『Bertrand's Wines Podcast』のカバーアート

Bertrand's Wines Podcast

Bertrand's Wines Podcast

著者: Bertrand
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Whether you’re a Burgundy devotee, a casual wine drinker or in the trade seeking deeper insight, this podcast will explore the geology, producers, and untold stories of the world’s most revered wine region.

Expect fresh perspectives, candid anecdotes, a few f-bombs, and materials to back each episode—designed to educate, entertain, and bring Burgundy closer to you.

We will also have some totally random episodes to talk about the news in the region, the wine industry and discuss with guests (producers, importers, sommeliers)...

Stay tuned!!!

2026 Bertrand
旅行記・解説 社会科学
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  • "The same disease, one tier up: RNDC and the American middle"
    2026/08/12

    The Same Disease, One Tier Up: RNDC and the American Middle (Part 2 of 2)

    DESCRIPTION

    In Part 1, Burgundy's problem came down to one line: the price of the wine became the price of the rent. This episode shows the same disease playing out one tier up and an ocean away.

    In July 2026, Republic National Distributing — once the second-largest alcohol distributor in the United States — filed for Chapter 11 and began winding down. Read the court filings and the cause is almost word-for-word the Burgundy story: boom-era buying commitments that only made sense while demand climbed, then an inventory overhang when the market reversed.

    To see why that matters to a grower in Vosne, you need to understand something drinkers never see: how a French bottle legally reaches an American table, and why the small, allocated producer has the least leverage at every gate. The tiers didn't fail each other — they failed together, because they drank from the same well.

    Part 2 of 2. Watch Part 1 first for the full picture.

    CHAPTERS

    0:00 Recap: the price of the wine became the price of the rent

    0:25 RNDC files Chapter 11

    1:00 The mechanism that should sound familiar

    1:45 How a French bottle reaches America: the three tiers

    2:45 Why the small producer gets hit first

    3:30 The tiers don't fail each other — they fail together

    4:20 Owned it, or rented it? The through-line

    KEY TAKEAWAYS

    • RNDC, once the #2 US alcohol distributor, filed Chapter 11 in July 2026 from the same trap as the micro-négociant: boom-era commitments meeting a demand reversal, leaving unsellable inventory and debt.
    • US law forces every bottle through three separate businesses — supplier, licensed wholesaler, retailer — and forbids producers from selling direct.
    • When a wholesaler that size fails, small allocated producers get orphaned, wait on receivables that may never come, and struggle to be picked up by volume-focused survivors.
    • The route to the American buyer narrows and gets more expensive exactly when a squeezed producer needs it most.
    • Booms hide who's solvent; the reversal reveals who owned their position and who was only renting it.

    PULL QUOTES (for clips, captions, promo)

    • "In a boom, everybody looks solvent. It's only when it reverses that you find out who owned their position — and who was just renting it."
    • "That is the micro-négociant's story — one tier up, and one continent over."
    • "In Burgundy: own your rows. In distribution: own your balance sheet. Same rule."

    SOURCES & REFERENCES (add links before publishing)

    • RNDC Chapter 11 filing, July 2026; market exits (California, 2025) and the Reyes acquisition of 11 markets — trade-press coverage. [add link]
    • US three-tier system (supplier / wholesaler / retailer), post-Prohibition framework. [add link]
    • French wine-sector insolvencies: 236 procédures collectives in 2025, up nearly 200% since 2019 (CNAJMJ). [add link]
    • Fine-wine correction: Liv-ex Burgundy 150, roughly a third off its September 2022 peak.
    続きを読む 一部表示
    6 分
  • "In Burgundy, the rent is priced in wine"
    2026/08/05

    PRESENTATION ═══════════════════════════════════════════

    TITLE (primary) In Burgundy, the Rent Is Priced in Wine (Part 1 of 2)

    TITLE (A/B alternates)

    • Burgundy Isn't Crashing. It's Repossessing. (Part 1 of 2)
    • The Boom Is Eating Burgundy's Middle (Part 1 of 2)

    HOOK LINE (first line of the description — keep under ~120 characters) Everyone's telling the Burgundy story backwards. Here's the mechanism nobody's naming.

    DESCRIPTION (publish-ready, ~160 words) The market says Burgundy is recovering — and at the very top, it is. But one street back from the grand crus, micro-négociants are filing for redressement judiciaire, leases are being pulled, and famous parcels are quietly changing hands. Most people are calling it the start of a crash. It isn't. It's a twenty-year boom collecting its bill.

    This episode explains the piece of machinery almost nobody talks about: in Burgundy, the rent on the vines isn't really priced in euros — it's priced in wine. Once you see that, you understand why the people who don't own their rows are the first to fall, why three short harvests turned the screw, and why the estate sales aren't the panic they look like.

    Part 1 of 2. Part 2 follows the same disease one tier up — to the collapse of a major US distributor. Subscribe so you don't miss it.

    CHAPTERS 0:00 The story everyone's telling backwards 0:35 Who the boom actually rewarded 1:10 The rent is priced in wine (fermage & métayage) 2:15 Three short harvests turn the screw 3:00 Why the micro-négociant fails first 3:40 The estate sales aren't panic 4:15 Watch the leases, not the filings 4:45 What's coming in Part 2

    KEY TAKEAWAYS

    • "Burgundy did well for twenty years" was only ever true for landowners; those farming rented rows faced a rising cost base.
    • Viticultural rent is pegged to the wine: fermage is a wine-quantity-per-hectare barème converted to euros each year at the appellation price; métayage is a share of the crop, capped at a third.
    • Three short vintages in five years plus a fine-wine correction (roughly a third off the 2022 peak) hit the leveraged, land-poor micro-négociant first.
    • Famous estates changing hands is driven more by succession tax and lease-renewal economics than by distress.
    • The real leading indicator isn't insolvency filings — it's who's converting or reclaiming leases.

    PULL QUOTES (for clips, captions, promo)

    • "This is not Burgundy collapsing. It's the boom repossessing the people who don't own their rows."
    • "Burgundy doesn't price the rent on its vines in euros. It prices it in wine."
    • "Don't watch the bankruptcy filings. Those are a lagging signal. Watch the leases."

    THUMBNAIL / COVER CONCEPT A single grand cru row at golden hour, with a stark caption overlay: "THE RENT IS PRICED IN WINE." No stock-photo wine glasses.

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    7 分
  • What is a Monopole? the case of Volnay
    2026/07/29

    What Is a Monopole? The Case of Volnay

    Duration: 24 min

    Behind a handful of centuries-old stone walls in the small Burgundy village of Volnay sits something almost no other appellation on earth can claim: eleven vineyards owned outright, top to bottom, by a single producer each. In Burgundy — where most vineyards are famously carved up among dozens of growers — that's about as rare as it gets.

    In this episode, we break down exactly what a monopole is and why it matters, then walk clos by clos through all eleven of Volnay's — from Domaine de la Pousse d'Or's trio of Bousse d'Or, 60 Ouvrées and Audignac, to the Marquis d'Angerville's iconic Clos des Ducs, to the unwalled outlier, Les Grands Champs, that proves a monopole is defined by ownership, not masonry. Along the way: which noble family built the original château these clos are named after, why one of them is leased out to négociant house Louis Jadot rather than farmed by its own owner, and what it actually means for a buyer, collector, or sommelier to put money down on a wine with nowhere else to hide.

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    24 分
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