Private credit has grown to roughly $2 trillion, but selling a single position remains a manual, bilateral process. Exiting a $25 million loan means NDAs, a data room, agent and borrower consents, and bespoke documentation — four to six weeks from decision to settlement, if a buyer is found at all.

Full analysis: [INSERT SUBSTACK LINK]

Josef Pschorn speaks with Alex Cordover, CEO of Tradable, about the exact mechanics of private credit secondaries — what happens between the decision to sell and settlement, and what a functioning secondary market requires.

• The full transfer anatomy: NDA, data room (loan tape, financials, original IC memo), non-binding IOI, consents, documentation, settlement
• Participation vs assignment: in a default, participation rights typically run against the seller, not the borrower
• Marks vs prices: every deal closed on Tradable has printed at par plus a buyer's premium, while valuation lag persists in software and direct-lending books
• Why trades die: information asymmetry and GPs unused to working together — not asset quality
• Where liquidity comes first: asset-backed, equipment and real estate finance before bespoke unitranche and distressed names

Guest links: https://tradable.xyz | https://www.linkedin.com/in/alex-cordover-72a0a276

Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating

Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

Recorded: 15.07.2026

#privatecredit #privatecreditsecondaries #creditmarkets #fixedincome #assetbackedfinance

MicroStrategy’s preferred shares dropped more than 20% over a few weeks. Then an 8-K reversed the mood, handingthe company buyback authority over both its preferred and common stock for the first time. The headlines focused on a small Bitcoin sale; the more important story was buried underneath it.

Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/stretch-is-not-cash-the-lesson-from?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Josef Pschorn speaks with Mark Palmer of Benchmark-StoneX, the first Wall Street analyst to cover Strategy, about how the company’s capital structure actually holds together and what genuinely changed.

Key takeaways:

• The 8-K gave Strategy “two-way capital management” for the first time — the ability to buy backpreferred and common stock, not just issue new securities to buy Bitcoin.
• Perpetual preferred stock behaves like near-permanent capital: no maturity wall, not dilutive while outstanding, and tax-advantaged as return of capital for as long as the company posts no positive net income.
• The recent Stretch selloff was driven by forced deleveraging among investors who had levered the position, not by any change in the Bitcoin backing the instrument.
• A common misconception — that a falling Stretch price increases Strategy’s cash dividend obligation — is simply wrong; the dollar obligation is fixed regardless ofprice.
• Strategy’s $6.75 billion convertible debt carries a blended coupon of just 0.52%, with the real risk being the 2028–2032 maturity wall rather thaninterest expense.

Guest links: https://www.benchmarkcompany.com/leaders/1601/

Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedInhttps://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | Xhttps://twitter.com/FixedFloating

Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

Recorded: 01.07.2026

Each AI company can price itself on an internally consistent story about winning its market. Sum those stories and the implied revenues exceed any market that could exist — the big market delusion. Aswath Damodaran puts a ceiling on it: $142 trillion in global revenues last year against $20–25 trillion in employee costs, which makes the $26 trillion addressable market in SpaceX’s IPO pitch fiction. The sharper question for credit investors is who absorbs the loss when it corrects.

Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/financing-the-big-market-delusion?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

Josef Pschorn speaks with Aswath Damodaran of NYU Stern about valuing the AI boom, the corporate life cycle, and why the credit side of the build-out carries the asymmetric risk.

Key takeaways:

• ​The biggest loser when the delusion corrects is private credit, not equity — lenders carry the downside without the upside, and “you can’t make interest payments withpotential and promise.”
• ​Financing should act its age: young companies should use converts or no debt; default risk belongs in the cash flows (value the firm twice, weight by survival probability), not in an inflated discount rate.
• ​In distress, equity is a call and debt is a put — a passive lender in a levered company is short an option whose variance the equity holder controls.

