The National Stock Exchange's ₹22,562 crore share sale closed on 21 September, and Jio Platforms has filed for one larger still. Neither is doing much to India's money market.

This episode looks at what that means for corporate treasury in India: why application money is blocked rather than paid away, the cap on borrowing to bid, the Reserve Bank's standing deposit facility and its reverse repo auctions, the ₹1 lakh crore of open market bond sales running through September, what allotment day actually moves between banks, and how I'd time a commercial paper roll or a surplus placement around all of it.

(00:00) Why the NSE issue didn't move rates
(01:29) What a big IPO used to do
(02:09) Three things that changed
(04:29) What's left of the old effect
(05:39) What I'd watch instead

Personal views. Not investment advice.

SOURCES
• Call money, triparty repo, standing deposit facility, reverse repo and net liquidity — Reserve Bank of India, Money Market Operations, daily releases
• Policy rates — Reserve Bank of India
• Open market bond sales through September — RBI announcements and auction results
• NSE issue size, subscription and bids — Business Standard and market reporting
• Jio Platforms' draft offer document, June 2026 — press reporting of the filing
• Blocked-amount application rules — SEBI circulars of 2011 and 2015
• The cap on non-bank lending against IPO applications — RBI Scale Based Regulation and the 2023 Master Direction
• Coal India's 2010 issue and the liquidity that week — contemporaneous Business Standard reporting

Figures are as reported. Check against the underlying data before relying on them.

The US Federal Reserve raised interest rates on 16 September, its first increase since 2023, and its own projections no longer show cuts next year.

This episode looks at what that means for corporate treasury in India: the Federal Reserve's own votes and projections, oil prices after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, inflation, the Indian rupee and its forward premium, the Reserve Bank of India's currency swaps and forward book, Indian interest rates before the October monetary policy decision, and hedging decisions on imports, exports and dollar loans.

(00:00) Why hedging didn't follow the Fed

(00:46) How the Fed changed its mind

(02:40) Why our hedging cost went up

(05:34) What it says about rates and the rupee

(06:37) What I'd do on the desk

If you'd like a follow-up once the Reserve Bank has decided, let me know on LinkedIn or X.

Personal views. Not investment advice.

SOURCES

• Fed decision, vote records and projections — Federal Reserve press releases, FOMC minutes and Summary of Economic Projections, March to September 2026

• Oil prices through the first quarter — US Energy Information Administration

• Forward premia and Indian swap rates — FBIL published benchmarks; US Treasury yields — FRED

• Importer and exporter forward cover — Clearing Corporation of India data, reported by Reuters

• The Reserve Bank's deposit window, currency swaps and forward book — RBI announcements and the August 2026 Bulletin, reported by Business Standard and Reuters

• Indian rate expectations before the October policy decision — Reuters

• Removal of the hedging requirement on foreign currency borrowing, February 2026 — Khaitan & Co on the amended regulations

Figures are as reported. Check against the underlying data before relying on them.

The new FEMA regulations for exports and imports take effect on 1 October 2026, and most of the decisions in them now sit with your AD bank rather than the Reserve Bank.

This episode looks at what that means for a corporate treasury: realisation periods and advances for exporters, payment terms and advances for importers, netting and central treasury arrangements, and the documentation that comes with all of it.

If you'd like a follow-up episode once banks publish their policies, let me know on LinkedIn or X.

Personal views. Not investment advice.

SOURCES

- Foreign Exchange Management (Export and Import of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2026 — RBI Notification FEMA 23(R)/2026-RB, 13 January 2026; Directions on Export and Import of Goods and Services, 16 January 2026; effective 1 October 2026 — regulation text as reproduced by World Trade Scanner; summaries by PwC India, EY India, AZB & Partners
- Export realisation 15 months, 18 months where invoiced or settled in rupees (Regulation 5); earlier history: 9 months, 15 months from 13 November 2025, 9 months from 5 June 2026 — CorpLawUpdates
- Earlier rule on export advances (shipment within one year; refund thereafter needed RBI approval) — RBI Master Direction – Export of Goods and Services, via TaxGuru; three-year extension, 13 November 2025 — Council for Leather Exports
- Import payments per the underlying contract (Regulation 9), replacing the six-month rule; USD 200,000 guarantee threshold on import advances replaced by bank discretion (Regulation 10(3)); consequences if an import doesn't materialise (Regulation 12) — regulation text; EY India
- Set-off of export receivables against import payables with the same overseas buyer or supplier or their overseas group or associate companies (Regulation 7); third-party receipts and payments (Regulation 8) — regulation text
- Group set-off through a centralised settlement arrangement — RBI A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 08, 4 December 2020, via TaxGuru
- Credit or debit only after the bank is satisfied of genuineness, with EDPMS/IDPMS updated simultaneously (Regulation 4(2)); bank internal policy and SOP (Regulation 19) — regulation text
- RBI framework for invoicing and settlement of international trade in rupees, 11 July 2022 — PIB

Figures are as reported. Check against the underlying regulation text before relying on them.

