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  • Episode 33: Project 100,000

    Episode 33: Project 100,000
    2026/07/13
    March 29, 1973. The last American POWs board a transport home. 591,000 servicemembers are discharged that final year. At airports across the country — Travis AFB, San Francisco International, O'Hare — some of them are met with protesters. Spat on. Called baby killers. A 1990 academic study would find that 44.3 percent of Vietnam veterans reported low homecoming support. Nearly twice the rate of other veterans. Controlling for combat, for deployments, for demographics — that hostile reception was independently associated with 2.13 times higher odds of PTSD. 1.91 times higher suicidality. The war damaged them. The homecoming compounded it. And for the men who had spent years in Navy boiler rooms, there was a third betrayal waiting — one that wouldn't announce itself for another twenty years.In 1991, Congress passed the Agent Orange Act. Veterans who'd been sprayed with dioxin herbicides in Vietnam finally got presumptive service connection — automatic disability benefits without having to prove the link between their cancer and their service. The PACT Act of 2022 extended the same to burn pit exposure. The system has learned. Twice. But not for asbestos. A veteran with mesothelioma today — diagnosed right now, in 2026 — still has to individually prove current diagnosis, documented service exposure, and a medical nexus opinion linking the cancer to the service. Even with 30 percent of all mesothelioma patients being veterans. Even with federal court findings of "official connivance at coverup." The burden is still on them.Episode 33 documents the homecoming no one talks about — and why the men most exposed became the men most overlooked.What This Episode CoversThe hostile homecoming — 1973 — Veterans returning from Vietnam faced a documented pattern of hostility unmatched in American military history. A 1990 academic study found 44.3% reported low homecoming support — nearly double the 26% rate for all veterans. Bob Greene collected hundreds of first-person accounts for his 1989 book Homecoming: When the Soldiers Returned from Vietnam. Controlling for combat exposure and demographics, low homecoming support independently produced 2.13x higher PTSD odds and 1.91x higher suicidality. The disease the men carried home in their lungs was invisible. The damage done at the airport was also invisible — in the data — until researchers finally measured it.Project 100,000 — August 1966. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced a program to accept 40,000 recruits per year who previously would have been rejected for low test scores. A social uplift program, he promised. President Johnson privately called them "second-class fellows." By December 1971, 354,000 men had been inducted. Hamilton Gregory, who wrote the definitive account (McNamara's Folly), documented that Project 100,000 recruits died at three times the rate of other Americans serving in Vietnam. A 1986 follow-up found they had lower incomes and higher divorce rates than if they had never served at all. The high-asbestos-exposure roles in the Navy — boiler tender, machinist's mate, engine room watch — went to lower-ranking enlisted personnel. Project 100,000 recruits were specifically assigned to positions requiring "little intellectual ability." The overlap is structural. The documentation doesn't exist, or hasn't been found. But the shape of it is visible.Agent Orange vs. asbestos — why one got recognition and the other didn't — Agent Orange was specific to one war, one time window, one government spray operation. It was visible — people saw the planes. It involved two chemical companies. Asbestos was everywhere: ships, planes, barracks, vehicles, all branches, all eras, hundreds of manufacturers. Agent Orange became a cause célèbre. The Agent Orange Act of 1991 created presumptive service connection. The PACT Act of 2022 extended it to burn pits. Asbestos veterans remained on their own — required to individually prove what the Navy documented and buried decades before their service began. The complexity of the asbestos industry protected the asbestos industry.Icom — Navy veteran. USS Kearsarge and USS John A. Bole. Boiler tender. Diagnosed with mesothelioma. His first doctor told him "it might go away." It didn't go away. Icom became the first VA patient to receive a cutting-edge P/D protocol — pleurectomy/decortication. He walked into surgery saying: "It's a beautiful day." Eight years later, Icom was still alive. His story appears in Beating the Odds: Surviving Mesothelioma, compiled by Dave Foster and available free to any family facing a diagnosis through Danziger and De Llano.The peak mortality window — right now — Vietnam service ran 1965 to 1973. Asbestos latency is 20 to 50 years. The math puts peak mesothelioma diagnosis between 1985 and 2023. We are in that window. Men who are 75 to 80 years old today were 20-year-old boiler tenders in the Gulf of Tonkin. They survived the war. They survived ...
