In the winter of 1855 the most powerful man in Russia put on a summer uniform, walked out into a St Petersburg winter, and inspected parades until it killed him. Nicholas I had started a war he was certain he could not lose: a million and a half men mobilised, the glory of beating Napoleon behind him, God on his side. He lost it in Ukraine. No decisive battle, no enemy at the gates of Moscow, half a million men gone, and an empire that simply ran out of ways to win.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk was Ukraine's Minister of Defence from 2019 to 2020, ran the Ministry's reform office from 2015, and chairs the Centre for Defence Strategies. He has also read the Crimean War for years as a hobby, in Soviet sources and Western ones both, which is why this conversation exists: Yevgeny Tarle writing under Stalin, and Orlando Figes writing in the West, and the same war coming out as two different books.

Along the way: the siege of Sevastopol was never a siege, because the northern road stayed open the whole time. The first war correspondent in history brought down a British government by telegraph while the tsar's own despatches took weeks to reach St Petersburg. By the end, British supplies reached Crimea faster from London than Russian supplies did from Moscow. The Crimean Tatars were the majority population, and 1850s prints of Simferopol show minarets and camels. And Russia, uninvaded, with millions still under arms, signed away its Black Sea fleet, because the coalition refused to leave a grey zone and the alternative was worse than losing.

The argument underneath it is the one to carry around. Analysts say there are two ways to win a war, attrition or annihilation. Zagorodnyuk says Crimea proves there is a third, and it is the one that happens to Russia: the aggressor has to win, it cannot live with uncertainty forever, and when every campaign fails the regime starts lying — not because it is dishonest first, but because it is incapable first. Russia does not lose by being beaten. It loses by running out of ways to win.

Recorded in Kyiv.

KEY MOMENTS 0:00 - Cold open: Nicholas I in a summer uniform 4:39 - Zagorodnyuk, unmanned systems, and the Centre for Defence Strategies 9:42 - Why the Crimean War is the war to study now 11:34 - The same regime 170 years apart, and its three priorities 12:38 - He wanted Istanbul and said he was protecting Christians 17:46 - Two libraries: Tarle under Stalin, Figes in the West 19:35 - Putin's rehabilitation of Nicholas I 27:32 - The siege of Sevastopol was never a siege 29:17 - The first war correspondent, the telegraph, and Florence Nightingale 34:15 - Supplies faster from London than from Moscow 37:09 - Losing without a single decisive battle 39:45 - Not attrition, not annihilation: running out of options 41:37 - Incapable first, lying second 46:34 - Precise affordable mass, and people spent like munitions 51:25 - The Crimean Tatars, blamed and punished 57:24 - The Paris Treaty, and the fleet Russia had to give up 62:56 - What would end this war the same way

Produced by the Borderlands Foundation. Support our work: https://theborderlandsfoundation.org

Why War Matters — Sam's San Francisco talk. Part I is free: https://ukraineforfounders.com/talk/

All episodes: https://ukrainemilitaryhistory.org/

Guest: Andriy Zagorodnyuk / Centre for Defence Strategies: https://defence.org.ua

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