Connect with Aswath Damodaran: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ | X https://x.com/AswathDamodaran

Connect with Fixed + Floating: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | Xhttps://twitter.com/FixedFloating

Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

Recorded: 15.06.2026#fixedfloating #creditmarkets #privatecredit #valuation #Damodaran

A third of Europe’s auto suppliers now sit in the distressed zone, and the share has barely moved in two years. Thesector has stopped behaving like a set of single restructuring cases and started behaving like a structural problem — one where operational stabilization no longer fixes the credit story.

Full written analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/the-autosupplier-problem-that-refinancing?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Josef Pschorn speaks with Daniel Steiner of PwC and Dr. Hendrik Hauke of Willkie Farr & Gallagher about whyEuropean auto-supplier distress has become structural, and how the restructuring toolkit actually gets used when it does.

Key takeaways:

• 40% of automotive CEOs expect their company not to last ten years on the current path; 33% of Europeansuppliers are already distressed.
• The binding constraint is the cost ofcapital — German suppliers carry the highest interest-to-EBIT ratio of anyregion.
• Europe runs 25–30% overcapacity and China around 50%, making consolidation, not refinancing, the real cure.
• LEONI’s StaRUG delevered successfully the balance sheet

Guest links: PwC https://www.pwc.de | Willkie https://www.willkie.com

Fixed + Floating:

⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠⁠ | ⁠⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠⁠ | ⁠⁠https://fixedfloating.substack.com/⁠⁠

This podcast is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.

Recorded: 04 June 2026.

#fixedfloating #creditmarkets #autosuppliers #restructuring #distresseddebt

US high-yield building products are a leveraged play on the US housing cycle dressed up across ten different tickers — and the concurrent distress in Cornerstone, JELD-WEN, Old Castle, and USLBM is the proof.

Full written analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/one-housing-trade-ten-tickers-the?r=718tew&utm_medium=ios

Andy Belton, Senior Analyst and Head of European Basics & Infrastructure at CreditSights, joins Josef Pschorn to unpack the structural fault lines that separate heavyside (cement, aggregates, ready-mix) from lightside (windows, doors, cabinets, distribution) in credit terms — and why that distinction is now producing a wave of concurrent liability management exercises on both sides of the Atlantic.

Key takeaways:

• ​Cement prices compounded at 4–5% annually over 20 years versus 1–3% for lumber — structural pricing power, not cycle management
• ​A 5% volume decline translates into a 10–20% EBITDA decline for fixed-cost light side manufacturers at today's utilization rates
• ​JELD-WEN carries nine times leverage with December 2027 maturities going current in December 2026 — the unsecured bonds are already pricing the shock absorber role
• ​Pfleiderer's Silekol drop-down — 90% equity sold to unrestricted subs, new debt raised — is the European J.Crew playbook, now deployed post-restructuring
• ​When sponsors reach for LMEs instead of conventional refis, they are signalling they no longer believe the cycle turns fast enough to clean up the capital structure

Guest: Andy Belton is Senior Analyst and Head of European Basics & Infrastructure at CreditSights, where he has covered global building materials for over two decades. Prior to CreditSights, he spent ten years at Citigroup as Head of European Ratings Advisory and began his career at Fitch predecessor IBCA. — https://creditsights.com

Fixed + Floating:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠ | ⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠ | ⁠https://fixedfloating.substack.com/⁠

This podcast is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Recorded: 18 May 2026.

#fixedfloating #creditanalysis #creditmarkets #buildingmaterials #highyield #LME #JELDWEN #CreditSights #cement #housingmarket

Significant Risk Transfers have quietly grown into a $1T+ hedged market — now bigger than European CLOs — and they sit at the centre of how banks manage RWAs, capital, and CET1 ratios.

Full analysis: ⁠https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/significant-risk-transfer-has-quietly?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web⁠

Josef Pschorn speaks with Frank Benhamou, Partner & Portfolio Manager and Head of SRT at Cheyne Capital, about the mechanics, pricing, and cycle behaviour of SRTs — from a $1B reference portfolio walk-through to what actually happens when defaults hit and banks can't roll their hedges.