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    13 分
  • Episode 32 — The Invisible Enemy Within

    Episode 32 — The Invisible Enemy Within
    2026/07/06
    S1E32 — The Invisible Enemy WithinThe Asbestos Podcast · Season 1 · Arc 7: The Truth Emerges (Episode 3)Episode 32 — The Invisible Enemy Within1939. A Navy Medical Officer recommends respirators for pipe covering workers. The recommendation goes nowhere. 1941. Commander Charles S. Stephenson writes to the Surgeon General: "I am certain that we are not protecting the men as we should." No documented response. No policy change. 1943. The Navy publishes comprehensive safety requirements for asbestos work — Section 11.1, requiring respiratory protection, segregated work, periodic medical exams. Requirements that are never enforced. Fifty years later, a federal judge would call what followed "official connivance at coverup of the hazards of asbestos in the shipyards."3.4 million Americans served in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. Every Navy vessel in the fleet contained asbestos. The men below decks — working in engine rooms above 130 degrees Fahrenheit, in spaces so thick with asbestos fibers a gunner's mate once described it as watching snow fall inside the ship — were never told. Not once. Not by the Navy. Not by the manufacturers. Not by anyone.Episode 32 documents what the Navy knew, when they knew it, and what they chose not to do with that knowledge.Key TakeawaysThe Navy's knowledge timeline (1939-1973) — 1939: Navy Medical Officer H.E. Jenkins recommends respirators. 1941: Commander Stephenson writes directly to the Surgeon General warning of inadequate protection. 1943: The Navy publishes Section 11.1 — comprehensive asbestos safety requirements for contract shipyards. A federal judge later found those requirements "were not enforced in naval shipyards" and that there was "official connivance at coverup." Sailors below decks received none of this. No respirators. No warnings. No monitoring. For thirty years.Walter Twidwell — Navy boiler tender, 1954-1973. Seven ships. Korea through Vietnam. The insulation on every pipe, every valve, every surface: white, fibrous, dusty. No respirator. No warning. When he retired, he built a log cabin in Washington State. Took daily walks with a miniature dachshund named Hiram. Hosted reading contests for schoolchildren. March 2017, at age 81: a persistent cough, shortness of breath, an X-ray showing a mass. "There is no cure for it. Do you have all your paperwork in order?" When Walter learned the Navy had required respirators since 1943 — and never told him — he said: "I didn't want to sue my government, and I damn sure didn't want to sue the Navy, 'cause they're still feeding me." A friend called the lawyers on his behalf. August 2018: a New York jury awarded Walter Twidwell $40.1 million against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Deliberation time: less than two hours. Walter died approximately a year later.What it was actually like below decks — 130-170 degrees Fahrenheit. 112 decibels — above the Navy's own threshold for double hearing protection, making verbal communication physically impossible. 3-4 hour watches in confined spaces. Boiler room insulation ranging from 5 to 99 percent amosite asbestos. And when the ship's guns fired: vibration shaking the insulation loose. A gunner's mate on USS Chevalier testified: "There was so much airborne asbestos that it looked like it was snowing inside the vessel."Bob Niemiec — USS Hermitage, entered service 1965. First assignment out of boot camp: scraping paint that contained asbestos. Nobody told him. Thirty years later, while umpiring baseball games, breathing problems. September 2019: two masses on his lungs, three collapsed lungs in succession, eight hours of surgery. Pleural mesothelioma. Prognosis: ten months to live. Bob decided: "I'm not going to take radiation and chemo and be sick with whatever time I have left." He takes over-the-counter pain medication. Nothing else. As of late 2024, Bob Niemiec was still alive — more than five years past his ten-month prognosis. His wife Jeannie: "They all said it's impossible medically for this man to still be alive. So it's just not his time to go."The VA policy most veterans don't know — Mesothelioma is NOT on the VA's presumptive list for asbestos exposure. Unlike Agent Orange or burn pit exposure, a veteran with mesothelioma must prove three things individually: a current diagnosis, service records demonstrating asbestos exposure likely occurred, and a medical nexus opinion connecting the diagnosis to service. Even with every Navy ship documented as containing asbestos. Even with 30 percent of mesothelioma patients being veterans. The burden remains on the veteran to prove what the Navy already knew for decades.Key Statistics1939, 1941, 1943 — the Navy's documented knowledge of asbestos hazards, predating widespread veteran exposure30 years — the period during which known safety requirements went unenforced for sailors3.4 million — Americans who served in the Vietnam theater, all aboard ships the Navy knew contained ...
