Jane opens with a framing that runs through the entire conversation: for Africa, the subsea cable story is not primarily about geopolitics. It is about connecting citizens and translating that connectivity into economic participation. Less than 40% of Africans use the internet, and while infrastructure investments are significant, the benefits tend to concentrate in urban hubs like Nairobi, Lagos, and Cape Town, while rural populations, women, and landlocked countries remain underserved. The 2024 cable cut that affected ten African countries brought into sharp focus just how fragile the system is. Africa has only one dedicated cable repair vessel for the entire continent, and mobilizing it costs millions of dollars and takes days. Jane walks through what is now being put in place: clearer government notification protocols, mandated interconnection between telecom operators, and cross-border coordination frameworks, with West Africa emerging as a model that the rest of the continent has not yet replicated.

On Chinese infrastructure, Jane is pragmatic. The framing of east versus west is, in her view, the wrong one for African policymakers who are already deeply invested in Chinese telecom towers, terrestrial fiber, and mobile devices across the continent. The more useful question is how to secure what already exists, ensuring cybersecurity safeguards are in place regardless of where the infrastructure comes from. On the ITU advisory body, whose final report was published in Geneva in July, the recommendations cover coordination, standards, and geographic diversity, but the document is non-binding. The real work, she says, now rests with national governments and regulators to take those recommendations forward.

Episode Contributors

Charukeshi Bhatt is a research analyst at Carnegie India, where her work focuses on the intersection of emerging technologies and international security. Her current research explores how advancements in technologies such as AI are shaping global disarmament frameworks and security norms.

Jane Munga is a Fellow in the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where she leads research on technology policy. Her work addresses how African countries can harness digital technologies to advance inclusive and sustainable growth. Her work focuses on the nexus of digital policy, digital partnerships, and developing the foundational elements of digital development.

Readings

India’s Stake in the Global Subsea Cable Race
Subsea Cables, Trusted Networks, and India's Strategic Opportunity

Every two weeks, Interpreting India brings you diverse voices from India and around the world to explore the critical questions shaping the nation's future. We delve into how technology, the economy, and foreign policy intertwine to influence India's relationship with the global stage.

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The conversation opens with a useful baseline on both countries. Australia has world-class mining equipment, technology, and services capabilities, and its mining sector contributes roughly 10 to 15 percent of GDP, yet it remains predominantly a raw material exporter with limited domestic demand. India has a large and growing demand for minerals to fuel its manufacturing ambitions, a vast talent pool, and competitive labour and energy costs, but has historically underinvested in systematic exploration, reserve creation, and processing relative to its long-term needs. The complementarity is clear, but Professor Yellishetty is equally clear about what is missing: while government-to-government and university-to-university engagement is working well through mechanisms such as the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Ministry of Mines MoU, and KABIL's engagement with Australia's Critical Minerals Facilitation Office, the business-to-business piece

On the Australia-India Critical Minerals Research Hub (AICMRH), the conversation traces its origins to a community of practice that came together during the COVID-19 lockdown, eventually growing to around 150 researchers. The Hub has since hosted national symposiums, submitted recommendations to ministries on both sides, and facilitated student exchanges, with institutional partnerships including Monash University's collaborations with IIT Bombay and IIT Hyderabad. Professor Yellishetty notes that the Hub's policy recommendations fed into discussions around India's first critical minerals list and the announcement of Centres of Excellence (CoE) under the National Critical Minerals Mission, launched in 2025. The next step, he argues, is institutionalising this through a Joint Centre of Excellence that can anchor commercial outcomes alongside research, including moving promising technologies such as environmentally benign processing methods like deep eutectic solvents from laboratory to pilot scale and eventually to commercial deployment.

Looking ahead, Professor Yellishetty organises the India-Australia opportunity into five buckets: policy and trade, technology research and development, investment and financing, skills and capacity building, and ESG learning. He sees particular promise in co-developing processing technologies rather than simply transferring them, spanning rare earth extraction, lithium value chains, and environmentally safer processing, as well as co-investing in third countries like Indonesia and Vietnam that hold significant mineral reserves. He also situates the bilateral relationship within the wider Quad framework, where Australia contributes mining and ESG expertise, Japan brings capital and downstream processing experience, and the United States offers technology and intellectual property, alongside India's scale and human capital. The ambition, ultimately, is to build India into not just a consumer of critical minerals but a processing hub capable of serving western markets.

Every two weeks, Interpreting India brings you diverse voices from India and around the world to explore the critical questions shaping the nation's future. We delve into how technology, the economy, and foreign policy intertwine to influence India's relationship with the global stage.

As a Carnegie India production, hosted by Carnegie scholars, Interpreting India, a Carnegie India production, provides insightful perspectives and cutting-edge by tackling the defining questions that chart India's course through the next decade.

Stay tuned for thought-provoking discussions, expert insights, and a deeper understanding of India's place in the world.

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Edward lays out three criteria for what makes something a genuine choke point: dominant market share, difficulty to substitute, and the ability to weaponize it with asymmetric impact, hurting the adversary far more than yourself. All three are needed.

The U.S. dollar is involved in 90% of foreign exchange transactions. China refines 90% of the global supply of rare earths. Nvidia designs 85% of advanced AI chips. These are all choke points. Canada's dependence on the U.S. market, on the other hand, is not, because imposing embargo-level tariffs on Canada would be just as damaging to the U.S. as to Canada. The distinction, he notes, is not between weaponizing interdependence but weaponizing dependence.

On the question of incremental versus decisive action when it comes to what nations can do in response to chokepoints, Edward's view is clear: when you ratchet up sanctions or export controls gradually, the adversary adapts the whole time. The pressure goes up a little, they find workarounds; the impact goes down, and you end up with a zigzagging pattern that is not particularly effective. On semiconductors, he pushes back on the argument that restricting chip exports to China simply incentivizes them to build their own, pointing out that Huawei's chip subsidiary currently holds around 1% of the advanced AI chip market. If the AI race could be decided in the next few years, giving China access to Nvidia chips in the interim would, in his view, be giving ammunition to an adversary in the middle of the most important technology race of our lifetimes.

On India, Edward's view is that India has more optionality than almost any other country outside the U.S. and China. He sees deeper economic integration with like-minded partners as the most promising path forward, and thinks India is well positioned to benefit from the current transition in the global economic order. He is also candid that both the U.S. and China use economic coercion, and that it is reasonable for countries like India to factor that in. But when stacking the two up, his view is that the U.S. legal system, with its checks and balances, offers more predictability than the alternative.

Every two weeks, Interpreting India brings you diverse voices from India and around the world to explore the critical questions shaping the nation's future. We delve into how technology, the economy, and foreign policy intertwine to influence India's relationship with the global stage.

As a Carnegie India production, hosted by Carnegie scholars, Interpreting India, a Carnegie India production, provides insightful perspectives and cutting-edge by tackling the defining questions that chart India's course through the next decade.

Stay tuned for thought-provoking discussions, expert insights, and a deeper understanding of India's place in the world.

Don't forget to subscribe, share, and leave a review to join the conversation and be part of Interpreting India's journey.