Key takeaways:

• A bank hedging the first 80M of a 1B corporate pool can claim ~75% capital relief once the regulator agrees significant risk has transferred.
• Annual SRT tranche issuance now sits around $30–35B against $350–400B of hedged portfolios, implying over $1T outstanding — larger than the European CLO market.
• SRTs are funded insurance in tranched format — not CDS, not CLOs — with assets remaining on the bank balance sheet and the investor stepping into a true-up / true-down loss mechanism.
• Returns sit at cash + 6–11%, with a triple-B-equivalent average pool rating that has been materially less volatile than CLO equity through recent stress.
• In a downturn, banks restructure the reference pool itself — excluding chemicals, metals, or whichever sectors are under stress — rather than only paying wider spreads.
• Despite the bull case, SRT does not drive loan origination at the deal level. It feeds into origination only at the macro level via freed-up capital.

Frank Benhamou: https://www.linkedin.com/in/frankbenhamou

Cheyne Capital: https://www.cheynecapital.com

Connect with Fixed + Floating:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | https://twitter.com/FixedFloating | https://fixedfloating.substack.com/

Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

Recorded: 01.05.2026

#CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #SignificantRiskTransfer #SRT #BankCapital #SyntheticSecuritisation #BaselIII #PrivateCredit #StructuredCredit

Covenant quality is weakening at a measurable rate, and software credits are where it is going to matter most.

Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/why-software-credits-are-lme-catnip?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Josef Pschorn speaks with Sabrina Fox of Fox Legal Training about the systematic erosion of lender protections in leveraged finance documentation and why software credits sit at the intersection of weak covenants and uniquely portable assets.

Key takeaways:

* LBO covenant quality deteriorated from 3.33 in 2023 to 3.53 in Q1 2026, compounding on a base that had been weakening since the early 2010s — 2024 saw a record 34 LME transactions

* Software IP can be transferred to unrestricted subsidiaries, valued at board discretion without independent appraisal, and licensed back the same day — making drop-downs a low-friction exercise that standard covenant packages were never designed to prevent

* Xerox circumvented its own J.Crew blocker by structuring a joint venture instead of a subsidiary, exploiting the definition of "subsidiary" as >50% voting power — a maneuver ION Platform lenders should be watching closely

* Two pending court cases on creditor co-ops could determine whether lenders retain their primary collective defence mechanism against LMEs in 2026

Sabrina Fox: sabrina@foxlegaltraining.com

Fox Legal Training: https://foxlegaltraining.com | LinkedIn: https://linkedin.com/in/sabrinafox

Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating

Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice.

Recorded: 17.04.2026

#CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #LiabilityManagement #SoftwareCredit #CovenantAnalysis #LeveragedFinance #DropDown #JCrewBlocker #IONPlatform #Xerox #DistressedDebt

A three-notch downgrade on a zero-default portfolio can more than double an insurer's capital requirement.

Read the full investment breakdown on Substack: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/when-annuities-meet-private-credit?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Catch our first deep dive with Jakub on the PE Insurance Flywheel (Episode 3): https://fixedfloating.substack.com/p/private-credits-insurance-flywheel

Josef Pschorn speaks with Jakub Lichwa of TwentyFour Asset Management about how PE-backed insurers use annuities to fund private credit exposure, why offshore reinsurance creates regulatory arbitrage, and where these capital structures begin to echo pre-2008 shadow banking patterns.

Key Takeaways:

• Rating downgrades hit capital requirements faster and harder than actual credit defaults

• Private placements offer an illiquidity premium that structurally matches annuity durations
• Asset-intensive reinsurance enables massive capital release through offshore affiliated structures
• State guaranty funds provide backstops today that were absent in the shadow banking era

Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/the-invisible-tech-moat?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠ | X ⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠

Check out Jakub's work at TwentyFour Asset Management

Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Host/guest views are their own. Consult professionals before investing.

#CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #PrivateCredit #Insurance #Annuities #RegulatoryArbitrage #Reinsurance #LifeInsurance #PEInsurance