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    18 分
  • Episode 31 — The Conference That Changed Everything

    Episode 31 — The Conference That Changed Everything
    2026/06/29
    Episode 31 — The Conference That Changed EverythingOctober 19th, 1964. Four hundred scientists in the room at the New York Academy of Sciences. The data is in front of them: 339 of 392 insulation workers with twenty or more years of exposure show X-ray evidence of asbestosis — 86 percent. Lung cancer at seven times the expected rate. Ten mesotheliomas. The numbers are unassailable. And while the final session is still running, the Asbestos Textile Institute legal team is already drafting warning letters to the Academy, to Selikoff personally, demanding suppression of the press release. The New York Times ran one article. Then — nothing. By design.Episode 31 covers the six years between Selikoff’s proof and the law. There was no OSHA in 1964 — the Occupational Safety and Health Act wouldn’t be signed until December 29, 1970. In the gap, the industry built a doubt machine. In 1966, the Asbestos Textile Institute created the “Information Center on Asbestos” in Philadelphia — its mission was to challenge Selikoff’s methodology, fund counter-research, and delay any enforceable standard. They attacked the data. When that failed, they attacked the man. A 1965 Owens-Corning memo sought “to find some way of preventing Dr. Selikoff from creating problems and affecting sales.” An ATI representative called him a “disturbing sore thumb.” Every tactic the tobacco industry would later make famous — asbestos ran it first. And in those six years of manufactured delay, 3.4 million Americans were being assigned to Navy ships, military bases, and factories still operating without enforceable standards.Key TakeawaysThe suppression started before the conference ended. ATI minutes document that member companies’ “protests and threats successfully prevented the distribution of press releases at the historic asbestos conference.” One Times article covered the findings. Six months of silence followed. Not an oversight — an operation.The doubt machine had a name and an address. The Information Center on Asbestos, Philadelphia, 1966. Created by the Asbestos Textile Institute to coordinate the industry’s scientific and PR response. Funded research designed to dispute dose-response models. Challenged Selikoff’s methodology while commissioning studies to identify “safe” exposure levels — when Selikoff’s own data showed no demonstrably safe level had been established.The regulatory architecture had no floor. Before OSHA, average industrial workers had only voluntary compliance, state workers’ compensation, and the goodwill of their employer. Mining had the Federal Mine Safety Code. Federal contractors had Walsh-Healey. Everyone else had nothing. The asbestos industry understood exactly what that absence meant and used it deliberately — every year without a federal standard was another year no law was broken, no violation existed, no liability attached.The ACGIH standard was already industry-captured. The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists set threshold limit values. In 1964, their asbestos TLV was five million particles per cubic foot. Selikoff’s data indicated that level was still killing workers. Industry representatives sat on the committees that set those values. Conflict of interest was structural.The evidence base kept growing anyway. The original 1964 cohort was 632 insulation workers. By the late 1960s, Selikoff was tracking 17,800 — one of the largest occupational health studies ever conducted. The mortality gap between insulation workers and the general population wasn’t narrowing. It was widening. He called what was coming the “asbestos cancer wave” that had already been set in motion and could not be recalled.The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed 63 days before the conference. Manufacturers who attended the October 1964 conference — who received the proof, who funded the Information Center on Asbestos, who sent the warning letters — those same manufacturers continued supplying every Navy ship, every military aircraft, every base being built for the Vietnam theater. After October 1964, there was no longer any good-faith claim of ignorance.OSHA’s first standard was still wrong. December 29, 1970 — Nixon signs OSHA. First asbestos standard: 12 fibers per cubic centimeter. Selikoff said immediately it was ten times too high. The standard fell: 12 (1971) → 5 (1972) → 2 (1976) → 0.2 (1986) → 0.1 today. A 99 percent reduction over 23 years. The conference changed the scientific record. It changed almost nothing in the factory. Not right away.Featured: NavairreShe was twenty-eight years old when she was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma. No known exposure source. Doctors gave her two years. That was more than twenty years ago. She found NIH specialists. Became one of the early adopters of HIPEC — hyperthermic intraperitoneal chemotherapy — before it was widely available. Her case helped show what was possible. Today she...