On the second of September, Japan's JCR gave India its best sovereign credit grade from a major international agency in over 35 years - A minus, with the country ceiling raised too. It's real, and it's a genuinely good story for India.

But does it move the number that actually decides your India cost of capital?

This episode is about the gap between a rating headline and what's still sitting inside a treasury's own model. Moody's, S&P and Fitch - the three agencies most hurdle rates and country risk premiums are actually built on - haven't moved, and are all on stable outlook. What does a sovereign rating actually do to a company's cost of funding, in two separate channels? And where has the market itself already been pricing India, ahead of every rating agency, JCR included?

We also look at the honest counter - where a smaller agency's move can matter contractually, in a facility's rating-linked clauses, even while it changes nothing in the model.

Personal views. Not investment advice.

SOURCES

- JCR upgrades India's FCY/LCY long-term issuer rating BBB+ to A-, stable outlook, raises country ceiling to A, unsolicited, 2 September 2026 - India TV, OpIndia, Organiser

- Fitch affirms India at BBB-, stable outlook, August 2025 - Yahoo Finance / Fitch, newsonair.gov.in

- S&P upgrades India to BBB, stable, from BBB-, 14 August 2025 - first S&P India upgrade in 18 years - Business Standard topic archive

- Moody's rates India Baa3, stable - Business Standard topic archive

- R&I (a separate Japanese agency from JCR) upgraded India to BBB+, September 2025 - newsonair.gov.in

- Damodaran country risk premium table: Baa3 default spread 1.87%, A3 default spread 1.02% - pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html, last updated 5 January 2026, data vintage January 2026

- India sovereign 5-year USD CDS spread, one recent reading, approximately 0.88% (87.67bp, near a 52-week high) - Investing.com, India CDS 5 Year USD page; flagged in the episode itself as needing a refresh before anyone builds on it

Figures are as reported. Check against the underlying data before relying on them.

The rupee fell 2.9% in 2024. It fell 4.9% in 2025 — the worst performance of any currency in Asia. In the first five months of this year, it fell 7%.

Nothing about India got three times more fragile in eighteen months. What changed is that somebody stopped holding the currency up, and had told us in advance this was coming.

This episode takes the rupee in three parts, each a different regime. How it was held for most of the last decade, at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars in reserves. How that changed with a new central bank governor in December 2024, and what the currency then did — a record low in February 2025, a new all-time low in May 2026. And what's holding it up now, which is different again: not spot dollar sales, but borrowed ones, through swap windows with published end dates.

It ends on what's actually ours to check — not where the currency goes next, but whether our hedge coverage, the instrument behind it, and the forecast it's built on were ever updated for the regime we're actually in.

Including the honest caveat: letting a currency move freely is a defensible policy, not a failure, and two of the three forces pushing the rupee down aren't Indian policy at all.

Personal views. Not investment advice.

SOURCES

• Rupee depreciation — 2.9% (2024), 4.9% (2025, worst in Asia), 7.04% (Jan-May 2026)

• Record low 87.57 (6 Feb 2025); 94.71 (Mar 2026); 95.33 (30 Apr 2026); all-time low 96.82 (20 May 2026)

• RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra on intervention aims — "maintain orderliness and stability without compromising market efficiency"

• RBI reserves — peak $728.49bn (Feb 2026), $690.69bn (1 May 2026), record $729.3bn (week to 21 Aug 2026)

• RBI forward book record $136.7bn (Jul 2026), up from $106.6bn (May 2026)

• FCNR(B) deposit window — $52.3bn raised, closed early 31 August 2026; corporate borrowing window open to 31 December 2026

• Rupee past 95, 9 September 2026, RBI selling dollars as crude climbed

Figures are as reported. Check against the underlying data before relying on them.

A year ago, India's inflation printed at a quarter of one per cent — the lowest reading on record. The only question in the market was how many more rate cuts were coming. Fifty-nine out of seventy economists polled in January expected the central bank to hold. Not one of them forecast a rise.

Yesterday, the government paid five point two per cent to borrow for three months, and five point nine to borrow for a year.

This episode asks what happened in ten months to move a rate-cutting story to a rate-hiking one — and what two named members of the rate-setting committee have said about it, in writing, in a published document.

