This course delves into the critical issue of electoral conflicts and violence in African states .

contemporary scholars of comparative politics have largely downplayed the moderating role of a crucial variable such as “political culture” in explaining democratization in African states. As a result, explanations of emerging democracies in Africa have remained incomplete, failing to understand and accurately predict the patterns and outcomes of electoral governance with respect to non-violent, acceptable, ‘free and fair’ elections. This presentation critically examine the nature and limits of employing a combination of theoretical frameworks (including formal historical and rational choice institutionalism, and other informal electoral institutions and political culture) in accounting for the effectiveness of electoral institutions and rules, as well as how they persist and change with respect to democratization in Africa. In this light, there is the need to take stock of the vast growing literature and examine the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of extending and clarifying them, in order to improve our scholarly understanding of political development in Africa. In short, this holistic approach greatly advances both the theoretical and empirical realms in the field of democratization as well as serve as an effective guide for scholars and policymakers interested in deepening of democratic governance in Africa.

Welcome back to the show. Today’s episode dives into a puzzle at the heart of constitutional democracy: why do some courts boldly strike down controversial laws, while others, facing similar laws, hold back. Scholars usually answer with one phrase—judicial independence—the idea that judges need protection from political pressure in order to make tough decisions against the government of the day.

Across the next ten minutes, this episode has three goals. First, to unpack what judicial independence really means in practice, and how it differs from judicial review itself. Second, to explain the article’s core claim that independence should be treated as a conditional factor that moderates the relationship between ideology and decisions, rather than just another additive variable in our models. Third, to explore what this conditional view tells us about famous US Supreme Court cases on important federal statutes, and what it implies for anyone who wants courts to both protect rights and remain accountable