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    13 分
  • Episode 30: Selikoff’s Warning

    Episode 30: Selikoff’s Warning
    2026/06/22
    S1E30 — Selikoff’s WarningThe Asbestos Podcast · Season 1 · Arc 7: The Truth Emerges (Episode 1)Episode 30 — Selikoff’s WarningOctober 19th, 1964. New York Academy of Sciences. Over 400 scientists in the room. Dr. Irving Selikoff presents two studies. In the clinical examination cohort: 1,522 insulation workers, 1,117 examined, 392 with twenty or more years of exposure. Of those 392, 339 — 86 percent — showed X-ray evidence of asbestosis. In the mortality cohort: 307 deaths. Lung cancer at seven times the expected rate. And mesothelioma — a cancer so rare that some pathologists doubted it existed — ten cases. The industry called it “an extraordinary high incidence.” Then they suppressed the press coverage.Episode 30 opens Arc 7: The Truth Emerges. It tells the story of the man who broke the silence. Irving Selikoff was born in Brooklyn in 1915 — the same quotas that kept Jewish students out of American medical schools sent him to Anderson’s College of Medicine in Glasgow, Scotland. He arrived on the S.S. Samaria October 12, 1936. He came back, cured tuberculosis with a drug his JAMA paper called “the most potent drug introduced thus far,” and then spent twenty years studying the men dying in the insulation trades. What he found in October 1964 was undeniable. What the industry did next was predictable. And what Congress had done ten weeks earlier — pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution — meant that the proof arrived just as 3.4 million more Americans were being sent into the most asbestos-saturated military in history.Key TakeawaysThe conference that almost wasn’t covered. The Asbestos Textile Institute mounted immediate opposition to the 1964 NYAS conference. ATI minutes document that member companies’ “protests and threats successfully prevented the distribution of press releases.” The New York Times published one article. The conference “barely registered a blip in the nation’s consciousness.” Not by accident. By design.Two studies, not one. Selikoff, Churg, and Hammond presented two distinct datasets at the October 1964 conference. The clinical study (NYAS Annals Vol. 132, 1965) found 86% of workers with 20+ years of exposure had asbestosis on X-ray. The separate mortality study, updated from their April 1964 JAMA paper, tracked 632 workers and found 307 deaths — with 10 mesotheliomas and lung cancer at more than 7 times the expected rate.The quota that sent him to Scotland. Yale Medical School’s dean — Milton Winternitz, himself Jewish — had instructed his admissions committee: “Never admit more than five Jews, take only two Italian Catholics, and take no blacks at all.” Selikoff couldn’t get into an American medical school. He boarded a Cunard liner in New York and arrived in Glasgow two weeks later. That detour is why he was available in Paterson, New Jersey in the early 1950s, when the UNARCO insulation workers first walked into his clinic.History for hire. In 2003, a British historian named P.W.J. Bartrip published an article attacking Selikoff’s credentials — funded by Turner and Newall, Britain’s largest asbestos manufacturer. Eight prominent researchers from Brown, Manchester, RMIT, and Mount Sinai published a rebuttal calling it “little more than an ad hominem attack.” In 2013, the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine stated: “The insulator mortality data stand undiminished by the test of time.”The timing. August 7, 1964: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 88–2 and 414–0. October 19, 1964: Selikoff presents proof at NYAS. March 2, 1965: Operation Rolling Thunder begins. The companies that received scientific certainty in October 1964 continued supplying the military without warnings for the next decade. About 37 percent of all U.S. asbestos ever consumed was consumed after 1965. Peak: 803,000 tons in 1973.OSHA’s long road. OSHA didn’t exist in 1964 — it launched in 1970. First asbestos standard: 12 fibers per cubic centimeter. Then 5. Then 2. Then 0.2. Today: 0.1. A 99 percent reduction over 23 years. A full ban didn’t arrive until the EPA’s 2024 rule — sixty years after Selikoff’s warning.Featured at Danziger & De LlanoRod De Llano, founding partner. Princeton undergrad. UT Law with honors. Spent four years at Jones Day — one of the largest law firms in the world — defending corporations in product liability cases. Then walked away. “He wanted to direct his energy and talents towards helping people in significant need of representation.” Over a billion dollars recovered. He knows exactly how the other side thinks because he used to be the other side. Free consultation at dandell.com.Paul Danziger and Rod De Llano founded Danziger & De Llano in 1995. Thirty years of mesothelioma litigation. Nearly two billion dollars recovered for over a thousand families. If you or someone you love has been diagnosed, the consultation is free.ResourcesFree consultation: dandell.comEpisode notes...
