『Paraguayan Banking Crisis』のカバーアート

Paraguayan Banking Crisis

Paraguayan Banking Crisis

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This week we talk about the collapse of a Paraguayan bank, the removal of a president, and a struggle inside one of the world’s longest-serving ruling parties.We also discuss deposit insurance, public pension money, and the difference between political accountability and criminal guilt.Recommended Book: Three Parts Dead by Max GladstoneTranscriptIn Paraguay, a country of around six million people, the accounts of a bank with close to three million customers were suddenly frozen on November third. People couldn’t withdraw their savings, transfer money, or use their cards. And while the government began returning some of these frozen deposits within days, a great many people were left wondering when, and whether, they would get all their money back.Three days later, the country’s president, Santiago Peña, was out of office.Peña had been elected in 2023. He offered to resign as the bank crisis grew, but lawmakers rejected that resignation and removed him through an impeachment vote instead. His vice president, Pedro Alliana, is now president, while Peña faces criminal charges connected to the bank’s collapse. He denies wrongdoing, and those charges have not been proven in court.What I’d like to talk about today is how a bank failure became a presidential crisis, and why the removal of one leader may not change the underlying political system that allowed this situation to develop in Paraguay.—The bank was called Ueno, spelled U-E-N-O, and it enjoyed a remarkably rapid rise in Paraguay. It began operating under that name in 2021, won a banking license in 2023, and absorbed an established bank called Visión the following year. It offered an easy-to-use digital account, generous rebates on everyday purchases, and a familiar name: it sponsored Paraguay’s national soccer team and slathered its branding across the country.Its growth wasn’t just the consequence of aggressive advertising, though. Ueno reached people traditional banks had often missed. According to the bank, more than a million Paraguayans opened their first bank account with them. And again, in 2026 it reported roughly three million customers, making its failure a problem for a substantial share of the country’s adults, and something like half of the country’s total population.And it wasn’t just normal people: public institutions were putting money in there, too. By the time Ueno failed, it held around $850 million in public deposits, roughly 30% of the money deposited with the bank. That included money from the country’s social security institution, pension funds, and operators of its large hydroelectric dams. So this wasn’t only a question of individual savings accounts. Money intended for retirement and public services was involved, as well.Let’s talk about banking in general, real quick, to better understand what happened here, and how a bank this successful could suffer an outcome this bad.When you deposit money, that deposit becomes an obligation the bank owes you. The bank uses much of the money it receives to make loans and buy other assets. If those assets are sound, the bank can generally meet its obligations over time. But if a significant number of loans are unlikely to be repaid, the bank may owe depositors more than its assets can cover. The bank’s own capital is supposed to absorb some of those losses; regulators require banks hold a minimum amount of money for precisely that reason.In Ueno’s case, Paraguay’s central bank said a review found problems with the quality of its assets, inadequate documentation for some transactions, and lending to companies connected to the bank’s owners. After the necessary adjustments to its accounts, Ueno’s measure of financial strength fell below half the required minimum. On November third, the central bank began a formal process to resolve the bank: taking control to assess what it owned, protect what it could, and determine how customers would be paid.Loans to a bank’s owners or their other companies are especially sensitive because the bank may have reasons to make those loans on terms it wouldn’t offer an unrelated borrower. That doesn’t mean every such loan is fraudulent, or that investigators have established exactly how much will be lost here. But it does help explain why the regulator’s findings were more serious than a temporary shortage of cash.And those findings raised another question: how had this bank grown so much, and received so much public money, if it had these sorts of problems?Peña had owned a stake in Ueno’s parent company until 2025. After becoming president, he also appointed Carlos Carvallo, who had previously led Ueno’s predecessor company, to head the central bank that regulated it. Lawmakers have accused Peña of using his position to direct public funds toward Ueno, and of allowing a large concentration of social security money in the bank despite legal limits. Prosecutors are investigating Peña and Carvallo over ...
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