Case Summary:

Harold R. Berk injured his ankle while visiting Delaware and went to Beebe Medical Center for treatment, where he was seen by Dr. Wilson Choy and other providers for what was diagnosed as a fracture that did not require immediate surgery. Hospital staff placed his leg in a boot and, in the course of doing so, allegedly twisted and aggravated the fracture, after which Berk was discharged with instructions to avoid bearing weight and to return for follow‑up care. At a follow‑up visit about a month later at Dr. Choy’s office, new X‑rays allegedly revealed that Berk’s ankle had become severely deformed, now requiring surgery, and Berk contends that this worsening resulted from negligent diagnosis, communication, and treatment by Dr. Choy and the hospital staff.

Berk, a citizen of another state, then filed a diversity medical‑malpractice action in federal district court in Delaware against Dr. Choy and Beebe Medical Center under Delaware substantive law. Delaware law requires that a medical‑malpractice complaint be accompanied by an affidavit of merit from a qualified expert, but Berk did not file such an affidavit and instead submitted medical records, arguing that the state’s affidavit requirement should not apply in federal court. The district court dismissed his case for failure to comply with the affidavit‑of‑merit statute, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Delaware requirement applied and warranted dismissal of his malpractice suit. The issue before the Supreme Court in Berk v. Choy was whether a federal court sitting in diversity and adjudicating a state‑law medical‑malpractice claim must apply a state “affidavit of merit” or expert‑affidavit requirement at the pleading stage, or instead follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure alone. More specifically, the question was whether Delaware’s statute requiring plaintiffs to attach a supporting expert affidavit to a malpractice complaint conflicts with and is displaced by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12 (and related rules) when the case is filed in federal court.

Case Summary:

Ellingburg v. United States involves a federal defendant, Holsey Ellingburg Jr., who robbed a First Union National Bank before the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) became law, but was sentenced after its enactment and ordered to pay $7,567.25 in restitution under that Act. Ellingburg committed the bank robbery in 1995, was indicted in 1996 on federal bank robbery charges, pleaded guilty, and received a prison term plus a restitution order to the bank, which he has still not fully paid. Years later, he challenged his ongoing restitution obligation under the Ex Post Facto Clause on the ground that applying the MVRA to conduct predating its April 24, 1996 effective date retroactively increased his punishment. The Eighth Circuit rejected his claim after treating MVRA restitution as a nonpunitive, civil measure and therefore outside the Ex Post Facto Clause, prompting the grant of certiorari. In the Supreme Court, both Ellingburg and the United States agreed that the lower court was wrong and that MVRA restitution is criminal punishment, so the Court appointed an amicus curiae, John F. Bash, to defend the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether restitution ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 constitutes criminal punishment, rather than a civil remedy, for purposes of applying the Ex Post Facto Clause to a defendant whose offense occurred before the MVRA’s enactment.

Case Summary:

Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, entered bankruptcy in 2014 and initiated adversarial proceedings against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., to collect $50,000 in allegedly unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro attempted to serve process on Coney Island by mail but purportedly failed to comply with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(b)(3)’s mail-service requirements. Coney Island did not file an answer, and the Bankruptcy Court entered a default judgment. Over the next six years, Vista-Pro’s bankruptcy trustee attempted to enforce the judgment. These efforts bore fruit in 2021 when a marshal seized funds from Coney Island’s bank account in satisfaction of the judgment. Coney Island filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, arguing that Vista-Pro’s failure to make proper service rendered the judgment void. The Bankruptcy Court denied relief, holding that Coney Island failed to abide by Rule 60’s requirement that parties make motions for relief within a “reasonable time.” The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.