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    21 分
  • Episode 29: The Shipyard Generation

    Episode 29: The Shipyard Generation
    2026/06/15
    S1E29 — The Shipyard GenerationThe Asbestos Podcast · Season 1 · Arc 6: The War Effort (Finale)Episode 29 — The Shipyard GenerationVeterans are 6 to 7 percent of the U.S. population. They account for 30 percent of all mesothelioma diagnoses. Navy veterans are 6.47 times more likely to die from mesothelioma than the general population. The average shipyard worker’s latency: 49.4 years. The reason isn’t bad luck. A factory worker goes home at night. A sailor lived inside his exposure — sleeping ten feet from the boiler room, eating in a mess hall surrounded by asbestos-insulated pipes, breathing ship air around the clock for years of service. Over 300 different asbestos-containing products on a single ship.Episode 29 is the Arc 6 finale. It follows the human cost of five episodes of statistics and corporate memos: three survivors who beat the odds the industry created, the 1977 discovery of the Sumner Simpson Papers that finally proved the cover-up, and the most tragic timing in American medical history — Dr. Irving Selikoff presented definitive proof that asbestos causes mesothelioma in October 1964. Ten weeks after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution sent 3.4 million more servicemembers toward the most heavily asbestos-insulated ships in the fleet.Key TakeawaysThe 30 percent problem. Veterans are four times overrepresented in mesothelioma diagnoses because naval service meant continuous exposure — not intermittent. A sailor couldn’t go home at night. He slept, ate, and worked within feet of asbestos-insulated boilers and pipes, twenty-four hours a day, for years. The Navy used over 300 different asbestos-containing products on a single ship. Navy veterans are 6.47 times more likely to die from mesothelioma than the general population. About 1,000 are diagnosed every year.The latency math. Average latency for shipyard workers: 49.4 years. Range: 14 to 72 years documented. Only 4 percent of cases appear within 20 years. A third don’t appear until after 40 years. A man exposed at Brooklyn Navy Yard in 1943 at age 22 would not typically receive his diagnosis until the early 1990s — when the executives who made the decisions he worked under were retired or dead, and no one could connect a cough to a pipe he insulated half a century before. That is not a coincidence. That was the calculation.Three survivors. Michelle was four years old when she was exposed — just hugging her father when he came home from work, his clothes covered in dust. Diagnosed at ten with peritoneal mesothelioma. Given three to six months. She lived thirty-five years. She adopted four children. She counseled over two hundred families facing the same diagnosis. She never charged a penny. Lannie was a conservation officer in Virginia, exposed through brake linings and gaskets. Diagnosed at sixty-two, given eighteen months. Seventeen years later, he is still here. Icom was a Navy boilerman on USS Kearsarge and USS John A. Bole for ten years — the most dangerous job on any ship. Diagnosed in 2016, he became the first VA patient to receive pleurectomy with decortication surgery. Eight years later: “It’s a beautiful day.”The Sumner Simpson Papers, 1977. Litigation in South Carolina forced internal Johns-Manville documents into the open. A 1930 memo titled “Pulmonary Asbestosis.” A 1931 letter from Johns-Manville’s attorney detailing the deliberate four-year delay of a government study. And Sumner Simpson’s 1935 letter: “The less said about asbestos, the better off we are.” Within months, a California congressman featured them in congressional hearings. The Washington Post reported companies had “hid evidence” for more than thirty years. Johns-Manville filed for bankruptcy in August 1982 under 16,000 lawsuits and was removed from the Dow Jones Industrial Average.The Manville Trust. Established in 1988 with $2.5 billion. Has since paid out over $5 billion to victims and families. It became the template for the more than 60 asbestos trusts now holding an estimated $30 billion in total assets.Selikoff’s timing. August 7, 1964: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 88–2 in the Senate. 414–0 in the House. The Vietnam escalation begins. October 19, 1964 — ten weeks later — Selikoff presents at the New York Academy of Sciences: definitive proof that asbestos causes mesothelioma and lung cancer, even at low exposures, even brief exposures. Even wives who only washed their husbands’ work clothes. Peak U.S. asbestos consumption: 803,000 tons in 1973. Three and a half million Vietnam-era servicemembers deployed. Average latency: 49 years. Peak deployment: 1968. 1968 plus 49 years.The Vietnam window is now. The peak mortality window for Vietnam-era veterans is today. That’s Arc 7.Featured at Danziger & De LlanoDave Foster, Executive Director of Patient Advocacy at Danziger & De Llano. Nearly two decades helping mesothelioma families navigate diagnosis, treatment, and legal options. He lost his own father to ...
