Often seen as the gold standard for societal resilience, Finland has many admirers. The Secretary General of its Security Committee, Petteri Korvala, describes Finland's approach.

Many nations are exploring how to build societal resilience as part of a comprehensive approach to security. The Scandinavian countries are often seen as exemplars of best practice, with Finland arguably leading the pack. But delivering resilience through comprehensive security requires trust across all elements of society and a cultural shift as much as it needs the right structures and processes.

In this episode, we hear from the Secretary General of Finland's Security Committee, Petteri Korvala, about how their comprehensive security system works.

Petteri Korvala has over 30 years of experience in Finland's defence forces and internationally, including in the Ministry of Defence and in Finland's Permanent Representation to the European Union, as well as having served as a liaison officer in United States European Command.

Further Reading:

Finnish Government, Security Strategy for Society: Government Resolution, 2025:3, available at https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/items/0126122a-1e8a-4ffa-9868-6286292efc01

Vesa Valtonen & Minna Branders, 'Tracing the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model', in Sebastian Larsson & Mark Rhinard (eds.), Nordic Societal Security, Routledge, 2020, pp.91-108. Available at: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003045533-7/tracing-finnish-comprehensive-security-model-vesa-valtonen-minna-branders.

Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen & Tapio Juntunen, 'From "spiritual defence" to robust resilience in the Finnish comprehensive security model', in Sebastian Larsson & Mark Rhinard (eds.), Nordic Societal Security Routledge, 2020, pp.154–178.

Tom Woolmore, The Porcupine and the Hedgehog: The Influence of Finland's Comprehensive Security Model on the British Whole-of-Society Approach, King's College London Master's Dissertation, 2025, available at: https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MA-Thesis-Thomas-Woolmore.pdf

Andrew Sharples (London School of Economics and Political Science): From Bowling Alone to Fighting Together: Social Capital and Whole-of-Society Defence.

Britain was not ready for the First World War but some key, if embryonic, plans and capabilities proved vital. Sir Hew Strachan discusses the lessons for today.

With concerns rising about how ready Western nations are for the risk of war in Europe, we discuss the lessons from Britain's preparation for The Great War. And while preparation is important, not all actions to prepare are equally important. In this case, Britain was not fully prepared but had taken some initial steps that were important in allowing the country to accelerate towards preparedness.

The crucial elements concerned the ability to engage society, coordinate across government and ensure a robust industrial base that supported the armed force that drew on the talent of regular and volunteer forces. As a result, Britain was better (although not perfectly) prepared for the Second World War. And large parts of Europe seem further away from readiness now, so the lessons are vitally important.

Joining us to discuss these lessons is Professor Sir Hew Strachan from the University of St Andrews. Described by Jonathan Boff as 'the most influential British historian of the First World War of his generation', Professor Strachan has published widely on the First World War and is a regular advisor to the British Government and Ministry of Defence, particularly in relation to reserve forces and veterans.

Professor Michael Epkenhans describes how Otto von Bismarck's adroit use of war, realpolitik and the harnessing all levers of state power unified the German nation.

Otto von Bismarck, Prussian Chancellor and – after 1871 – the leading political figure of the Second German Empire after the Kaiser, hated to be bullied but managed to manipulate and bully all around him into following his complex strategic plan. This involved not only keeping German democrats at bay but also Denmark, Austria, and France. Tricking Denmark and France into breaking conventions and declaring war on Prussia and its allies respectively, he got the other German states to close ranks and back the Prussian claim for leadership in a newly united German State.

By putting Prussia on the defensive, the other European great powers – the United Kingdom and Russia – did not intervene, even though the emergent German superstate changed the balance of powers in Europe. Stopping short of aiming for overseas territories, taking on the role of the honest broker of the quarrels among others, Bismarck avoided pushing Britain and Russia over the brink into coalescing against Germany – which his immoderate successors did not.

We are joined by Michael Epkenhans, Beatrice Heuser's successor as Director of Research at the Bundeswehr's Military History Research Office, and specialist on 19th century German and Prussian history.