Ep. 105: Noncompetes and the spread of ideas
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Ep. 105: Noncompetes and the spread of ideas
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In 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a rule banning most noncompete agreements nationwide, arguing that greater worker mobility would foster new business creation and raise workers' earnings. The rule was later vacated, but it brought renewed attention to a longstanding debate over the economic effects of noncompetes. Supporters of noncompete agreements contend that these restrictions encourage firms to invest in new ideas by preventing employees from taking proprietary knowledge to competitors.
In a paper in the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, authors Kate Reinmuth and Emma Rockall examine the effect of noncompetes on innovation, using 26 changes in state-level noncompete enforceability between 1991 and 2016. They find that an average-sized increase in enforceability reduced patenting by about 14 percent after five years, with larger declines among the most novel patents and venture-backed firms.
Reinmuth and Rockall recently spoke with Tyler Smith about the arguments for and against noncompetes, how they isolated the causal effect of enforceability on innovation, and what their findings imply for policymakers.