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    21 分
  • Episode 28 — Wartime Production, Peacetime Deaths

    Episode 28 — Wartime Production, Peacetime Deaths
    2026/06/08
    Episode 28 — Wartime Production, Peacetime DeathsWhen World War II ended, asbestos production should have declined. Instead, U.S. consumption increased 107% — from 343,000 tons in 1945 to 709,000 tons by 1955. The post-war housing boom put asbestos into 40 million American homes: floor tiles with 40–70% asbestos backing, joint compound at 3–6%, popcorn ceilings, roofing, siding. Meanwhile, the industry voted 6 to 2 against studying whether their product caused cancer because it would “stir up a hornet’s nest.”Episode 28 follows the paper trail from the 1947 Asbestos Textile Institute vote through the Braun–Truan report fraud to the suppression of Richard Doll’s groundbreaking 1955 British study — revealing how corporations expanded their market into suburban America while burying evidence that would take 30 years to surface in courtrooms.Key TakeawaysThe 1947 ATI vote. March 1947. The Asbestos Textile Institute voted 6–2 against commissioning an epidemiological study on lung cancer. The written reason: it would “stir up a hornet’s nest and put the whole industry under suspicion.” This was twelve years after Sumner Simpson’s 1935 letter: “the less said about asbestos, the better off we are.” Same companies. Same strategy.The Braun–Truan fraud. 1957: The Quebec Asbestos Mining Association funds a study through the Industrial Hygiene Foundation. The private report to the Mining Association finds a miner with asbestosis has “a greater likelihood of developing cancer of the lung.” The published version? That finding is deleted. Dr. Rutherford Johnstone’s 1960 textbook cites Braun–Truan as evidence asbestosis does not predispose to lung cancer. A textbook teaching the fraudulent version.Levittown’s 17,447 homes. Built 1947–1951. Every structure came with asbestos siding, asbestos roofing, nine-by-nine floor tiles (99% likely to contain asbestos by the “Rule of Nines”), and joint compound with 3–6% asbestos content. The marketing called it “fireproof.” They just didn’t mention it would kill you thirty years later.The shipyards that never closed. Brooklyn Navy Yard operated until June 30, 1966 — 9,500 workers at closure, 21 years after the war. Charleston Naval Shipyard: April 1, 1996 — 51 years after V-J Day. Workers exposed in the 1980s won’t develop mesothelioma until 2010, 2020, 2030. The clock is still ticking.Why unions stayed silent. 1947’s Taft–Hartley Act outlawed closed shops, banned solidarity strikes, required union officers to sign anti-communist affidavits. The CIO expelled eleven unions — roughly one million members — between 1949 and 1950. The left-led unions that had been most militant on workplace conditions were gone. The “postwar accord” ceded workplace safety to management in exchange for wages and benefits.The perfect crime math. Latency period for mesothelioma: 20 to 60 years. Median: 32 to 38 years. A worker exposed at Brooklyn in 1943 wouldn’t develop symptoms until 1973. The executives who suppressed the 1947 study? Retired. Or dead. Documents buried in corporate archives. No connection visible between the cough and the pipe insulated thirty years earlier.3,000 applications. By 1958, asbestos appeared in approximately 3,000 products. Among them: Kent cigarette filters (30% crocidolite asbestos, 1952–1956, marketed as “greatest health protection in history”) and the fake snow falling on Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz — chrysotile asbestos.Featured at Danziger & De LlanoAnna Jackson, Director of Patient Support at Danziger & De Llano. Nearly fifteen years helping mesothelioma families navigate diagnosis and next steps. She lost her own husband to cancer. She knows what this conversation costs.Paul Danziger, founding partner. Over 30 years of mesothelioma litigation experience. The firm has recovered nearly $2 billion for families affected by asbestos. If you or someone you love is facing a mesothelioma diagnosis, trust funds, VA benefits, and lawsuit settlements may all be available.ResourcesMesothelioma help: dandell.comEpisode notes and sources: mesotheliomalawyersnearme.com/podcast/episode-28-wartime-production-peacetime-deaths/Full transcript: wikimesothelioma.com/Asbestos_Podcast_EP28_TranscriptPrevious episode: EP27 — The Women of the ShipyardsAsbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making — 52 episodes tracing asbestos from ancient pottery to the 2024 EPA ban. Produced by Danziger & De Llano.Next: Episode 29 — The Shipyard Generation. December 1960. J.C. Wagner publishes in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine. Mesothelioma. A cancer no one knew existed. They knew it existed. Now everyone else would too.Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making is sponsored by Danziger & De Llano Mesothelioma Law Firm, a nationwide practice with over 30 years of experience and nearly $2 billion recovered for asbestos victims. If you or someone you love has been diagnosed with mesothelioma, ...
