There is considerable evidence that the US is interested in “expanding its options” for using its nuclear arsenal. In particular, it appears that the Pentagon would like to increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons for both deterrence and warfighting should deterrence fail.

I will argue that fighting a war with tactical nuclear weapons is unlikely to produce a meaningful military victory and is likely to have catastrophic consequences. In fact, the US and NATO embraced this very option in the 1950s in the context of a war in Europe, only to realize that they had to find a different way to deter the Soviet Union and fight it should deterrence break down. The same basic logic that applied then still applies today. Simply put, tactical nuclear weapons are not war-winning weapons.

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CHAPTERS

00:00 Introduction
00:31 Why tactical nuclear weapons, why now
01:52 From massive retaliation to flexible options
03:04 The real driver: weakened conventional forces
04:46 Ukraine, Iran, and depleted munitions
05:07 Balancing conventional and nuclear deterrence
06:24 The appeal of tactical nukes on the battlefield
07:04 Why that thinking is misguided
07:55 Defending Europe in the 1950s
10:26 NATO's nuclear answer — and why the US never adopted "no first use"
11:54 Carte Blanche: the June 1955 war game
14:41 Destroying Germany to save Germany
15:38 The escalation problem
16:47 Command and control in a nuclear war
18:50 MC 14/2: NATO doubles down in 1957
20:20 Shift one: rebuilding conventional deterrence
23:03 Shift two: nuclear weapons as coercion, not warfighting
25:19 A handful of weapons and the slippery slope
28:00 MC 14/2 vs. MC 14/3
29:30 Recap: how NATO moved away from warfighting
31:30 What this means for the US today
33:49 Conclusion

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Music modified (edited/remixed) from the original.