity.
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The difference between partisan voting records and actual obedience to leadership.
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A simple probability model for comparing a candidate's electoral prospects with their expected value to party leaders.
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How political dependence can shape the relationship between elected officials and the people who helped put them in office.
Ultimately, the episode asks whether political movements are trying to elect the most effective representatives—or the representatives they can most easily influence.