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    17 分
  • Episode 27: The Women Of The Shipyards

    Episode 27: The Women Of The Shipyards
    2026/06/01
    Episode 27 — The Women of the ShipyardsBy May 1943, 45,174 women worked in U.S. Navy yards alone. They held welding torches. They cut asbestos cloth with their hands. They sewed insulation blankets. They filled sewn forms with loose asbestos fiber. The Women’s Bureau documented 189 different occupations — including, in official government classifications, “asbestos filler and sewer” and “asbestos layer-out and cutter.” Nobody told them what asbestos was.When the war ended, one in four women factory workers was fired in the first three months. By January 1946, four million women had left the industrial workforce. Portland Kaiser collapsed from 97,000 workers to 2,000. The records went with them — because the same word that justified their lower pay also obscured their exposure history. They weren’t welders. They weren’t asbestos layers. They were helpers. And decades later, when they or their children got sick and their families went looking for documentation of what they’d breathed — the records said helper.Key Takeaways189 occupations documented. Among them: “asbestos filler and sewer,” “asbestos layer-out and cutter.” Official government classifications for women working in spaces white with asbestos fiber. No warnings. Instructions, not information.The “helper” classification did two things. It justified paying women less than half the rate of the men beside them. It also meant they weren’t recorded in exposure categories that would matter 40 years later on a trust fund claim form.Lucille Kolkin, Brooklyn Navy Yard tack welder, 1942. She wrote home to her husband Al every week. Her letters are at the Center for Brooklyn History. Her oral history, recorded in 1989, is in the same collection as 48 other women who built the ships. Jennifer Egan read them to research Manhattan Beach. “Nobody ever asked for a hammer,” Kolkin wrote. “They asked for a fuckin’ hammer.”Dr. Muriel Newhouse, 1965. Colonel in the British Army. Landed in Normandy after D-Day. Her colleagues called her a “fearsome ferret.” Her 1965 study found 9 of 83 mesothelioma patients had household-only asbestos exposure — 7 wives, 2 sisters. The most common history: washing a worker’s dungarees. A meta-analysis across studies: 5.02x increased mesothelioma risk from household contact.The industry knew in 1940. Metropolitan Life Insurance internal report: “asbestos is the type of toxic substance that requires changing clothes when leaving an area of exposure.” OSHA’s separate-laundry mandate: 1972. Thirty-two years.The Jeanette Franklin case. Born during the war. Both parents worked at Western Pipe and Steel Shipyard. She never set foot in the yard. Diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma in 1996. The jury awarded $6.5 million. The appellate court reversed on a 1948 purchase agreement’s fine print. The California Supreme Court declined review. Jeanette Franklin received nothing.Female latency is 29% longer. Median 43.7 years versus 33.8 for men. Cases from 1940s shipyard exposure are still emerging today.Featured at Danziger & De LlanoAnna Jackson, Director of Patient Support at Danziger & De Llano. Nearly fifteen years of experience helping mesothelioma families navigate what comes after the diagnosis. She lost her own husband to cancer. She knows what this conversation costs.Michelle was diagnosed with mesothelioma at age ten — secondary exposure through her father’s work clothes. Given three to six months. She survived thirty-five years. During those years, she counseled over two hundred newly diagnosed families. Her story is in Beating the Odds: Surviving Mesothelioma, compiled by Dave Foster, available free from Danziger & De Llano.ResourcesMesothelioma help: dandell.comEpisode notes and sources: mesotheliomalawyersnearme.com/podcast/episode-27-women-of-the-shipyards/Full transcript: wikimesothelioma.com/Asbestos_Podcast_EP27_TranscriptPrevious episode: EP26 — The Shipyards Never SleepNext: Episode 28 — Wartime Production, Peacetime Deaths. The men came home. Production didn’t stop.Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making is sponsored by Danziger & De Llano Mesothelioma Law Firm, a nationwide practice with over 30 years of experience and nearly $2 billion recovered for asbestos victims. If you or someone you love has been diagnosed with mesothelioma, the exposure happened somewhere—and Paul Danziger and Rod De Llano know how to trace it back. For a free consultation, visit https://dandell.com.Resources:→ Mesothelioma legal rights: https://dandell.com/mesothelioma/ → Asbestos exposure sources: https://dandell.com/asbestos-exposure/ → Asbestos trust funds ($30B+ available): https://dandell.com/asbestos-trust-funds/ → Free case evaluation: https://dandell.com/contact/ Sister Podcast - MESO: The Mesothelioma Podcast:http://mesotheliomapodcast.com/
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    19 分