Then it splits into the two things that actually reach a treasury desk. What the T-bill curve is paying us to do with cash today. And why a hike, if it comes, may not reach our own borrowing costs on the day it happens — because most corporate lending in India sits on a benchmark that moves on its own schedule, not the market's.

Including the honest caveat: the committee held in August, the central bank's own inflation forecast came down, and the reasons behind all of this are mostly not Indian at all.

Personal views. Not investment advice.

SOURCES

• India CPI inflation — record low of 0.25% in October 2025; 4.45% in July 2026, highest since December 2024

• RBI Monetary Policy Committee minutes, 19 August 2026 — Deputy Governor Poonam Gupta and Governor Sanjay Malhotra

• Reuters poll, January 2026 — 59 of 70 economists expected a hold at the February meeting

• Treasury bill auction, 9 September 2026 — 91-day 5.2089%, 182-day 5.6174%, 364-day 5.9148%

• RBI repo rate 5.25% since 5 December 2025; 125bps of cuts across 2025

• Reported EBLR transmission ~85-95% vs MCLR ~40-60% in six-month windows

Figures are as reported. Check against the underlying data before relying on them.

Two days ago the Reserve Bank offered to take seven lakh crore rupees off the banking system for a month. The banks took just over a third of it — while sitting on more than ten lakh crore of surplus liquidity, the most the system has ever held.

So why would a bank turn down a rate on cash it can't otherwise use?

Because of what leaves on the fifteenth. This episode is about the largest predictable liquidity event in the Indian money market, which is not a policy decision or a currency move — it's the corporate tax calendar. Advance tax on the fifteenth, GST on the twentieth, in the same fortnight, four times a year.

It asks why a drain that has flipped the system from surplus to deficit in September 2023, 2024 and 2025 still catches treasuries out. What it means that the dates are in the Income Tax Act rather than in anybody's forecast. And what three things are worth doing about it — none of which need a view on where interest rates are going.

Also the honest part: whether a record surplus simply absorbs the whole thing this quarter, and when it's not worth the bother at all.

Personal views. Not investment advice.

SOURCES

• RBI 30-day variable rate reverse repo, 7 September 2026 — ₹7 lakh crore notified, ₹2,59,276 crore of bids received, accepted at a weighted average 5.24%; market had expected up to ₹5 lakh crore

• Banking system liquidity surplus at a record ₹10.3 lakh crore, early September 2026, with expectations of ~₹12 lakh crore by 11 September

• Reported reason for weak participation: upcoming GST and advance tax outflows

• September 2023 — liquidity deficit reached ₹1.46 lakh crore, a four-year high, on advance tax and GST; twin outflows in a single fortnight estimated at up to ₹2.5 lakh crore

• Same pattern recorded September 2024, September 2025, and June 2026 (lowest system liquidity of FY27)

• Repo rate 5.25% since 5 August 2026; Monetary Policy Committee meets 5–7 October 2026

• Bank credit growth ~18% year-on-year to June 2026

Figures are as reported. Check against the underlying data before relying on them.

Fifty Indian companies have split themselves up in three years. Vedanta has missed its own completion deadline three times. And when Religare announced theirs, the share price fell ten per cent — on the announcement, not on results.

So what's changed?

This episode asks why the market has started pricing execution risk at the moment a split is announced rather than waiting to see. Why splitting a company just got procedurally cheaper, and what a shorter approval route does to your build window. And then the part that decides whether any of it works: what a demerger actually does to the debt, the cash, the exposures and the flows.

Including the questions that are far cheaper to answer before the perimeter is fixed than after it. Whether removing a business from the group trips a covenant on facilities that have nothing to do with it. Whether the smaller entity can fund itself on day one. What happens to hedge accounting when a group stops hedging centrally. And why the cash pool has to be rebuilt twice, not once.

Personal views. Not investment advice.

SOURCES

• LSEG data via Business Standard — 50 demergers in three years; 2025 a ten-year high at 29 deals and over $40bn; 2026 to date five deals worth $764m
• Business Standard — FY27 demerger pipeline: Vedanta, Apollo Hospitals, Natco Pharma, Religare
• Vedanta — completion date extended to 30 June 2026, third postponement, clearances pending
• MCA — Companies (Compromises, Arrangements and Amalgamations) Rules amended September 2024 and September 2025; Rule 25(9) recognises fast-track demergers; ~10,000 cases pending before the NCLT
• Academic research — 163 BSE spin-off announcements 2000–2023, positive cumulative abnormal returns; operating performance improvements not consistently observed post-restructuring
• Separation advisory material — covenant default risk on removal of assets, IFRS 9 hedge re-designation, "wrong pockets" risk on guarantees and charges

Figures are as reported. Check against the underlying filing before relying on them.