  • Episode 26 — The Shipyards Never Sleep

    Episode 26 — The Shipyards Never Sleep
    2026/05/25
    S1E26 — The Shipyards Never SleepThe Asbestos Podcast · Season 1 · Arc 6: The War Effort, 1942–1945 (consequences to present)Episode 26 — The Shipyards Never Sleep“The first time I walked out on the ways, I was walking into a kind of nightmare of sounds, noise, and smells.” Howard Zinn was nineteen years old when he walked through the gates of Brooklyn Navy Yard in December 1941. He’d later become one of America’s most influential historians. But first, he’d spend years crawling into four-by-four-by-four-foot compartments so full of asbestos dust that workers couldn’t see across them.By December 1943, 1.7 million shipyard workers labored around the clock — three shifts, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Each Iowa-class battleship contained 465 long tons of asbestos insulation. Each destroyer: 85,000 to 90,000 pounds. Over 5,500 ships built between 1939 and 1945. One Navy memo from 1944 called the dust concentrations “a dangerous hazard to personnel.” It never reached the workers on the floor. They thought the dust dissolved when they breathed it in — like sugar in water.Key Takeaways465 long tons of asbestos insulation per Iowa-class battleship. Eighty-five thousand to ninety thousand pounds per destroyer. Over 5,500 vessels built 1939–1945 — Liberty ships, Victory ships, destroyers, battleships — each one packed with asbestos and built by workers who had no idea what they were breathing.Three shifts. Twenty-four hours. Seven days a week. At Brooklyn Navy Yard, 70,000 workers per day at peak production. Forty percent were logging more than 48 hours a week by 1942. The time-weighted averages industrial hygienists later used to define “safe” exposure were meaningless for workers logging 60–70-hour weeks in asbestos dust.Every trade was exposed. Pipe coverers handled felt insulation that was 85–95% asbestos by content. Welders wore asbestos gloves, aprons, leggings, and blankets. Boilermakers worked in compartments where insulators had just been. Electricians handled asbestos wire insulation. Carpenters cut Transite board (asbestos-cement). Court records: “Asbestos was essentially everywhere.”The 1944 Navy Bureau of Medicine letter. Dust counts during amosite felt insulation application were “well above the accepted maximum of eight million particles of dust per cubic foot.” Conclusion: “a dangerous hazard to personnel.” Written in 1944. Workers on the shipyard floor: never informed.Clarence Borel’s testimony. Industrial insulation worker, 33 years (1936–1969). Under oath: “I blowed this dust out of my nostrils by handfuls at the end of the day.” He thought it was “bothersome.” He “never realized it could cause any serious or terminal illness.” He believed the dust “dissolves as it hits your lungs.” He learned the truth in January 1969. He died June 3, 1970 — four months later. His case became Borel v. Fibreboard, the landmark asbestos liability decision.The information gap. 1930: British science establishes asbestos causes asbestosis. 1938: U.S. Public Health Service sets a 5-million-particle safe limit. 1941: Stephenson warns Admiral McIntire that “we are not protecting the men as we should.” 1944: Navy documents “dangerous hazard to personnel.” Workers’ knowledge throughout: the dust dissolves.30% of all mesothelioma diagnoses are veterans. Nearly 1,000 shipyard and Navy cases annually. The 20–50-year latency clock meant executives who signed the 1944 memos were retired before workers started dying. Cases from 1940s wartime exposure are still being diagnosed today.Featured at Danziger & De LlanoLarry Gates, Senior Client Advocate & Military Veteran Specialist at Danziger & De Llano. His father died of mesothelioma after years at the Shell refinery in Pasadena, Texas. Larry is seventy-two and currently fighting his own battle with cancer. When he talks to veteran families, he’s not reading from a script.ResourcesMesothelioma help: dandell.comVeterans and mesothelioma: dandell.com/mesothelioma/veterans/Episode notes and sources: mesotheliomalawyersnearme.com/podcast/episode-26-the-shipyards-never-sleep/Full transcript: wikimesothelioma.com/Asbestos_Podcast_EP26_TranscriptPrevious episode: EP25 — The Navy Comes CallingAsbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making — 52 episodes tracing asbestos from ancient pottery to the 2024 EPA ban. Produced by Danziger & De Llano.Next: Episode 27 — The Women of the Shipyards. By 1943, women made up 13% of shipyard production workers. They did the same jobs. They breathed the same dust. And when they went home, the dust came with them.Asbestos: A Conspiracy 4,500 Years in the Making is sponsored by Danziger & De Llano Mesothelioma Law Firm, a nationwide practice with over 30 years of experience and nearly $2 billion recovered for asbestos victims. If you or someone you love has been diagnosed with mesothelioma, the exposure happened somewhere—and Paul Danziger ...
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